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The United States pharmaceutical industry is a dynamic organizational system 
populated by organizations pursuing different strategies to reach different goals. The aim 
of this dissertation is to examine the organizational field of the pharmaceutical industry to 
determine if categories of pharmaceutical organizations exist based on organizational 
strategy. This project applies the theoretical constructs of organizational fields and 
institutional logics developed by institutional theorists to examine the institutional effects 
on organizational strategies. This is a mixed methods project using historical analysis, 
latent class analysis, and case studies to evaluate the drug development process. The 
findings of this study show field level institutions do affect organizational strategy and 
contribute to organizational diversity within a field. However, the findings suggest the 
influence of institutional logics is neither straightforward nor without organizational 
costs. The general findings of my research show organizations benefit when their 
dominant logic aligns with the dominant logic of the field; while, misaligned logics 
require organizations to pursue alternative tactics to legitimize their strategies. 
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 Several highly publicized events have raised public concern over organizational 
practices within the United States pharmaceutical industry during the past few years. One 
of the most recent incidents was the accusation of price gouging by executives at Turning 
Pharmaceuticals last fall (Ramsey 2015); however, the practice of acquiring the patent 
rights on a drug and then raising the drug’s price to generate profits is not uncommon. In 
2011, Gilead spent $11 billion to acquire Pharmasset Inc., a small biotech company 
started by researchers at Emory, for the intellectual property rights to the hepatitis C drug 
it was currently testing (Tirrell 2011). Gilead currently prices Sovaldi, the brand name of 
the approved hepatitis C drug, at approximately $84,000 for a 12-week treatment course 
(Express Scripts 2015). Gilead publically argued the high cost of the drug was due to the 
high cost of research and development; however, the available information on Pharmasset 
Inc. indicates the research cost for developing Sovaldi up to phase II clinical trials was 
only between $300 and $500 million (Sachs 2015).  
 The Sovaldi case reveals two reasons behind the high cost for prescription drugs 
in the United States (1) market factors of speculation and (2) pharmaceutical corporations 
acting strategically in pursuing organizational goals. As a small research company, 
Pharmasset Inc. lacked the organizational capacities of a large multinational corporation, 
such as Gilead, to manufacture and mass market a product. Pharmasset approached 
Gilead in 2004 with a buyout offer after the compound for Sovaldi had been developed 
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but prior to the completion of clinical testing. However, rather than make an offer 
significantly lower than the eventual purchase price, Pharmasset’s founder and largest 
stock holder quoted $400 million as an acceptable offer at the time, Gilead waited until 
clinical trial data showed Sovaldi was a marketable product before making the acquisition 
bid (Berkort 2011).  
 This example indicates the United States pharmaceutical industry is a dynamic 
organizational system populated by organizations pursuing different strategies to reach 
different goals. The aim of this dissertation is to examine the organizational field of the 
pharmaceutical industry to determine if categories of pharmaceutical organizations exist 
based on institutionalized organizational strategy. This project applies theoretical 
constructs developed by institutional theorists to examine how expectations from 
different stakeholders create organizational fields of institutional pluralism legitimating 
multiple organizational strategies.  
 Institutional theory research in organizational studies seeks to understand 
organizational behaviors within the broader cultural context of a society. Key areas of 
work within the theory are the institutional logics perspective and organizational fields. 
The institutional logics perspective argues organizations align with societal logic orders, 
whereby it is possible to identify which logic order dominates an organization’s strategy. 
The organizational field is an analytical tool for evaluating how actors outside an 
organization influence organizational behavior. Organizational field researchers examine 
power relations to identify key stakeholders and the methods employed externally that 
influence organizational strategy. 
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 Drawing from an historical analysis and prior organizational research, I argue that 
the organizational field of the pharmaceutical industry in the United States is composed 
of several key stakeholders: pharmaceutical corporations, the federal government, third 
party payers, professional medicine, and patients. These stakeholders coexist in an 
interdependent system with varying levels of power that allow certain stakeholders 
influence over other stakeholders and the ability to shape field structure. Drawing from 
the institutional logics perspective, I propose that these stakeholders adhere to different 
logic orders, which results in an organizational field of institutional pluralism that 
legitimates multiple organizational strategies.  
 I use a mixed methods approach to evaluate my propositions by conducting three 
distinct research projects. First, following the recent work of Neil Fligstein and Doug 
McAdam (2012) that sought to develop a cohesive field theory approach for institutional 
analysis, I conduct a historical analysis of the United States pharmaceutical industry. The 
purpose of the historical analysis is to show that the pharmaceutical industry is a distinct 
organizational field and to examine the changing field dynamics to identify the logic 
orders and key stakeholders in the current field. The second project is a quantitative 
analysis using a dataset of information on approved new drug applications by the Food 
and Drug Administration and annual corporate financial data from a sample of 
pharmaceutical corporations between 1997 and 2014. The purpose of the quantitative 
analysis is to examine the sample of pharmaceutical corporations for latent classes and 
determine if the identified factors of organizational strategy act as mechanisms creating 
organizational heterogeneity within the field. The final research project is four case 
studies drawn from the classes identified through the latent class analysis. The main 
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purpose of the case studies is to evaluate if differences in organizational strategy can 
explain class separation. The second purpose of the case studies is to compare the 
identified organizational strategies with the framework of institutional logics to evaluate 
if logic orders differ between classes.  
 This dissertation is organized around these three research projects. Chapter 2 
presents an overview of institutional theory in organizational studies. I review the 
literature on the specific components of the theory that are relevant to my work and list 
the guiding questions of the project as well as the more detailed theoretical propositions 
that I evaluated. Chapter 3 examines the major contemporary stakeholder relationships in 
the pharmaceutical industry. Since this project was focused on pharmaceutical 
organizations, I restricted my analysis to the direct relationships between pharmaceutical 
organizations and the other main stakeholders in the field: the Food and Drug 
Administration, professional medicine, patients, and the pharmaceutical supply chain. 
Chapter 4 is the historical analysis. In this chapter, I present evidence showing the 
pharmaceutical field developed as the result of distinct historical events and collective 
action by the key stakeholders mentioned above. The changing field dynamics over the 
past century indicate the field structure was continually reshaped by external factors and 
altering power relationships in way that allowed multiple organizational strategies to 
emerge.  
 Chapter 5 is the quantitative analysis of the drug submission and corporate 
financial data. I use factor analysis to evaluate the data for latent constructs that can be 
identified as organizational strategies. I use the identified strategies to build a structural 
equation model that represents a coherent latent strategic framework within the field. The 
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final model provides the variables used to conduct a latent class analysis that reveals two 
organizational categories.  
 Chapter 6 is four cases studies, two from each latent class. Analysis of the case 
studies provides contextual data on the specific organizational strategies of organizations 
in each class. The qualitative data indicates the dominant institutional order of 
organizations differs between classes, but that this difference is not the sole factor driving 
class separation. The final chapter is a comprehensive evaluation of the historical, 
quantitative, and qualitative data. My central conclusion is that institutional effects do 
result in divisions within the field based on latent organizational strategy; however, it is 
the processes of legitimation, rather than logic orders, which drive organizational 
subgrouping in the field. 
 This project provides several contributions to the organizational studies literature. 
One contribution is a novel approach to mixed-methods analysis that addresses the 
challenge institutional theorists face in measuring institutional effects (Greenwood et 
al.2014, Schneiberg and Clemens 2006, Scott 2014, Thornton et al. 2012). Bazeley’s 
(2015) review of mixed methods research published in the top organization and 
management journals revealed that most previous work utilizes a priori qualitative 
analyses to inform the direction of quantitative research. This introduces the potential of 
selection bias if the observed differences are not causal to the category separation. For 
this project, I sought to reverse the common practice by using a quantitative analysis to 
direct the qualitative analysis. Rather than relying on a priori indicators of institutional 
orders, I sought to evaluate if a latent class analysis would indicate existing subgroups 
within the field using common organizational practices as indicators. This methodology 
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aligns with the conceptual approaches proposed by researchers in the strategy-as-practice 
literature (Vaara and Whittington 2012). 
 Another contribution to the literature is that this study addresses the issue recently 
raised by Greenwood et al. (2014) that current organizational research focuses primarily 
on the construction and maintenance of institutions rather than how institutions actually 
effect organizations. Recent scholarship in the field of family business has illustrated how 
the intersection of family and market institutions directly effects organizational strategy 
in family firms, creating strategies that differ from publically traded companies (Cannella 
et al. 2015, Gomez-Mejia et al 2011). While these studies in family business cut across 
industry categories, my project adds to the literature by exploring the effects of 
institutional pluralism on organizations within the same industry. 
 The findings of this study show institutions do affect organizational strategy and 
contribute to organizational diversity within a field. The data indicate common 
organizational practices do form coherent and divergent organizational strategies within a 
field. However, the findings also suggest the influence of institutional logics is neither 
straightforward nor without organizational costs. The general findings of my research 
show organizations benefit when their dominant logic aligns with the dominant logic of 





INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL STUDIES 
2.1 Introduction 
Sociologists argue that institutions are pivotal social phenomena that have 
multidimensional effects on society; but institutions are latent constructs, which 
complicates research seeking to understand their affects (Berger and Luckmann 1967, 
Parsons 1980, Scott 2014, Weber 1978). Institutional theory is a branch of organizational 
studies that focuses on analyzing institutional effects on organizations. The broad goal of 
institutional theory is to understand how institutional effects produce similarities or 
facilitate differences between organizations in the same environment. Through the 
application of institutional theory as a framework for analysis, previous researchers have 
gained valuable insights on organizational processes and structures (DiMaggio 1991, Rao 
et al. 2003, Scott et al 2000). Moreover, recent developments and studies using 
institutional theory indicate the theory continues to hold value for future work 
(Greenwood et al. 2014, Powell and Sandholtz 2012, Quirke 2013).  
 The goal of this project is to explore if institutions influence the strategy of 
pharmaceutical corporations. Institutional frameworks become incorporated into 
organizational fields through stakeholder evaluations and expectations, and differences in 
stakeholder power can lead to contradictions within a field as organization’s struggle to 
develop a consistent strategy to meet competing demands (DiMaggio 1991, Scott et al 
2000). The pharmaceutical industry in the United States is an organizational field with
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competing institutional frameworks where multiple stakeholders hold different interests 
in the outcomes of pharmaceutical research and on the behaviors of pharmaceutical 
corporations.  
Organizational strategy is one element of organizational behavior theoretically 
subject to institutional effects. I choose to focus on organizational strategy because unlike 
other aspects of organizational behavior, such as informal organizational culture, strategy 
is constrained by the basic functions of an organization. The basic practice of a research 
based pharmaceutical corporation is to develop marketable drugs that are advancements 
over current treatments to improve patient lives. Since research based pharmaceutical 
organizations operating in a capitalist market need to meet this expectation for survival, 
identifying strategies used to achieve this goal provides a good source of material for 
examining institutional effects. My central question is that if different institutional logics 
exist within the organizational field and provide legitimacy to a range of strategies, then 
will pharmaceutical corporations adopt different strategies of drug development or is 
there a dominate institutional framework creating isomorphic pressure to adopt strategy. 
As an exploratory project, I constructed two guiding questions drawn from the literature 
to serve as the general frameworks of the analysis.  
Question 1: Do multiple institutional logics exists in the pharmaceutical 
organizational field and serve as potential sources of legitimacy for different 
organizational strategies?   
Question 2: Is pharmaceutical development an interorganizational1 negotiation 
between field stakeholders whereby strategic action by pharmaceutical 
                                                          
1 The term interorganizational denotes organizational processes that require organizations to cooperate, 
collaborate, or interact directly to achieve a desired outcome at either the firm or organizational field level. 
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corporations is necessary to address the claims of the other stakeholders in the 
field: regulators, physicians, patients, and investors in order for a new product to 
be successfully legitimized and adopted? 
These questions frame my central arguments as an institutional analysis project and 
position pharmaceutical corporations as the site of evaluation within the organizational 
field. From these general questions, I develop two sets of specific theoretical 
propositions, presented later in the chapter, to evaluate the quantitative and qualitative 
data collected.  
The counter argument to institutional theory is that organizational strategy results 
from the aggregate of individual choices; therefore, similarities between organizations are 
the result of market constraints or opportunities specific to industry and organizational 
types but not attributable to latent conceptual frameworks. The organizational 
environment affects strategy through options for action presented to managers following 
rational decision-making processes not influenced by ideological trends or culture (March 
1988). Organizational success or failure, then, depends on the ability and skills of 
organization members over normative evaluations by outside stakeholders. This 
framework for organizational studies treats organizational strategy as calculated and 
impersonal but this stance is problematic because organizations are composed of 
individuals who bring differing perceptions and connections with the social world into 
the organization (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Selznick 1949). Even within the same 
                                                          
For example, the interaction between the FDA and a pharmaceutical corporation seeking approval for a 




company, the rational decision of one manager might not be viewed as rational by 
another manager.  
The embeddedness of individuals within culture implies that broader social 
ideologies become incorporated into organizations; therefore, the perspective of 
organizational strategy as constructed by aggregating individual choices is rather sterile. 
Institutional theory offers a framework for explaining organizational strategy that 
recognizes the complexity of interactions between individuals, organizations, and society 
and provides the tools for analyzing how similarities between organizational strategies 
can result from societal level forces outside of the individual’s direct perception. This 
chapter provides a brief history on institutional analysis in organizational studies and 
discusses the contemporary theoretical concepts from institutional theory applied to 
explore organizational strategy in the U.S. pharmaceutical field.  
2.2 Early Perspectives in Institutional Analysis and Organizational Studies 
 Institutional analysis is fundamental to the discipline of sociology and a topic 
discussed by many classical theorists. Emile Durkheim reified institutions as social facts 
reflecting collective understanding and affecting individual behavior. In the preface to the 
second edition of The Rules of Sociological Method, he advocated institutional analysis 
as central within the discipline writing, “sociology can then be defined as the science of 
institutions, their genesis and their functioning” (1981: 45). Max Weber contributed the 
process of rationalization and ideal types to institutional analysis while additionally 
recognizing the interdependent quality of their relationship with society (1978). Weber’s 
detailed analysis of bureaucratic structure and authority systems was foundational to 
multiple branches of organizational studies (Perrow 1986). The work of Karl Marx 
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demonstrated a multilevel institutional analysis between capitalist economies, 
organizations, and workers (Adler 2009). Finally, Scott (2014) noted Herbert Spencer’s 
application of an organic framework to social systems, highlighting the concept of 
interdependence between systems components, as seminal to understanding modern 
sociological work on institutions. 
 Later scholars in the 20th century appropriated these classical insights on 
institutions within their research agendas and began focusing on the institutional analysis 
of organizational behavior. Talcott Parsons (1980) integrated the concepts of Weber and 
Durkheim to develop his functional perspective that highlighted institutionalization as a 
key force creating and maintaining social order and solidarity. His AGIL model, based on 
functionality within a system, proposes organizational behavior develops from a link 
between functional requirements and structural arrangements. Berger and Luckmann 
(1967) incorporated institutionalization into their broad perspective on the social 
construction of reality, arguing that institutions act as elements of social control by 
shaping individual perception and knowledge through channeling conduct in 
predetermined directions. Organizational strategy then is viewed a product of pre-existing 
cultural expectations. Parsons’ and Berger and Luckmann’s conceptualizations on 
institutionalization framed institutions as macro-level elements for analyzing the 
construction of social structure and how organizations are integrated into societies.  
 Other modern theorists incorporated the institutional perspectives of classical 
scholars into their frameworks for understanding organizations as units of analysis. Philip 
Selznick was one of the most important figures in the early school of institutional 
analysis (Scott 2014). Selznick’s (1949) classic study on the Tennessee Valley Authority 
 
12 
proposes organizations can become institutionalized through a “process of organic 
growth, wherein the organization adapts to the strivings of internal groups and the values 
of the external society” (Perrow 1986: 167). Selznick’s work, and that of his students, 
demonstrated that while organizations hold formal and official goals, interactions with 
interests internal and external to the organization result in organizations being guided by 
objectives other than those officially promoted (Scott 2014). Organizational strategy then, 
instead of being merely a means to an end can become the end in itself when 
organizational behavior becomes oriented to self-sustainment.  
The work of James March and Herbert Simon (1958) represents another important 
branch of organizational studies. March and Simon focused on the decision-making 
process within organizations and, following Weberian thought, attempted to incorporate 
rationalization into their explanations of organizational strategy (Perrow 1986). Their 
work focused on how organizational structure simplified decision-making for individuals 
by restricting the number of appropriate choices. The “garbage can” model is their well-
known concept of organizational strategy and argues solutions are generated every day 
and stockpiled, thrown in the garbage can. When managers encounter problems, rather 
than delegating employees to find a solution, they pull a pre-existing solution out from 
the garbage can. The “garbage can” model represents the most significant contribution of 
March and Simon’s work, the application of bounded rationality to organizational 
strategy, that lead to richer analytical techniques for empirically analyzing the allocation 
of attention in organizations (March 1988, Scott 2014).  
Another pivotal contribution of Selznick, March and Simon, and their 
contemporaries was expanding the field of organizational research by reframing 
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organizations as open systems as opposed to previous scholars who analyzed 
organizations as closed entities. This development allowed researchers to incorporate 
non-organizational factors from the external social environment into explanations of 
organizational behavior. An example of later work drawing on these developments is 
Paul Hirsh’s (1975) comparative study between the phonograph record industry and 
pharmaceutical manufacturing, which demonstrated the ability of organizations to control 
aspects of their external environments that affect profitability. Importantly, Hirsh (1975) 
showed how these external factors could be products of social construction, such as the 
social prestige of the industry, in addition to technical or material factors. His findings 
indicated organizations within each industry developed similar strategies while the 
strategies were different between industries.  
Some critics of these early open system researchers, however, pointed out their 
work was still focused on explaining organizational strategy from the point of individual 
organizations instead of considering organizational strategy as a product of collective 
behavior. For example, Selznick’s research on the TVA was viewed as typical of the 
exposé style research conducted by early institutionalists (Scott & Davis 2016). Perrow 
(1986), for instance, criticized the early institutional school for this, stating the “school’s 
view of organizations and society fails to connect the two” (173). This line of criticism 
paved the way for the development of three notable theoretical frameworks in the 1970s: 
resource dependency, population ecology, and institutional theory, which sought to 
address the complex interdependent relationship between organizations and their 




2.3 Neoinstitutional and Institutional Theory in Sociology 
Contemporary institutional theory is a field of organizational studies that frames 
organizations as open systems embedded within the larger social structure of a society. 
The value institutional theory adds to organizational studies is the understanding that 
cultural factors, such as differences in power relations between stakeholders, impact 
organizational strategy on multiple levels by affecting individual perceptions of 
legitimate organizational activities and goals, the role of organizations within society, and 
the social structure supporting or constraining organizations (DiMaggio 1991, Fligstein 
1991). Institutional theorists seek to understand how institutions and institutional 
processes in the organizational environment collectively affect organizations instead of 
focusing on explaining behaviors as firm specific behaviors (Scott 2014).  
2.3.1 Early Works and Theoretical Cohesion 
The origins of contemporary institutional theory lie in four studies conducted 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s. While these four articles overlap conceptually, 
they were not written intentionally as a cohesive collection for an emerging theoretical 
paradigm. They are now considered the foundational works of the “new institutionalism 
in organizational analysis” not only because of their direct influence on subsequent work 
but because DiMaggio and Powell (1991) grouped them together as the first section of 
their edited volume intended to delineate neoinstitutionalism as a distinct research 
paradigm. As DiMaggio and Powell pointed out in the introduction to their anthology, 
one of the needs for the book was to distinguish and consolidate sociological 
institutionalism from the institutional work of scholars in other disciplines. To facilitate 
this goal, they categorized work beginning with Meyer and Rowan’s 1977 article 
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“Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony” as new 
institutionalism, or neoinstitutionalism, while older work was labeled old institutionalism.  
However not every scholar accepts that there is a theoretical distinction between 
old and new institutionalism. Philip Selznick (1996), who DiMaggio and Powell labeled 
as a prominent old institutionalist, notably objected to this categorization scheme and 
instead argued the work of current institutionalists represented the expansion and 
development of sociological institutionalism in general not the emergence of a distinct 
research paradigm. While there continues to be scholarly debate between the demarcation 
of the terms new institutionalism and neoinstitutionalism, the work of sociologists in 
institutional theory since these early papers has become theoretically cohesive and 
recognizable as a distinct research field within organizational studies in general 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991, Hall and Taylor 1996, Tolbert and Zucker 1996, Scott 
2014). I agree with Selznick’s point that the term neoinstitutionalism is a semantic 
distinction rather than the demarcation of a novel theoretical field, so I use the general 
term institutional theory throughout this project to represent the collective work within 
this branch of organizational sociology. 
The first pivotal article of institutional theory is the classic paper by John Meyer 
and Brian Rowan (1977) who departed from existing organizational research paradigms 
by emphasizing how organizations were guided by both informal (symbolic) and formal 
(rational) properties. Meyer and Rowan’s research revealed that the importance 
organizations place on symbolic value could extend to an organization adopting an 
institutionalized practice even if it decreased operational efficiency. At the same time, 
organizations can engage in the processes of decoupling, which is the public adoption of 
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a practice without implementing it. Decoupling provides organizations with a crucial 
advantage because it “enables organizations to maintain standardized, legitimating, 
formal structures while their activities vary in response to practical considerations” 
Meyer and Rowan (1977: 357).  Meyer and Rowan framed institutionalism as a social 
mechanism external to the organization and functioning as a rational myth that generated 
isomorphism, organizational uniformity, within the organizational environment.  
“Institutionalization involves the processes by which social processes, obligations, or 
actualities come to take on rulelike statues in social thought and action” (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977: 341). In other words, organizations will adopt practices because of 
normative pressures to avoid the social label of a deviant or non-adopter.  
Tolbert and Zucker (1996: 178) derived three major effects Meyer and Rowan’s 
article had on research at the time connecting organizational behavior to institutions: 
organizations are driven to adopt formal structures regardless of their efficacy to increase 
legitimacy and survival, the social evaluation of an organization is partially an evaluation 
on the appropriateness of the organizations formal structure, and the relationships 
between daily activities and formal structure may be negligible or “loosely coupled.” 
Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) work represented a key departure from other organizational 
studies by focusing on the impact of symbolic structures in organizational behavior and 
moving organizational studies beyond analyzing organizations individually to analyzing 
organizations as embedded in relational networks.   
The second important article on institutionalization is by Lynne Zucker (1977), 
who was a student of Meyer’s (Scott 2014). Zucker (1977) drew on the then recent 
developments in ethnomethodology to develop a micro-level understanding of 
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institutionalization as a process that she tested in a laboratory experiment. Zucker (1977) 
argued institutionalization was a process of objectification involving three aspects of 
cultural persistence: transmission, maintenance, and resistance to change. The importance 
of Zucker’s (1997) work was in operationalizing institutionalization as a measurable 
property and reframing institutions as a variable of degrees, rather than a binary event. 
Assessing institutional effects through a continuum allows researchers to study how 
institutions produce differences between organizational strategy rather than treating 
institutional effects as uniformly homogenizing. In her later work, Zucker developed an 
expanded model of the institutionalization process that included innovation, 
habitualization, and sedimentation as additional components to objectification (Tolbert 
and Zucker 1996). 
One of the most well cited and influential articles of institutional theory (and the 
only work of institutional theory I’ve seen covered in an introductory sociology textbook) 
is Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell’s (1983) article on institutional isomorphism. 
DiMaggio and Powell elaborated on the macro level nature of institutional effects on 
organizational strategy by arguing institutions act as isomorphic factors on firms. They 
defined three mechanism of institutional isomorphism: coercive, mimic, and normative. 
Coercive isomorphism occurs through external acts of regulation. Mimic isomorphism is 
the result of uncertainty resulting in organizations adopting the practices of successful 
organizations to deal with ambiguity. Finally, normative isomorphism is the result of 
cultural affects, primarily stemming from professionalization. Together these pressures 
operate to create organizational homogeneity. 
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In their seminal work on institutional isomorphism, DiMaggio and Powell also 
proposed the concept of organizational fields as a framework for the institutional analysis 
of organizations. Organizational fields are defined as “those organizations that, in 
aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and 
product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar 
services or products” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983:148). The utility of the organizational 
field framework for organizational studies is that framing organizational analysis around 
an issue or process, as opposed to organizational types, reveals a wider range of 
environmental factors and actors affecting organizational decisions; furthermore, the 
organizational field framework underscores the need to consider historical context when 
evaluating organizational behavior. As Scott (2014: 51) nicely summarized, 
“Organizational fields help to bound the environments within which institutional 
processes operate.”  
 The fourth foundational article is Richard Scott and John Meyer’s (1983) work 
“The Organization of Societal Sectors.” In this article, Scott and Meyer proposed a 
framework for the institutional analysis of organizations that was similar to DiMaggio 
and Powell’s (1983) organizational field. Scott and Meyer created a typology perspective 
arguing both technical and institutional forces shaped organizations and then proposed 
the concept of societal sectors to understand this dynamic system. Societal sectors were 
“defined to include all organizations within a society supplying a given type of product or 
service together with their associate organizational sets: suppliers, financiers, regulators, 
and so forth” (Scott and Meyer 1983: 129). Like the organizational field framework, the 
 
19 
boundaries of societal sectors were functional, signifying that organizations operated in 
interdependent systems not limited by geographic proximity (Scott and Meyer 1983).  
2.3.2 Further Cohesion and Contemporary Directions 
Several scholars since Powell and DiMaggio’s (1991) first attempt at 
consolidation have developed other metatheoretical frameworks for institutional theory. 
Richard Scott’s three pillars is one well-known model utilized by researchers to study 
institutional effects on organizational strategy. Scott (1995, 2001, 2014) originally 
proposed the three pillars almost 20 years ago as a method to integrate the major concepts 
in institutional theory and since then has adapted and modified the framework to 
incorporate developing research and criticisms. The basic argument of Scott’s framework 
is that all institutions use the same set of processes to construct social structure and three 
pillars categorize these processes: regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive. These 
pillars are similar to the three isomorphic mechanisms identified by DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) but the pillars framework defines each pillar through multiple dimensions 
as an analytical approach for evaluating the distinct processes that lead to the 
construction of organizational strategy and the effects of institutional intersections on 
organizations.  
 The regulatory pillar gives prominence to the explicit regulatory processes of an 
institution (Scott 2014). Organizational research applying the regulatory pillar focuses on 
the rules, laws, and sanctions institutions impose and frames the logic of such institutions 
as instrumental, or technical. Differences in power are important factors to measure 
because coercion is the dominant mechanism of regulatory institutions. The normative 
pillar focuses on how institutions construct rules and procedures as a relationship to 
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social obligations (Scott 2014). The normative framework evaluates organizational 
strategy as the result of appropriateness and organizational legitimacy is tied to moral 
assessments made by actors within the institutional system. The cultural-cognitive pillar 
stresses how institutions create meanings through shared conceptions of social reality 
(Scott 2014). Orthodoxy is the cultural-cognitive mechanisms used to generate 
compliance suggesting organizational strategy is the result of normative pressures 
because deviant actions are simply inconceivable by decision-making actors within 
organizations.   
While distinctive features define the three pillars, Scott argued that “in most 
empirically observed institutional forms, we observe not one, single element at work but 
varying combinations of elements” (2014: 70). The three pillars framework views 
specific institutions as composed of elements from all the pillars but Scott pointed out 
current institutional analysis research tends to focus on explaining institutions through 
only one pillar, which one varies by discipline and researcher interest. This is a 
significant component of the framework because the misalignment of these pillars within 
an organizational field can generate contradictions and conflicts leading to institutional 
change (Scott 2014). The three pillars framework is a valuable analytical tool for 
institutional analysis and studying institutional effects on organizations but it is not as 
efficient for studying organizations subject to competing institutional claims, referred to 
as situations of institutional pluralism. The institutional logics perspective is a 
metatheoretical framework that better addresses the development of organizational 
strategy under institutional pluralism.  
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The origin of the institutional logics perspective is the article written by Roger 
Friedland and Robert Alford (1991) for Powell and DiMaggio’s (1991) anthology 
(Thornton et al. 2012). The article was a theoretical departure from the other works in the 
book and proposed a logic of institutions framework that, while not immediately taken up 
by other scholars, has become an important and distinct perspective within institutional 
theory over the past decade (Thornton et al. 2012). Friedland and Alford (1991:248) 
defined an institutional logic as “a set of material practices and symbolic constructions 
which constitutes its organizing principles and which is available to organizations and 
individuals to elaborate.” This conceptualization of institutions departed from the 
contemporary perspectives by arguing that institutions were limited to a core societal 
level set and that institutions encompassed material practices as well as symbolic 
systems.  
The most important aspect of the institutional logic perspective is the 
conceptualization of society as an interinstitutional system, meaning that the institutions 
within any given society are interdependent with one another and change subject to 
historically contingent affects (Thornton and Ocasio 2008, Thornton et al. 2012). 
Conceptualizing society as an interinstitutional system shifts the focus of analysis from 
institutions as having homogenous effects on organizational strategy to analyzing 
differences in organizational strategy as emerging from contradictions between 
institutional orders (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). Instead of being subject to the effects of 
a singular institutional order, organizations are reframed as affected by multiple 
institutional orders, placing them in positions of institutional pluralism; however, 
organizations are argued to align more strongly with one logic order over the others, 
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resulting in the ability to categorize individual organizations by a dominant logic. 
Differences between institutional orders result in conflicts at the organizational level and 
produce heterogeneity within an organizational field because the salience of each logic 
order varies between organizations and because organizations possess partial autonomy 
that allows for organization in the same field to pursue dominant organizational strategies 
aligned to different logics.  
The concept of partial autonomy addresses how organizations negotiate 
institutional contradictions. As Thornton et al. (2012) stated individuals and organizations 
assume multiple roles and identities in society that can lead to contradictions between 
identity and behavior. The concept of partial autonomy originates in the earlier work of 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) on decoupling and proposes that while institutions constrain 
actors, this constraint operates as a mechanism of degree providing actors with the ability 
to loosely couple, or decouple, their identity from their behavior to negotiate 
contradictions. Congruently partial autonomy also allows for organizational 
heterogeneity because actors subject to the same competing institutional pressures have 
the ability to respond differently. The institutional logics perspective is a valuable 
expansion of institutional theory for conducting an organizational analysis in a complex 
system because it departs from the earlier emphasis on the uniform effects of institutions 
while still incorporating the significance of culture in affecting organizational strategy.  
In summary, institutional theory has become a dominant paradigm in 
organizational sociology (Scott 2014, Scott and Davis 2016, Thornton et al. 2012). Core 
components include the recognition that symbolic and cultural mechanisms impact 
organizations in multiple ways, that organizations are not isolated entities but embedded 
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in complex interdependent systems, and that the effects of institutions operate on multiple 
social levels with differing strengths between organizations in the same environment. The 
remainder of this chapter focuses on the following four concepts within institutional 
theory: institutions and institutionalization as a dynamic social process, organizational 
fields as a level of analysis, legitimacy as a symbolic mechanism guiding organizational 
behavior, and organizational decisions as strategic actions shaped by the cognitive 
framework of institutional orders. 
2.4 Institutions and Institutionalization 
 This project is an institutional analysis, which requires me to identify measurable 
factors of institutional effects. It is difficult to measure institutions primarily because they 
are latent social constructions. The difficulty of the task is compounded by the fact that 
while institutions are a basic concept in sociology, researchers do not use a uniform 
definition for the term nor is the scholarly usage of the concept consistent (Abrutyn 2014, 
Clemens and Cook 1999, Hall and Taylor 1996, Jepperson 1991, Scott 2014, Thornton et 
al. 2012). Therefore, it is necessary to review the various definitions of institutions and 
institutionalization used in previous organizational studies and develop a definition of 
institutions for this study that allows me to address the issues set forth in the guiding 
questions. 
2.4.1 Conceptualization of institutions in Early Institutional Theory 
In general institutional theory in organizational studies adheres to a 
constructionist frame of institutions as macro level social forces external to the 
organization that affect organizational behavior through cognitive-cultural mechanisms 
which both constrain and construct perceptions of normative processes and structures of 
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action. The constructionist perspective of institutions in institutional theory originates 
from the work of Berger and Luckmann (1967). They stated institutions were the result of 
habitualized actions that become typified through reciprocation in social interaction; this 
conceptualization frames institutions as predetermined patterns of behavior that are 
historically contingent and mechanisms of social control (Berger and Luckmann 1967).  
Institutionalization is a process of social interaction because many habits develop 
in society but not all habits become institutions; institutionalization occurs only when a 
habit becomes objectified (Berger and Luckmann 1967). Objectification is a state where 
participants conceive of the action reflexively and when society members who are not 
participants in the interaction recognize the habit (behavior) as distinct from the 
individuals engaging in the activity. An institution then is a social mechanism external to 
and coercive of the individual through normative processes (1967:58). The example 
Berger and Luckmann (1967: 58) use to explain their concept is paternity. Paternity is 
institutionalized because when a man states he is the father of a child, members within 
the society who are strangers understand the meaning and associated role of that claim. 
 Ronald Jepperson’s (1991) article in Powell and DiMaggio’s anthology takes 
Berger and Luckmann’s concept as a starting point for consolidating the various 
definitions of institutions used in the institutional theory literature up to that point. 
Jepperson’s article is now widely cited in the field as providing the definitive 
conceptualization of an institution. According to Jepperson (1991), the core definition of 
an institution is “an organized, established, procedure” (143) where “routine reproductive 
procedures support and sustain the pattern” (145). Jepperson provides a list of common 
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institutions in society ranging from social abstractions, for example marriage, to specific 
behaviors, for example a handshake.  
There are several key conceptual ideas behind Jepperson’s varied list about how 
institutions should be defined and measured by researchers. First is “whether we consider 
an object an institution depends upon what we are considering to be our analytical 
problem” (Jepperson 1991: 146). Operationalizing institutions around the research 
question frames them as relative constructs existing within a specific context; therefore, 
an institution can be more than a binary state, an institution can be dimensional relative to 
the framework of analysis, as Zucker (1977, 1991) argued. Another key point is that 
because institutions are macro level structures they “are not reproduced by ‘action,’ in 
this strict sense of collective intervention in a social convention” (145), rather Jepperson 
argued that taking action is a departure from institutionalized behavior. As normative 
constructs within social structure, institutional reproduction occurs through conformity 
that makes action a deviation from expectations. 
Jepperson (1991) viewed theoretical conceptions of institutions that defined 
institutions primarily as taken-for-granted structures as problematic because the concept 
taken-for-granted was ambiguous and framed institutions as background elements rather 
than dynamic phenomena. Institutions do not just constrain actors; they also empower 
actors creating a constraint/freedom duality. Jepperson stated institutions possess a taken-
for-grantedness that is distinct from comprehension, conscious awareness, and 
evaluation: “Institutions are taken for granted, then, in the sense that they are both 
relative fixtures in a social environment and explicated (accounted for) as functional 
elements of that environment” (1991:147). Institutions are taken-for-granted macro-level 
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structures, but this is not their defining property; institutions create opportunities for 
actions by providing alternative paths. These alternative paths are actions that have not 
been institutionalized. Within organizational studies Jepperson noted rules and cognitive 
frameworks are considered the basic elements of institutional effects but cautioned on 
measuring institutions as property variables for legitimacy, formal organization, and 
context since determining causality is problematic because institutions do not operate 
solely as top-down mechanisms. This last viewpoint reflects the process of 
institutionalization discussed by Berger and Luckmann (1967) that individual habits can 
diffuse through society from bottom-up processes to become institutions. 
 Zucker (1977) pointed out a key factor of institutions in organizational studies is 
how institutions persist even if they are suboptimal. Like Jepperson (1991), she viewed 
institutionalization as a matter of degree, specifically between three processes: cultural 
persistence, maintenance of culture, and resistance to change. Moreover, in agreement 
with Berger and Luckmann (1967) she argued that institutions must be perceived as 
exterior and objective to the individual. Zucker’s (1977) classic article focused on the 
micro foundations of institutions and in the reprint for Powell and DiMaggio’s (1991) 
anthology, she added postscripts that address some conceptual issues with definitions for 
institutions in institutional theory since the publication of the original paper. 
The importance of Zucker’s (1991) postscripts is two specific problems in how 
the organizational literature treats macro level institutionalization. First, the existence of 
institutionalization as a social factor is simply taken-for-granted; by this, she argued not 
enough research focused on the organizational level to unpack the process of 
institutionalization. Second, institutionalization was confounded with resource 
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dependency perspectives; by this Zucker pointed out that the diffusion of technical 
processes between organizations is not necessarily a result of institutional influence but 
may represent the rational adoption of a technical advancement or innovation. In other 
words, if a practice spreads through an organizational field, institutionalization should not 
be the default explanation; the new practice could be a real improvement in 
organizational practices that places non-adopters at a competitive disadvantage. Zucker’s 
central point with these two critiques is organizational researchers need to pay attention 
to the micro foundations of institutions to avoid treating institutions as black boxes at the 
organizational level. Zucker took up her own critique a few years later by proposing a 
component process of institutionalization that framed institutionalization as a stage 
process, allowing for analysis of institutions at various points in their development 
(Tolbert and Zucker 1996).  
2.4.2 Conceptualization of Institutions from Outside Institutional Theory 
Applying a clear definition of institutions is important for sociological analysis 
because institutions link micro level processes of individual cognition with the macro 
level processes of social structure. Mary Douglas (1986: 46) asserted, “minimally an 
institution is a convention” which provides the cognitive structure to legitimize a social 
grouping. Douglas’ (1986) perspective reflects the general framing of the concept in 
institutional theory by arguing institutions are not just practical social arrangements, 
which she contrast to an economic view, institutions have cultural meanings.  
Institutions become embedded in society not as passive elements but as systems 
that structure social life beyond daily routines (Douglas 1986). Douglas’ comparison of 
wine classification between the Bordeaux region of France and Napa Valley vineyards 
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illustrated how institutional systems defy rationalization because neither classification 
system is logically superior and both created distinct cognitive schemas and industry 
practices (1986: 105-108). What was important to the vintners in Douglas’ study was 
how the institutional framework provided the means to construct categories of wine 
within their region by structuring the knowledge of differences between wines. The 
systems of wine classification also shaped the organizational identity of the vintners: 
French wineries were defined by wine type while California wineries were categorized by 
operational scale and scope. The fact these two categorization systems were not 
compatible illustrates Douglas’ central point that institutionalization is not a process of 
universal logics or economic rationalization but a culturally specific phenomena. The 
effect of institutions to create and shape actors identities is a pivotal concept other 
researchers have also found occurring in diverse settings including French cuisine (Rao et 
al. 2003) environmental forestry organizations (Bartley 2007) and accounting firms 
(Greenwood et al. 2002). 
Douglas North (1990) applied the concept of institutions to organizational 
strategy from an economic perspective. In North’s (1990) view institutions exist prior to 
organizations as frameworks in which organizations develop and the relationship between 
institutions and organizations is one of interdependence. “Both what organizations come 
into existence and how they evolve are fundamentally influenced by the institutional 
framework. In turn they influence how the institutional framework evolves” (North 1990: 
5). A key aspect of North’s (1990) framework is how institutions function as constraints 
and determine the opportunities in a society while leading to the creation of organizations 
that take advantage of those opportunities. “The major role of institutions in society is to 
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reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to 
human interaction” (North 1990:6). North’s concept of institutions is more formal than 
the other perspectives presented; however, this more structured relationship between 
institutions and organizations is important to consider when conducting a quantitative 
analysis of institutional effects on organizational strategy. 
2.4.3 An Alternative Conceptualization of Institutions 
Before condensing these perspectives on institutions and institutionalization into 
the framework for this project, I think it is valuable to mention some dissenting 
viewpoints on institutions. Seth Abrutyn’s (2014) recent work provides a concise 
summary of the criticisms against the concept of institutions applied within much of 
institutional theory and organizational studies. Abrutyn (2014) pointed out the concept of 
institutions is not theoretically problematic for most sociologists but when confronted by 
Jepperson’s (1991) list of institutions the question arises “Are institutions so broadly 
defined that the differences between collectives, patterned action, role positions and 
ideologies are less important that their similarities?” (6).  
Abrutyn’s aim was not to dismiss the work of institutional theorists but to argue 
these scholars overemphasize the cultural aspect of institutions by broadening the concept 
of institutions to frame them as dynamic mechanisms around singular phenomena. 
Abrutyn (2014) argued that there are a finite number of institutions and institutions are 
distinct societal level phenomena that affect both structural and cultural elements. To 
clarify Abrutyn’s position, a kinship system is an institution but marriage is not an 
institution; marriage is only a component within a society’s kinship institution. Applying 
Abrutyn’s definition to Douglas’ winemaker example results in neither winemaking 
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tradition being an institution; instead, French winemaking becomes a component within 
the French market institution and California winemaking becomes a component within 
the American market institution. Hence, Abrutyn’s concept of institutions aligns with the 
perspective of historical institutionalists who view institutions as broad and stable 
societal level structures that are not reducible to smaller parts. 
2.4.4 Conceptualizing Institutions for this Project 
This project adheres to the dominant conceptualizations of institutions found in 
the institutional theory literature. I conceptualize institutions as macro level phenomena 
exerting influence on multiple social levels: individual, organizational, field, and societal, 
and not limited to a small set of societal institutions. Institutions shape cognition through 
both material and symbolic mechanisms. Institutions shape material aspects through 
practices and cultural structures, and symbolically institutions provide meaning systems 
for interpretation and understanding (Thornton et al 2012). Institutions create social 
stability by laying out “the rules of the game” (North 1990), providing structure in daily 
life that goes beyond simple routine. Institutions are more than social conventions; they 
provide meaning and structure to social interactions beyond single events.  
Institutions constrain perception and action but also support and empower actors 
(Scott 2014) by providing mechanisms for agency. Institutions legitimize social 
structures and behaviors but constrain actors by limiting choices to a range of legitimate 
options. This form of social control is neutral but can create negative or positive 
outcomes depending on social context. Institutions can provide paths for innovation when 
actors find a more beneficial or rational process than the current one and require 
conscious action to deviate from the taken-for-grated route. Institutions help reduce 
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uncertainty and risk by providing templates for decision-making through the construction 
of normative expectations. Institutions can also empower individual actors by providing 
them with the context and tools to initiate change. 
Institutionalization is a social process that, once achieved, embeds the institution 
in society in a taken-for-granted manner; however, embeddedness does not guarantee the 
institution will continue to exist. Deinstitutionalization can, and has, occurred (Dacin and 
Dacin 2008, Davis et al 1994). Institutions change due to both endogenous and 
exogenous factors; therefore an institutional analysis should frame the institution under 
study as historically contingent (Thornton et al. 2012). Institutions are also subject to 
change through collective behavior. These mechanisms indicate that while institutions 
provide stability for society they not are stable phenomena themselves. Rather 
institutional maintenance, or reproduction, is an active and interdependent process.  
The institutions within a society are interdependent. Change in one institution can 
diffuse into other institutions. This interdependence between institutions also means 
actors can find themselves in positions where competing institutional demands create 
contradictions for action. These situations can illuminate the salience of a specific 
institution for making decisions as well as expose the complexity of the underlying 
institutional structure. 
I apply my conceptualization of institutions on two levels. First, I propose the use 
of pharmaceuticals is institutionalized in U.S. society through the acceptance of what 
some scholars refer to as pharmaceutical regimes (Busfield 2010, Conrad and Lieter 
2008, Williams et al. 2011). The pharmaceutical regime is an institutional regime 
whereby individuals accept pharmaceuticals as a legitimate treatment method for 
 
32 
conditions of illness and disease or expect pharmaceutical usage to improve their general 
quality of life. Institutional regimes occur around social phenomena when the 
institutional rules and sanctions for inclusion exist outside of any specific organization 
and monitoring occurs through collective action within a strategic action field (Jepperson 
1991).  
The purpose of utilizing the concept of pharmaceutical regimes is to construct the 
boundaries of pharmaceutical development outside of pharmaceutical organizations. The 
pharmaceutical regime exists at the societal level; therefore, the drug development 
strategies of pharmaceutical corporations include the social negotiation for the inclusion 
of a specific product into the regime, in addition to pharmacological development. The 
acceptance of any one pharmaceutical product is not taken-for-granted but subject to 
challenges requiring strategic action at the organizational level to convince other 
stakeholders within the organizational field. This indicates that the structure of the 
organizational field is dynamic with differing levels of influence between stakeholders 
based on power and claims of authority. Therefore, for the inclusion of a new product 
within the pharmaceutical regime it is necessary to legitimize a product to all of the 
stakeholders.  
The second conceptualization of institutions I propose comes from the 
institutional logics perspective, which I discuss in detail later in the chapter. Here 
institutions are conceptualized as combinations of social phenomena connected within a 
dominant meaning system referred to as a logic order. Relevant to this project, these logic 
orders serve to legitimize specific organizational structures and practices within society. I 
assert the competing institutional logics within the organizational field result in 
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pharmaceutical corporations adhering to a finite number of organizational strategies that 
align with specific logic orders in order to gain legitimacy with the other stakeholders: 
the Food and Drug Administration, medical professionals, patients, corporate owners, and 
third party payers.  
Logic orders serve as a normative force within an organization by creating the 
templates for appropriate decision-making. Therefore, I propose that analyzing the 
research and development decisions of a pharmaceutical corporation should reveal what 
logic order dominates that organization’s strategy. My reasoning is institutionalization 
results in organizational practices becoming routine, therefore, when analyzed over time 
patterns of different practices should emerge within and between organizations. 
2.5 Organizational Fields and Institutional Pluralism 
 The purpose for applying the organizational field framework in this project is to 
frame pharmaceutical development as a collective process. Pharmaceutical development 
in this respect does not refer to pharmacological discovery but the interorganizational 
process necessary to bring a new drug into the pharmaceutical regime. The organizational 
field framework allows me to incorporate non-pharmaceutical organizations in the 
process of drug development because these organizations are stakeholders in the 
pharmaceutical regime. These stakeholders also bring different logic orders into the 
pharmaceutical field through their membership in other fields. This makes the 
pharmaceutical field a site of institutional pluralism. I propose it is because of 
institutional pluralism that pharmaceutical corporations have the opportunity to adopt an 




2.5.1 The Development of Organizational Fields 
 A strength of institutional theory compared to other organizational theories is the 
awareness that organizational decisions are subjectively influenced by divergent internal 
interest, differences in power relations, and historical contingencies. The realization that a 
diverse range of external forces affects organizational strategy led institutional theorists 
to develop complex frameworks for understanding how organizations function as 
embedded entities. In their seminal work on institutional isomorphism, Powell and 
DiMaggio (1983: 148) proposed the concept of organizational fields to link the impact of 
institutions to organizational behaviors. The utility of the organizational field framework 
for organizational analysis is that positioning organizations within a relational network, 
as opposed to focusing on the operations of a single organization, reveals a wider range 
of environmental factors affecting organizational strategy. The organizational field 
framework provides researchers with a better understanding on why organizations with 
dissimilar goals would collaborate to accomplish a given task and expands the level of 
analysis beyond direct connections to larger fields of influence. 
Institutions are the structures that guide behavior within an organizational field. 
Early research on organizational fields highlighted how cultural-cognitive, regulative, 
and normative structures provided collective meaning and stability within the field 
(Wooten and Hoffman 2008). The decision to adopt a specific practice was framed as an 
isomorphic process where the effect of the organizational field was to confer external 
legitimacy on the organization. While decision-making occurred within the organization, 
early theorists argued strategy was guided by the institutional framework of structured 
decision-making not by objective assessments of efficiency. DiMaggio’s (1991) article 
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on the emergence of public art museums in the United States exemplifies this early 
approach in reach applying organizational fields as the level of analysis.  
DiMaggio (1991) noted that two competing ideologies about the purpose of 
public art museums existed during the early 20th century period when these organizations 
were being founded: museums as educational centers displaying replicas of famous 
works versus museums as centers of connoisseurship containing only original pieces. The 
convergence of museums around the curator model (connoisseurship ideology) occurred 
in conjunction with the rise of professional museum curators and the influence of external 
funding organizations controlled by wealthy donors. DiMaggio proposed that because the 
conflict between ideologies did not occur within individual museums, different 
stakeholders in the field were able to work collectively to construct the organizational 
environment at the field level.  
Isomorphic pressure defined organizational strategy based on the connoisseurship 
ideology as the only legitimate model for public art museums. Museums following the 
education ideology faced a crisis of legitimacy that effectively cut them off them from 
necessary revenue streams. This example also illustrates another important aspect of the 
organizational field framework, the need to consider historical context when evaluating 
organizational behavior because the widespread rise in art museums was partially due to 
gilded age tycoons seeking ways to create public legacies. Scott el al. (2000) 
demonstrated in detail the value of historical context for analyzing organizational strategy 
in their detailed examination of hospital changes in the San Francisco Bay Area during 
the last half of the 20th century. 
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Scott et al. (2000) studied institutional change by analyzing health care 
organizations in the San Francisco Bay Area between the mid-1940s and mid-1990s. One 
portion of their analysis focused on the organizational field and the effects field level 
changes had on individual hospitals. The data revealed a field of three competing logic 
orders: professional dominance, federal responsibility, and managerial-market orientation 
(Scott et al. 2000: 316). Within the period of the study, each of these institutional orders 
experienced a time where it was the dominant logic of the field; however, all three logic 
orders were always present to some degree in the field. Scott et al (2000) categorized this 
field level phenomenon as institutional fragmentation: a measure of degree to which field 
participants confront a coherent institutional environment. They drew several conclusions 
from these findings. Related to institutional theory the data indicated the factors leading 
to the decline in one logic order were not necessarily the factors leading to the subsequent 
rise of the new dominant logic order. Specifically they point out the decline of the 
professional dominance logic was followed by the rise of the federal responsibility logic, 
but the federal responsibility logic was intentionally constructed to maintain professional 
dominance. The incongruence in institutional change also demonstrated how exogenous 
factors affect field structure as illustrated by the shift from federal responsibility to 
managerial control, which originated with economists questioning the efficiency of 
public health and regulatory structures. 
DiMaggio’s (1991) study of public art museums and Scott et al.’s (2000) study of 
hospitals in the San Francisco Bay Area illustrate another key component of 
organizational fields: the process of field demarcation is flexible. Powell and DiMaggio’s 
(1983) original definition constructed organizational fields as relational networks, which 
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makes the boundaries not only porous but also definable around empirical conditions 
determined by the researcher’s analytical focus (Scott 2014). This allows the demarcation 
of organizational fields around a broader range of potential measures than the market-
exchange relationship definition of industry sectors. 
2.5.2 Demarcating Organizational Fields 
Charlene Zietsma and Thomas Lawrence (2010) stated field boundaries and 
practices are interdependent. “Thus we adopt an understanding of fields as co-
evolutionary systems in which boundaries and practices exist in a recursive relationship 
significantly affected by the heterogeneous boundary work and practice work of 
interested actors” (Zietsma and Lawrence 2010:191). Demarcating the boundaries of an 
organizational field through practice underscores the importance of embedded and 
collective action for analyzing organizational strategy. Organizations face behavioral 
constraints as embedded actors by the institutionalized structure of legitimate practices 
while at the same time, the structure only gains institutionalized legitimacy through 
collective recognition. Zietsma and Lawrence (2010) expanded DiMaggio and Powell’s 
(1983) conception of the organizational field by adding this recursive element to the 
framework which explains how the boundaries of organizational fields are beyond 
market-exchange connections and can encompass activities tangentially connected to the 
production of a commoditized good or service.  
Current research utilizing organizational fields has also shifted from the 
isomorphic perspective of early studies towards a view of fields as contested arenas. 
Reframing the relationship between institutions and organizations as both dynamic 
bottom-up and top-down processes was pivotal to this expansion of the organizational 
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field framework (Scott 2014). One of the ways researchers have demonstrated fields are 
dynamic structures has been through the analysis of the conflicts and change that 
accompany a shift in the dominant institutional order within an organizational field. Roy 
Suddaby and Royston Greenwood’s (2005) study of organizational change within 
Canadian accounting firms is a clear illustration of the contested process of institutional 
change within an organizational field.  
The institutional change observed by Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) was the 
expansion of accounting firms from provided financial services to offering legal 
advisement on financial and tax matters. Within the organizational field of financial 
service firms, accounting firms and law firms were two stakeholders originally offering 
different services and adhering to different logic orders. The acquisition of a legal firm by 
a major accounting firm represented a violation of the jurisdictional borders between 
accounting and legal firms (Abbott 1988). Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) revealed 
stakeholders within the field contested this acquisition because it violated the accepted 
institutional logics governing accounting firms. Accounting organizations re-established 
field stability by employing rhetorical strategies that redefined the institutional logics of 
accounting firms to incorporate the role of legal advisement on financial matters. This 
example illustrates another question raised by contemporary research on organizational 
fields: if organizational fields are sites of conflict and negotiation, is field stability better 
framed as a temporary truce, or settlement, between stakeholders (Reay and Hinings 
2005, Wooten and Hoffman 2008). 
 As Trish Reay and Bob Hinings (2005: 354) stated “Actors within a field 
recognize the dominance of one institutional logic during times that we can characterize 
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as relative stability, even though all actors may not agree with that dominant logic.” The 
lack of agreement required by actors to achieve field stability poses another direction for 
organizational field research to move away from organizational isomorphism towards 
explaining organizational heterogeneity. The concept of institutional pluralism provides 
the conceptual framework to expand the organizational field concept as contested arenas 
where stability is only temporary outcome of settlement negotiations. The institutional 
logics perspective argues that in situations of institutional pluralism an organization will 
use practices aligned to different institutional orders but adopts one logic order as the 
dominant order for overall organizational strategy (Thornton el al. 2012). Expanded to 
the organizational field level this would explain heterogeneity between organizations of 
the same type because in a field where multiple logics exist organizations could adopt 
differing dominant logics and still maintain legitimacy. 
2.5.3 Institutional Pluralism within Organizational Fields 
Michael Lounsbury and Ellen Crumley’s (2007) research on the mutual fund 
industry demonstrates how heterogeneous organizational fields emerge and continue to 
exists in a state of institutional pluralism. Mutual funds originated in Boston in 1924 and 
operated under a strategy of conservative trusteeship (Lounsbury and Crumley 2007). 
Around the middle of the century, developments in statistical techniques and economic 
theory operated as exogenous factors generating new practice strategies for mutual fund 
management. These new practice strategies were contradictory to the Boston model of 
passive investing; however, unlike nouvelle cuisine (Rao et al. 2003) or offering legal 
advice (Suddaby and Greenwood 2005), the new active money management model did 
not replace the old model but was incorporated into the mutual fund field as valid 
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alternative for mutual fund management (Lounsbury and Crumley 2007). The current 
mutual fund market is an organizational field where several institutionalized strategies for 
mutual fund management coexists. The “Process Model of New Practice Creation” 
Lounsbury and Crumley (2007) proposed as an explanation for the rise of actively 
managed mutual funds also reinforces the broader claim that organizational fields are 
dynamic structures that engender conflict and where stability occurs through a negotiated 
settlement between stakeholders.  
Another recent article by Mary Dunn and Candace Jones (2010) examined 
institutional pluralism within formal medical education in the United States. Dunn and 
Jones found that the strategies of medical education programs in the U.S. were contested 
between institutional logic orders of science and care. Understanding how these 
competing logics coexisted required analyzing the historical context of the formal 
institution of medicine in the United States. Dunn and Jones (2010) stated the logic of 
science originated during the 19th century professional project developing formal 
medicine while the logic of care was incorporated into formal medicine through the rise 
of public health as a discipline in the 20th century. Their analysis on the frequency of 
these logic orders in medical journals indicated that while the logics were dominant at 
different points in time both were continually present with vocal advocates continually 
seeking to promote whichever position was not currently in favor.  
At the organizational level, recent work by Walter Powell and Kurt Sandholtz 
(2012) on the emergence of the biotechnology sector in the United States revealed 
institutional pluralism at the field level allowed the development of two distinct 
organizational strategies. Powell and Sandholtz (2012) analyzed the organizational 
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practices of 11 prominent early biotechnology firms with founding dates between 1968 
and 1981. Because biotechnology was an entirely new field, these early firms lacked an 
institutionalized template of legitimatized organizational strategy; furthermore, as a 
developing field the contested dynamics between stakeholders had not reached a period 
of settlement. Based on the data, Powell and Sandholtz (2012) concluded these 
organizations adhered to two distinct and legitimate organizational strategies drawn from 
models legitimated outside of the field: organizational strategy based on a logic of 
science and organizational strategy based on a logic of commerce. Furthermore, Powell 
and Sandholtz demonstrated that the background of the firm founders’ heavily influenced 
the organization strategy adopted by a specific firm. Firms founded by academic 
researchers were more likely to adhere to an organizational strategy that aligned with the 
logic of science. While firms founded by venture capitalist or pharmaceutical executives 
were more likely to an organizational strategy that aligned with the logic of commerce. 
In summation, organizational fields are a well researched and valuable component 
of institutional theory. The concept allows organizational researchers to recognize the 
importance of organizational embeddedness and reinforces the conceptualization of 
institutions as dynamic phenomena. Additionally, the incorporation of institutional logics 
and institutional pluralism within the organizational field framework provides an avenue 
for institutional theorists to address strategic agency at the organizational level. 
2.6 Organizational Agency and Strategic Action 
In order to interpret organizational categories as influenced by institutional 
effects, the organizations studied have to possess some flexibility in adopting 
organizational strategies. A key component of this project is the proposition that 
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pharmaceutical corporations, or the actors within them, possess decision-making agency 
in regards to the overall strategy of an organization. There are multiple factors 
researchers have used to indicate organizational agency. I chose to collect corporate 
financial data and information on the drugs approval by the Food and Drug 
Administration as measure of organizational decisions that could reveal variations in 
strategies between pharmaceutical corporations.   
Using FDA approval information as data on organizational strategy aligns with 
the strategy-as-practice approach developed within the strategic management literature 
(Vaara and Whittington 2012). The strategy-as-practice perspective argues that strategy 
can be invisible because it has become institutionalized; therefore, analyzing common 
practices at the organizational field level can reveal distinct strategies if groupings of 
practices emerge across organizational boundaries. Since regulatory approval is a 
constraint placed on all pharmaceutical companies, how organizations manage the FDA 
submission process is an ideal common practice to analyze for latent strategies at the field 
level. 
Furthermore, the FDA approval process is a dynamic interaction between an 
organization and the FDA that requires strategic action on the part of both organizations 
(Babiarz and Pisano 2014, Monahan and Babiarz 2014). Companies do not haphazardly 
submit drugs for approval but engage with regulators through a multi-year process that 
starts with the submission of an investigational new drug application to begin clinical 
trials with the end goal as approval of a new drug application (NDA). In addition to being 
a lengthy and uncertain process, drug approval is also expensive making it unlikely a 
company would not manage the process internally or attempt to monitor best practices 
 
43 
within the field (Babiarz and Pisano 2014); therefore, it is logical to expect organizational 
strategies are exists within this practice. 
2.6.1 Bringing Agency into Institutional Theory 
The main strength of institutional theory, the recognition that culture shapes 
organizational behavior, poses a problem for organizational analysis because it risks 
framing organizations as over socialized. “In other words, the theoretical 
accomplishments of institutional theory are limited in scope to the diffusion and 
reproduction of successfully institutionalized organizational forms and practices” 
(DiMaggio 1988: 12). This problem originated when early institutional theorists tackled 
the structure agency debate by claiming that structure trumps agency because institutional 
effects were isomorphic forces on organizations. However, as researchers expanded 
beyond studies of isomorphism to explore institutional change, creation, and destruction, 
the need for incorporating agency into the theory became apparent (DiMaggio 1988, 
Lawrence, Suddaby, and Roy 2009, Oliver 1999, Scott 2014).  
To address this deficiency, DiMaggio (1988) proposed the concept of the 
institutional entrepreneur: organizational actors “who have an interest in particular 
institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to 
transform existing ones” (Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence 2004: 657). The concept has led 
to a distinct subfield of literature analyzing the actions of specific agents towards 
changing institutional structures (Hardy and Maguire 2008) but is criticized for framing 
institutional entrepreneurs as heroic actors and ignoring their embedded institutionalized 
context (Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 2009). Another early approach for incorporating 
agency into institutional theory stems from the work of Christine Oliver.  
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Oliver (1991) stated institutional theory had not fully addressed agency or interest 
driven action by organizations but the theory was compatible with these concepts. 
Applying concepts from resource-dependency theory, she constructed a typology of five 
strategic responses organizations could have to institutional processes: acquiesce, 
compromise, avoid, defy, and manipulate. Oliver (1991) defined in detail the tactics and 
strategies for these five responses as well as the differences in institutional structures that 
are more likely to engender specific responses. In his review of Oliver’s work, Scott 
(2014) provided examples of research applying each strategic response and supporting 
the overall validity of concept. In general, Oliver’s (1991) framework for strategic action 
indicates that the more complex an organizational field is, the more ability, and 
likelihood, individual organizations will engage in acts of non-conformity; i.e. engage in 
strategies of compromise, avoidance, defiance, or manipulation. 
Jens Beckert (1999) presented a dissenting viewpoint from DiMaggio (1988) and 
Oliver’s (1991) approaches and argued instead that “under market conditions, 
institutional rules and strategic agency can be conceptualized as two coordination 
mechanisms that destabilize each other, but, nevertheless, remain interdependent” (779). 
According to Beckert (1999), the attempts to introduce agency through periods of 
institutional conflict were inadequate because they did not explain how actors decided on 
strategy, and while conceptualizations of the institutional entrepreneur were more 
successful, they altered the fundamental argument of institutions as taken-for-granted.  
Beckert (1999) argued strategic agency was the purposeful attempt to reach a goal 
but the means to achieve that goal could only be chosen rationally if the actor had a 
reasonable expectation of the other actors’ behavior. Institutions provide structure for 
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interorganizational relations, which reduce uncertainty and make organizational action 
more likely. Beckert’s argument challenged the view that periods of contestation in 
organizational fields are the source of strategic action by instead proposing that periods 
of institutional stability lead to strategic action because they are times when organizations 
are better able to predict the outcomes of their decisions and therefore risk taking actions 
that depart from institutional expectations. 
The work of DiMaggio (1988), Oliver (1991), and Beckert (1999) facilitated the 
ability of institutional theorists to analyze agency within institutional structures but still 
met with criticism for treating agency as a product of institutional structures rather than 
individual actors. The concept of institutional work was proposed to link the previous 
ideas of agency and shift the focus of analysis to understating how actions affect 
institutions (Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 2009). Institutional work does not discount 
the previous ideas of agency but expands the analysis of agency in institutional theory by 
arguing agency and institutions have a recursive relationship: institutions structure action 
but at the same time actions create, maintain, and disrupt institutions (Lawrence, 
Suddaby, and Leca 2009).  
Institutional work focuses on activity rather than accomplishment, which allows 
for the analysis of the intentions behind actions as opposed to focusing on the outcomes 
of the actions. Institutional work proposes agency does not occur because a vacuum of 
isomorphic pressures drives decision-making but because actors derive distinctive 
intentions from the institutional structure. Agency, however, is still embedded within an 
institutional framework because it is the institutional structure that provides the enabling 
conditions for action (Battilana and D’Aunno 2009). Evaluating agency then requires a 
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multidimensional viewpoint since changes in the institutional and organizational 
environments will result in changes to the purpose and intention of an action. Battilana 
and D’Aunno (2009) developed a typology for evaluating the intersections of the three 
main forms of institutional work: creating, maintaining, and disrupting, with three 
dimensions of agency: iterative, practical-evaluative, and projective. Institutional work is 
an important construct within institutional theory because it reiterates the core argument 
that institutions are products of collective action and at the same time indicates 
institutions are neither totalitarian nor permanent. Institutional work explains why 
institutional pluralism occurs within a field because organizations structure their 
interactions through the dominant logic order of their primary field and thereby 
incorporate components of those logics into the shared field. In the pharmaceutical 
industry, professional medical organizations, third party payers, and financial investors 
engage in institutional work by brining different institutional logics into the field for 
evaluating pharmaceutical development strategies.  
2.6.2 Strategic Action Fields 
Neil Fligstein and David McAdam (2012) recently proposed a comprehensive 
theory of fields that builds on the previous work of institutional theorists by incorporating 
agency in organizational analysis through the framework of strategic action fields. The 
strategic action field concept proposes the act of reproducing an existing social institution 
is a function of constant negotiation between actors. A strength of this framework is that 
while collective action underpins the interdependence of field members, the interests and 
advantages of individual actors are incorporated. Strategic action fields are socially 
constructed arenas dependent on the definition of the situation and issues at stake 
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(Fligstein and McAdam 2012); therefore, they retain the flexible demarcation of the 
organizational field framework. This project applies Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) 
field theory to argue the pharmaceutical industry in the United States is a distinct 
strategic action field within the health care system comprised of six main stakeholders: 
pharmaceutical corporations, medical professionals, patients, the Food and Drug 
Administration, third party payers, and financial investors. 
The framework of strategic action fields is appropriate for my research because all of 
the stakeholders within the pharmaceutical field do not automatically accept newly 
developed pharmaceutical products. Pharmaceutical corporations actively manage 
knowledge of new drugs utilizing a variety of different organizational strategies designed 
to address the specific interest of each stakeholder. With investors and other financially 
motivated stakeholders, pharmaceutical corporations discuss drug innovation and disease 
prevalence rates to support claims a new product has market potential. Pharmaceutical 
corporations strategically use the concept of science and empirical validity to frame the 
presentation of clinical data to government regulators and medical professionals as a 
method of gaining product legitimacy (Abraham 1995, Applbaum 2009, 2010, Matheson 
2008). With potential patients, pharmaceutical corporations focus on developing a 
perception of need for treatment around a disease or condition while framing 
pharmaceutical use as the solution and pathway toward an improved quality of life (Fox 
and Ward 2009, Williams et al. 2009). 
Strategic action fields can also explain why pharmaceutical corporations within the 
same organizational field would display a heterogeneous mix of organizational strategies. 
Each organization possesses the ability to adopt a preferred organizational strategy but 
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external stakeholders could also influence these preferences. For example, a small startup 
firm might desire to be research oriented but the need to secure funding from private 
sources could act as a countervailing force resulting in the organization adopting a 
market-based strategy. The research of Powell and Sandholtz (2012) showed that these 
two organizational strategies existed in early biotechnology firms, and while their 
analysis indicated these differences were associated with an organizations founding, the 
concept can be applied to analyze established organizations. 
2.7 Institutions and Organizational Legitimacy 
From its conception, institutional theory has recognized the importance of 
legitimacy in organizational studies and incorporated the concept into multiple research 
frameworks (Deephouse and Suchman 2008, DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Meyer and 
Rowan 1977, Scott 2014). Developing a framework for legitimacy is important for this 
project because legitimacy underlies the institutional process of pharmaceutical regimes 
and the organizational actions taken by stakeholders within the pharmaceutical field. 
Pharmaceutical corporations are unlikely to adopt drug development strategies if other 
stakeholders perceive them to be illegitimate means. However, if corporations adopt 
strategies not institutionally legitimized, they may attempt to justify those strategies to a 
stakeholder as legitimate using an alternate logic order.  
Legitimacy research has resulted in a variety of definitions for legitimacy, but the 
idea that legitimacy is a collective process requiring social consensus is found in a 
majority of definitions (Deephouse and Suchman 2008, Ridgeway and Berger 1986, 
Zelditch 2001). To analyze how legitimacy works in relation to the development of new 
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pharmaceutical products, a distinct process of legitimacy should be adopted which 
addresses legitimacy issues that may arise in an institutionally plural organizational field.  
2.7.1 Organizational Legitimacy and Logic Orders 
 Organizational legitimacy occurs when there is congruence between the social 
values and norms of a society and the organizational behavior or activities of a specific 
organization (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Dowling and Pfeffer 1975, Scott 2014). 
Applying this concept of legitimacy to the pharmaceutical industry allows for the 
evaluation of specific organizational strategies as legitimate on a variety of dimensions:  
“For instance, regulatory approval of a new pharmaceutical not only confers 
regulatory legitimacy but also (a) enhances the ‘cognitive’ comprehensibility 
and taken-for-grantedness of the new compound, (b) indicates the that entity is 
consistent with the ‘moral’ value of good health, and (c) confirms the entity’s 
demonstrable ‘pragmatic’ benefits.” (Deephouse and Suchman 2008: 68)  
At the organizational level, this framework of legitimacy is useful to analyze 
specific organizations within a field by evaluating the differences between organizational 
strategy and societal expectations. However, focusing on organizational legitimacy is 
problematic for analyzing organizational interactions within a complex field because 
organizations can be embedded in multiple fields each with distinct institutional logics so 
an interaction between organizations necessitates acknowledging multiple, and 
sometimes contradictory, institutional expectations. As Deephouse and Suchman 
(2008:68) argued, “researchers might do well to attend more closely to the workings of 
various sources of legitimacy.”  
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The concept of institutional pluralism is necessary to analyze legitimacy in a 
complex organizational field because stakeholders evaluate an organization’s actions as 
legitimate through the institutional order most in line with that stakeholder’s relationship 
to the organization (Jarzabkoski, Matthiesen, and Van de Len 2009). I argue three logic 
orders are salient to pharmaceutical corporations: commerce, science, and care. Table 2.1 
list the components of these logic orders adapted from the Table 3.1 found in Thornton et 
al. (2012: 56) and the work of Dunn and Jones (2010) and Powell and Sandholtz (2012).  
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Viewing the pharmaceutical industry as a multi-institutional strategic action field 
requires more than analyzing organizational legitimacy since stakeholders within the field 
evaluate their interactions with pharmaceutical corporations using different logic orders 
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but the actions of all field members still adhere to an institutional level of legitimacy 
supporting pharmaceutical regimes. Understanding organizational strategy in a field of 
institutional pluralism requires utilizing a concept of institutional legitimacy. Institutional 
legitimacy “emphasizes the ways in which sector-wide structural dynamics generate 
cultural pressures that transcend any single organization’s purposive control” (Suchman 
(1995: 572).  
2.7.2 Institutional Legitimacy and Stakeholder Expectations 
Suchman (1995) stratifies legitimacy into three broad categories, pragmatic, 
moral and cognitive, all of which are applicable to analyze of the pharmaceutical field as 
a strategic action field. Pragmatic legitimacy is tied to self-interest, and characterized an 
exchange-based legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy is evaluated through the outcome value 
of the product an organization receives through interaction. Moral legitimacy is a 
normative evaluation on organizational behaviors as a reflection of their promotion of 
social welfare. In moral legitimacy, legitimacy occurs through the judgment of 
organizational accomplishments, the assessment of organizational operations as using 
socially accepted techniques and procedures, and the perception of worthiness of the 
social institution. The third process of legitimacy is cognitive legitimacy which is 
legitimacy based on the comprehensibility of organizational action and a social structure 
that makes alternative actions unthinkable. Cognitive legitimacy focuses on the culturally 
constructed nature of legitimacy as a process of collective action.  
My argument is that through the development of a new product within the 
organizational field pharmaceutical organizations strategically engage other field 
stakeholders using mechanisms designed to address pragmatic, moral, and cognitive 
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legitimacy concerns at the institutional level by using different logic orders. My research 
explores the following theoretical propositions related to the organizational pursuit of 
legitimacy in a situation of institutional pluralism: 
P1a: When interacting with investors, trade industry groups, or third party 
payers, pharmaceutical corporations will strategically frame a new product 
through measures of potential profitability as a method to secure pragmatic 
legitimacy in line with the logic order of commerce. 
P1b: When interacting with regulative stakeholders, pharmaceutical 
corporations will strategically frame data on new product efficacy through 
measures of empirical and scientific validity as a method to secure moral 
legitimacy in line with the logic order of science. 
P1c: When interacting with potential patients and physicians, pharmaceutical 
corporations will strategically employ narratives to frame the perception of need 
for a new pharmaceutical product as a method to secure cognitive legitimacy in 
line with the logic order of care. 
These theoretical propositions suggest the actions of pharmaceutical corporations in 
developing new pharmaceutical products is a strategic interorganizational processes 
designed to meet the specific institutional expectations of outside stakeholders. Figure 2.1 
displays the general model of these propositions. The arrows between stakeholders are 
double-sided to indicate the interactive structure of a strategic action field. Only 
relationships between pharmaceutical corporations and other field stakeholder are 
represented because these relations are the focus of this project. 
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Investors, industry trade groups, and insurance companies interact with 
pharmaceutical corporations through the logic order of commerce where the value of a 
new pharmaceutical product is based on market exchange principles; therefore, the 
legitimation of a new product by these stakeholders requires the demonstration of 
profitability, as either an investment or increased cost-effectiveness in a payment 
 
Figure 2.1 Theoretical Model of Pharmaceutical Corporations’  
Relations to Other Field Stakeholders by Logic Order 
scheme. The Food and Drug Administration acts as the regulator and gatekeeper within 
the pharmaceutical field leading to the evaluation of pharmaceutical products through a 
framework of scientific validity based on the experimental methodology of clinical trials. 
To gain legitimacy from the FDA pharmaceutical corporations should adopt concepts of 
institutionalized science to demonstrate objectively and empirically that a new product 
demonstrates efficacy and safety. Finally, pharmaceutical corporations need to address 
the legitimacy of consumers and physicians who evaluate pharmaceutical products 
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through a framework of how they can improve individual health. To legitimate a new 
product to potential consumers and physicians pharmaceutical corporations need to 
operate within the logic order of care, where institutionalized medicine positions the 
value of a treatment in its ability to address a pathological problem or improve quality of 
life.  
In conclusion, the process of market development places pharmaceutical 
corporations in a position of institutional pluralism by the requirement that new products 
meet the interest of each stakeholder for successful institutionalization within the 
pharmaceutical regime. Navigating these institutional expectations requires that 
organizations act strategically by applying different mechanism to meet the institutional 
expectations of legitimacy held by each stakeholder. Drawing from institutional theory, 
the expectation is these institutional effects will create a field of heterogeneous 
organizations because pharmaceutical corporations will align their dominant 
organizational strategy to different logic orders. 
2.8 Institutionalization, Medicalization, and Pharmaceutical Regimes 
 Contemporary drug development proceeds on the logic that consumers have 
unmet needs that the company can determine and market to (Applbaum 2009, Civan and 
Maloney 2006, Fisher et al. 2015). Critics contend research programs at large 
pharmaceutical companies focus not on improving health but on increasing profit. 
“Pharmaceutical companies continuously emphasize how deeply society depends on their 
development of innovative products to improve health. But in fact, these companies are 
mostly developing drugs that are mostly little better than existing products but have the 
potential to cause widespread adverse reactions even when appropriately prescribed” 
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(Light et al. 2013: 591). While this critique of industry interest is valid, it obscures the 
dynamics of the field because it fails to distinguish that the interest of public health and 
consumer markets derive from different institutional frameworks making commercial 
interest valid too. A more useful analysis reframes the issue of pharmaceuticals usage as 
an institutionalized process, which is why I adopt the concept of the pharmaceutical 
regime. The fact pharmaceutical use is institutionalized in society is not debated even by 
the most vocal critics of the industry. Neither Marcia Angell (2005), Peter Conrad (2007), 
Ben Goldacre (2012) or, Ray Moynihan and Alan Cassels (2005) suggest pharmaceutical 
products cannot actually treat disease or improve patients’ lives, rather the idea a 
chemical compound can be consumed and lead to a cure or improvement in health is a 
taken-for-granted concept. 
 Analyzing pharmaceutical development as an institutionalized interorganizational 
process allows for better understanding on how different perceptions of pharmaceutical 
use develop. More explicitly, stakeholder perceptions on the purpose of pharmaceutical 
usage can incorporate aspects of both public health and market economics because if 
these logic orders coexist in the organizational field. In the United States, pharmaceutical 
usage can be an aspect of public health when the product is intended to benefit more than 
the user; an example is vaccines. Likewise, pharmaceutical usage can be part of the 
market economy when they are purchased in lieu of an alternative treatment option: for 
example the consumption of antidepressants instead of behavioral therapy. Complications 
arise at institutional intersections, most clearly demonstrated by the current debates over 
the high cost of cancer treatments and price increases on patent expired medications with 
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no generic competition. It is through these contested situations that understanding 
pharmaceutical usage as an institutional process is most valuable.  
By framing pharmaceutical development as institutionalized, this project is in a 
unique position to engage critically with one of the significant areas of research in 
medical sociology, the thesis of medicalization. Social scientists have studied 
medicalization for the past forty years (Conrad 2007, Freidson 1970, Zola 1972). 
Medicalization is a social process that researchers have broadly defined to allow for a 
wide range of applications in empirical analysis. Conrad (2007:4) defined medicalization 
as “a process by which nonmedical problems become defined and treated as medical 
problems, usually in terms of illness and disorders.”  
Recent researchers have proposed pharmaceuticalization as an elaboration on the 
general medicalization thesis to address issues related specifically to the use of 
pharmaceuticals in society and reflect the changes that have occurred in the past two 
decades within society and the institution of formal medicine (Abraham 2010, Barker 
2011, Bell and Figert 2012, Williams et al. 2011). One of the key aspects of the 
pharmaceuticalization literature that diverges from the general claims of medicalization is 
the concept pharmaceutical regimes can be developed for conditions not considered 
pathological, meaning pharmaceuticals are developed and promoted as capable of general 
lifestyle enhancements not just medical treatments (Bell and Figert 2012).  
The majority of the existing sociological research on medicalization and 
pharmaceuticalization is qualitative which presents the opportunity for new research to 
add to the literature by analyzing medicalization using quantitative methods. A 
quantitative analysis would address the criticism of medicalization that the thesis itself is 
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too abstract; specifically that the existing research has not presented sufficient empirical 
evidence for the claim of medicalization over an argument that pharmaceutical expansion 
is actually the result of advancements in medical knowledge. For example, a significant 
proportion of the medicalization literature focuses on medicalization through the 
expansion of psychiatric conditions but current research on the drug pipeline shows 
products targeting mental disorders only account for 4.12% of the drugs currently under 
development (Fisher et al. 2015).   
The medicalization thesis is important to address in this project because it implies 
a distinct path of strategic action by a pharmaceutical corporation. A pharmaceutical 
corporation engages in medicalization if it seeks to expand the definition of treatment on 
specific conditions. The medicalization thesis is neutral in that the motivation for actively 
seeking expansion can be categorized as components of all three logic orders: commerce, 
science, and care. At the same time, medicalization could also be the consequence of 
pharmaceutical research and not a defined organizational strategy. Analyzing 
pharmaceutical development strategies for latent constructs could reveal if medicalization 
is a distinct organizational strategy.  
Regarding expectations of organizational strategy, industry critics argue 
medicalization practices align primarily with the commerce logic and pragmatic 
legitimacy. However, if pharmaceutical corporations operate from a position of 
institutional pluralism, framing a new product as an advancement in medical knowledge 
and addressing a health care need is necessary for market success. Product development 
requires a pharmaceutical corporation to meet the interest of all the stakeholders, 
obscuring the internal interest of the organization so expansionary practices could also 
 
58 
result from the logics of science and care. I explore the concept of medicalization in the 
case study analysis through the following theoretical propositions designed to evaluate 
internal organizational interest within the strategy of expansion, if one is identified in the 
quantitative analysis. 
P2a: If a pharmaceutical corporation’s dominant logic aligns with the commerce 
logic then the primary organizational reaction to a product-harm crisis will be to 
mitigate internal financial loss. 
P2b: If a pharmaceutical corporation’s dominant logic aligns with the logic of 
science then the primary organizational reaction to a product-harm crisis will be 
to validate the scientific accuracy of clinical trial data. 
P2c: If a pharmaceutical corporation’s dominant logic aligns with the logic of 
care then the primary organizational reaction to a product-harm crisis will be to 
mitigate potential harm to patient health. 
 These propositions assess the medicalization thesis because if pharmaceutical 
corporations are not primarily concerned about financial loss it undercuts the claim 
market interest drive medical expansion. If pharmaceutical corporations are concerned 
with ensuring the accuracy of clinical trial data then the argument medical expansion is 
due to genuine scientific advancements cannot be dismissed. If pharmaceutical 
corporations are primarily concerned with protecting patients from harm then medical 
expansion is more likely driven by the logic of care.  
2.9 Conclusion 
 Organizations are not isolated entities; they are dynamic phenomena shaped by 
both external social factors and the interest of internal actors. Institutional theory 
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provides a conceptual framework for understanding and analyzing organizations in 
society and is the theoretical foundation of this project. Researchers have demonstrated 
that the connection between institutions and organizations is an interactive process, but 
the focus of my analysis is on how institutions effect organizational strategy. Institutional 
theory contains concepts that can thoroughly explain organizational level actions in a 
complex system where organizations must meet the competing demands of multiple 
stakeholders. 
 I apply the construct of organizational fields as the conduit that mediates strategic 
choice between institutions and organizations. The field level provides context for 
organizational behavior by framing strategy as an agentic process bound by the 
expectations of other stakeholders. A pharmaceutical corporation is unlikely to pursue 
strategies that are viewed externally as illegitimate even if they maximize the self-interest 
of the company. Analysis at the field level also allows the indirect influence on 
organizational behavior by other stakeholders to be observed through the processes of 
collective negotiation and settlement over the dominant institution of the field.  
 Of central importance in this project is the concept of institutional logics and their 
connection to organizational strategy. Institutional logics exist in the background of the 
organizational environment, shaping both organizational practices and external 
evaluations of organizational behavior. Drawing from the strategy-as-practice theory 
literature, institutional logics are expected to influence the drug development process and 
should be measurable in basic organizational decisions. Analyzing the characteristics of a 
product submitted to the FDA for approval as representational of organizational decisions 
that are effected by a logic order can reveal the institutional logics in the field. 
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 The pharmaceutical industry in the United States is complex with corporations 
following different organizational structures and developing different products, but are 
these differences the result of unique decisions at the organizational level or are external 
factors creating commonalities in strategy between organizations? I argue that the 
presence of multiple institutional logics within an organization field explains diversity in 
organizational strategy. The impact of institutional pluralism at the field level results in 
diversity because individual firms address the influence of competing logics by selecting 
one logic order as the dominant framework for the organization. The caveat though is that 
the field’s other stakeholders must perceive the each logic orders of as legitimate. 
 Using organizational fields as the site of analysis necessitates that the researcher 
develop an awareness of the field dynamics. Power shifts between stakeholders and 
technological advancements are to two mechanisms that result in changing logics so it is 
important for a researcher to take historical context into account (Fligstein and McAdam 
2012). These field level dynamics influence institutional logics by operating as 
mechanisms of exposure to alternate logics and organizational forms as well as 
structuring the field by providing paths or constraints on specific organizational 
behaviors. The next chapter is an analysis of the current dynamics between 
pharmaceutical corporations and the other stakeholders in the field to assess the general 





CURRENT STAKEHOLDER DYNAMICS WITHIN THE  
PHARMACEUTICAL FIELD 
3.1 Introduction 
 The goal of this study is to understand how multiple institutional frameworks 
come to populate an organizational field and effect organizational strategy. Theoretically, 
the structure of interorganizational relationships will affect strategy choice at the firm 
level through mechanisms such as power differentials or resource dependencies but 
studying strategy selection within the firm may not reveal institutional influences. In 
order to reveal institutional level effects on pharmaceutical organizations, it is necessary 
to evaluate the details of the interorganizational interactions within the field to determine 
how institutional logics structure these relationships. The purpose of this chapter is to 
provide empirical evidence to evaluate the proposed model of stakeholder relationships in 
Figure 2.1, page 53, and demonstrate the complex interdependent structure of 
pharmaceutical development is appropriate for an institutional theory analysis.  
 The benefit of analyzing pharmaceutical development through the organizational 
field framework, instead of an industry perspective, is the field framework incorporates 
stakeholder dynamics as interactive and reciprocal. This chapter covers the general 
structure of the relationships between pharmaceutical corporations and the other main 
stakeholders in the modern pharmaceutical field of the United States and defines them 




relationship is subject to a complex set of dynamics resulting in changes over the past 
several decades worthy of detailed study, my discussion of these relationships only 
highlights the major dynamics since an extensive analysis of each relationship is beyond 
the scope of this project.   
 One of the most important relationships in the current field is between the FDA 
and pharmaceutical corporations. The central element shaping the current dynamic was 
the passage of the Prescription Drug Users Fee Act in 1992. This piece of legislation 
changed the overall field dynamics by weakening the FDA’s position for the benefit of 
pharmaceutical corporations and possibly at the expense of patients’ health. The direct 
relationship between pharmaceutical corporations and patients is similarly complicated. 
Pharmaceutical corporations engage patients as consumers in a market system through 
direct to consumer advertisements and indirectly by providing financial support for 
patient advocacy organizations. Pharmaceutical corporations present both strategies as 
awareness campaigns rather than product marketing, obscuring financial motivations and 
increasing the likelihood of patient buy-in. 
 Pharmaceutical corporations manage their direct relationship with physicians by 
treating physicians as liaisons to the consumer. Pharmaceutical corporations use a variety 
of subtle strategies to influence physician prescription habits, such as managing 
continuing education programs and enlisting well-respected experts to serve as 
ghostwriters on professional publications. Pharmaceutical corporations also employ 
strategies of direct marketing towards physicians through advertisements in medical 
journals and deploying drug representatives for office visits. The final stakeholder 




debate has focused on the pricing of prescription pharmaceuticals, but concern over the 
listed price of drugs obscures how the fragmented supply structure actually creates a 
market of differential pricing. Figure 3.1, page 87, provides a concise overview of the 
complex relationships in the pharmaceutical supply chain between health maintenance 
organizations, pharmacy benefits managers, retail pharmacies, wholesale distributors, and 
pharmaceutical corporations.  
3.2 Pharmaceutical Corporations and the Food and Drug Administration 
 The regulatory strategy in the pharmaceutical field combines components from 
the logic of care and science. Historical developments, discussed in chapter 4, resulted in 
the Food and Drug Administration gaining enough stakeholder power in the late 1960s to 
shape the pharmaceutical field and determine the processes of drug development from 
clinical trials to market release. While these actions were beneficial to patients, 
pharmaceutical corporations found these regulatory statues increasingly burdensome and 
constraining on corporate goals.  
 By the late 1970s, the increased regulatory requirements of the FDA had become 
a major point of contention between the agency and pharmaceutical manufacturers, and 
companies were complaining loudly of a drug-lag in the United States (Schweitzer 1996), 
and pharmaceutical corporations began to increasingly engage in strategic collective 
actions designed to shift the regulatory process towards the logic of commerce. At the 
same time, there was a shift in disease politics as the National Cancer Institute began 
pressuring the FDA for quicker approvals on new treatments following recent 
developments in chemotherapy (Carpenter 2010). The 1980s brought a general rise in the 




Bush, Sr. further setting the stage for major changes in the field dynamics between 
pharmaceutical corporations and the FDA. Changes in drug regulation where additionally 
spurred on as other stakeholders began calling for FDA reform; notably AIDs activist 
organizations started pressuring the FDA in the late 1980s to relax regularly standards on 
drug approvals to allow quicker and expanded access to experimental treatments. 
3.2.1 The Prescription Drug User Fee Act and Drug Reviews 
 The external pressures mentioned above all contributed to the legislative events of 
1992 that caused a significant shift in the field dynamics between pharmaceutical 
corporations and government regulators. In 1992, Congress passed the Prescription Drug 
User Fee Act (PDUFA) that altered the funding stream for drug reviewers at the FDA 
from being solely dependent on the federal government to include funds from 
pharmaceutical companies by authorizing the FDA to charge companies application fees 
for each review submission. However, PDUFA was not a neutral piece of legislation; it 
was a strategic settlement within the field intended to diminish the power of the FDA by 
making it more dependent on private industry.  
 PDFUA was also a solution to the staffing needs within the FDA, which was the 
result of the chronic underfunding from deregulation during the 1980s and had led to 
increased drug approval times from an average of 6 months to 30 months (Carpenter 
2010, Light et al. 2013). PDUFA provided the FDA with the additional income stream 
the organization needed to increase drug review staff and reduce approval times. 
Pharmaceutical corporations benefited directly from the passage of PDUFA by receiving 
an explicit guarantee from the FDA that priority drug applications would be reviewed 




no guarantee from the industry regarding the quality of the data submitted for review and 
the organizations reliance on industry money has led scholars to charge the Act resulted 
in regulatory capture and institutional corruption (Light et al. 2013). 
 One direct outcome of PDUFA was that while drugs were being approved 
quicker, the rates of adverse drug events (ADRs and commonly referred to as side 
effects) also increased (Chen and Yang 2013, Light et al. 2013). “An in-depth analysis 
found that each 10-month reduction in review time — which could take up to 30 months 
— resulted in an 18.1-percent increase in serious adverse reactions, a 10.9-percent 
increase in hospitalizations, and a 7.2-percent increase in deaths” (Light et al. 2013:595). 
“From 2000 through 2010, serious ADRs reported through the FDA Adverse Event 
Reporting System (AERS) increased 3.1-fold from 153,818 to 471,291 cases, and fatal 
ADRs rose 4.3-fold from 19,445 to 82,724 reports” (Chen and Yang 2013). These trends 
remain even after increases in prescription drug usage are controlled for indicating either 
more drugs of lower quality are being developed or the new shortened regulatory 
structure is inadequate for detecting and preventing many iatrogenic effects.   
 Part of the adverse drug event problem is the approval process is a delicate 
balance of risk: the risk of releasing a drug too soon and causing patient harm through 
adverse drug reactions versus the risk of keeping a drug under review to long and causing 
patient harm by denying access to beneficial treatments (Daemmrich and Krücken 2000). 
However, critics contend PDUFA skews this risk-risk calculation towards increasing the 
risk of adverse drug events by restructuring the regulatory process around industry 




Increased adverse drug events do not align with the logic order of commerce, but do 
indicate influence from the order of care has diminished in the regulatory process.    
 PDUFA altered the power dynamics between field stakeholders by weakening the 
FDA and solidifying pharmaceutical corporations as the dominant field stakeholder; 
physicians and the FDA are still gatekeepers, but their ability to fulfill this role has 
shifted from a proactive regulation and assessment of new products to a reactive position 
with the ability to apply constraints only after problems arise. The case of Zyprexa is a 
well-known example that demonstrates how strategic actions on the part of 
pharmaceutical corporations led to industry control over the process of drug regulation 
and supports the argument of regulatory capture. 
3.2.2 Zyprexa and the Corporate Management of Data 
 Scholars of the pharmaceutical industry and industry insiders make a distinction 
between the market competitiveness and scientific aspects of a drug. A competitive 
pharmaceutical product is a drug that can gain market share while scientific progress is a 
product offering a therapeutic advancement over existing treatment options. The 
strategies of market competition and scientific advancement are not mutually exclusive, 
many drugs are developed intending to achieve both, but a drug can be competitive 
without offering a therapeutic advantage. The current regulatory approval process 
encourages the adoption of a strategy for market competition over scientific advancement 
by only requiring that a new drug demonstrate efficacy in placebo control trials; 
therefore, a successful marketing campaign can increase the competitiveness of a new 




  Kalman Applbaum (2009) stated the marketing of Zyprexa was typical for 
contemporary pharmaceutical corporations. In 1998, Eli Lilly’s patent on Prozac was 
close to expiration. Seeking to develop a replacement blockbuster, the company formed 
the New Antidepressant Team, which was headed by a marketing strategy expert and a 
psychiatrist (Applbaum 2009). It is important to note pharmaceutical companies now rely 
primarily on blockbuster drugs to generate income (Lexchin 2006, Lybecker 2006, Vogel 
2007). Internal company documents reveal the strategic focus for developing Zyprexa 
was on uncovering patient needs, framed as expanding the market, and meeting them 
through a competitive product rather than a scientific advancement. This strategy was 
partially the result of the lesson learned from Prozac that a successful drug needed not 
only to be effective but also required a campaign to raise public awareness on need. 
 Zyprexa was an antipsychotic medication approved in 1997 to treat schizophrenia. 
At the start, the Eli Lilly development team determined “Zyprexa will be the world’s 
number one neuroscience pharmaceutical in history” (Applbaum 2009: 198) and set out 
to achieve this goal by expanding the approved therapeutic categories for Zyprexa usage. 
The first success the company had was in getting Zyprexa approved to treat bipolar 
disorder and Eli Lilly subsequently began marketing the drug to physicians as a new 
treatment option for this condition. Released internal documents, however, show Lilly 
sought to deceive physicians both about the adverse drug reactions of Zyprexa and 
illegally promoted off-label usage for unapproved conditions (Applbaum 2010).  
 The adverse drug reactions did not go unnoticed outside of the company and 
articles began appearing in journals linking Zyprexa to various negative side effects. For 




designed to counter any negative claims that surfaced in the medical literature (Applbaum 
2010). Eventually Eli Lilly lost a series class action lawsuits over the company’s 
intentional withholding of information on adverse drug reactions and received a criminal 
misdemeanor charge for promoting off-label uses. The Zyprexa court case revealed Eli 
Lilly managed the FDAs regulatory process by strategically providing information to the 
agency that downplayed the risk of the drug while overstating its benefits (Applbaum 
2009, 2010). Lacking the funds or authority to conduct internal clinical trials, the FDA 
was limited in its ability to sanction the corporation because it was dependent on the data 
provided by the company. John Abraham’s (1995) research indicated the corporate 
control of scientific information is not unique to the Zyprexa case but is a common 
industry strategy for managing the regulatory process in the submission company’s favor. 
 In conclusion, the relationship between the FDA and the pharmaceutical industry 
has changed to one where industry now has countervailing power within the field. New 
drugs are still subject to regulatory approval by the FDA but companies have been able to 
gain control of this process by selectively submitting data that leads to their desired 
outcome. Moreover, once the FDA has approved a drug, it is slow to issue a withdrawal. 
These shifting dynamics are the result of both broader political and economic changes 
exogenous to the organizational field, as well as, the rise of patients as a stakeholder 
within the field who began to view the FDA as an obstacle to treatment and further 
advocated for reducing the organizations regulatory power. Finally, while the current 
regulatory process appears be increasingly aligned with the logic of commerce, the logics 
of care and science are still evident in the FDAs standards of clinical trial testing and that 




3.3 Pharmaceutical Corporations and Patients, or the Potential Consumer 
 Researchers have argued one of the central changes in the field of health care 
since the 1980s has been the rise of the patient as an independent health care consumer 
(Applbaum 2006, Clarke and Adele 2009, Conrad 2007). Although other researchers state 
this type of patient interaction with the health care system has its roots in an earlier era 
(Tomes 2001). Regardless of the exact origin, pharmaceutical corporations have actively 
facilitated this normative shift from passive patient to active consumer with increasing 
emphasis during the previous three decades (Applbaum 2009). In the United States, 
pharmaceutical companies engage with patients as consumers primarily through two 
organizational strategies: direct interaction through marketing campaigns and indirect 
interaction by supporting patient advocacy organizations. Both of these strategies utilize 
components from the logic of care to engender the perception that pharmaceutical 
products offer patients an avenue to wellbeing.  
3.3.1 Direct to Consumer Advertisement of Pharmaceuticals  
 The direct advertisement of prescription drugs to consumers, while not legally 
prohibited, did not occur much between 1906 and 1980 because of the gentleman’s 
agreement between industry and the American Medical Association (Conrad and Leiter 
2008). There was also confusion over the regulatory jurisdiction of pharmaceutical 
advertisements between the FDA and Federal Trade Commission that was only resolved 
after the 1962 Drug Amendments Act (Junod 2007). Direct to consumer marketing 
strategies for prescription pharmaceutical products became a common industry practice 
during the 1980s following the general deregulation of the Regan administration, the 




care management. The early advertisements were tenuous as companies sought to 
establish the boundaries rather than exceed them and risk negative publicity.  
 Conrad and Leiter (2008) noted that there was a general sense of 
inappropriateness about direct to consumer marketing in the FDA, the medical 
profession, and surprisingly the pharmaceutical industry in early years of the 1980s. The 
primary concerns over direct to consumers advertising (DTCA) were the ability of 
patients to understand the information, whether it would lead to self-diagnosis, and how 
this could undermine the physician role in health care delivery. Because the consumption 
of any prescription medication contains the risk of iatrogenic effects, proponents argued 
that the advertisement of pharmaceutical products could not present only the benefits of 
treatment but needed to include risk and side effect information. This argument aligns 
with the logic of care as patient outcomes outweighed the immediate economic benefits 
for the corporation. However, the increasing pressures of market competition that 
accompanied the shift of investors focusing more on financial metrics as performance 
indicators led corporations to begin testing DTCA. 
 The FDA reacted to the earliest attempts of DTCAs in 1981 by calling for a 
moratorium on DTCA at the end of 1982 that was not retracted until 1985. For the rest of 
the decade and into the 1990s, the FDA applied a policy of ‘fair balance” on 
advertisements. This policy required ads to give equal space on potential benefits and 
possible side effects. This requirement served as an unintentional restriction on DTCA to 
print media and despite the initial hesitant responses within the industry, DTCA spending 
quickly grew to $12 billion annually by 1989 (Conrad and Leiter 2008). In August of 




pervious rules by allowing companies to list a source where consumers could find 
additional information instead of requiring all the information be included in the 
advertisement. 
 The most vocal industry opponents argue direct to consumer advertisements are 
inherently negative because they present misleading information and are focused on 
expanding market share rather than improving public health (Angell 2005, Moynihan and 
Cassels 2005, Goldacre 2012). These critics point out the marketing cycle for products is 
designed to stimulate demand for brand name prescription drugs only while they are still 
under patent; after patent protection ends and generics become available companies tend 
to cease marketing a drug. Some research has even indicated marketing can increase the 
price of a drug over time as sales, and usage, increase, a contradiction to the expectations 
of price sensitivity in basic economic theories on supply and demand (Faden et al. 2009). 
 Industry officials and representatives argue direct to consumer advertisements 
serve a vital function by educating the public about both the treatment options available 
as well as the conditions themselves. However, pharmaceutical companies use these 
marketing tools strategically to expand the market share of specific products. Companies 
are aware of the connection between direct to consumer marketing and product success. 
A strong marketing campaign serves to build the brand of a specific drug and increases 
the chance patients will ask their physician for that drug during an office visit (Applbaum 
2009, Lexchin 2006).  
 Companies are also aware of the importance of marketing plans in the product life 
cycle. The prescription drug market is a competitive market where consumers frequently 




outcomes. The financial success of a new product depends on a rapid adoption rate, and 
with the time of patent protection constantly decreasing, the window for a company to 
make money on a product is small. Therefore, it is common for corporations to devote a 
significant amount of marketing resources into advertising a product just prior to its 
launch on the open market (Applbaum 2009, 2010). This strategy increases the chance 
consumers will request the product sooner, which results in longer spans of treatment that 
maximize profits. The other patient targeted marketing strategy pharmaceutical 
corporations pursue is establishing relationships with patient advocacy organizations to 
build awareness on both prescription drugs and health conditions. 
3.3.2 Patient Advocacy Organizations and Pharmaceutical Corporations 
 Non-profit patient advocacy organizations (PAO) have been part of the health 
care field for most of the 20th century. Some of these organizations have evolved into 
large, well known organizations, for example the March of Dime and the American 
Cancer Society (Rothman et al. 2011, Starr 1982). The early PAOs were funded by 
private individuals and were able to become influential and trusted stakeholders within 
the health care field (Rothman 2011 et al.). However, the structure of these organizations 
began to change during the 1980s with the rise of HIV and AIDS activist groups. These 
new groups represented a distinct change in organizational strategy because they focused 
on making new pharmaceutical treatments, including drugs still in experimental trials, 
readily available to patients (Rothman et al. 2011). At the same time, pharmaceutical 
companies began to view these organizations as potential partners for expanding their 
product markets and started increasing their financial donations to them (Moynihan and 




 PAOs are perceived by outsiders to be primarily motivated by the desire to 
improve health care options for individuals but research has indicated these organizations 
now increasing favor new, expensive medical technologies and brand name drugs 
(Conrad 2007, Rothman et al. 2011). However, evidence on the co-optation of patient 
advocacy organizations by pharmaceutical corporations is difficult to find because an 
asymmetry of information exist whereby pharmaceutical corporations are under certain 
legal obligations to report money given to advocacy organizations but advocacy 
organizations are not subject to the same disclosure requirements (Jones 2008, Rose 
2013, Rothman et al. 2011).  
 Advocacy for the newest medical treatments does not necessarily indicate 
industry co-optation of a PAO but several instances support the conclusion that the 
relationship between the two stakeholders is not neutral. Marcia Angell (2005: 152) 
discussed the case of hepatitis C coalitions that appeared to be grassroots organizations 
but were revealed as initiated and sponsored by Schering-Plough, the manufacturer of 
Rebetron, the primary treatment for hepatitis C at the time. Another well-cited example is 
the case of the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI). While receiving millions 
of dollars in funding from the pharmaceutical industry, NAMI used its political position 
to oppose black-box warnings and down play emerging data that linked antidepressant 
use to increased suicide rates in adolescents (Conrad 2007, Rose 2013). NAMI concealed 
both the amount of funding it received from the pharmaceutical industry and that it 
coordinated its lobbying efforts with drug makers; this information was uncovered and 




 Patient advocacy organizations occupy an interesting stakeholder position within 
the pharmaceutical field. These organizations have differing interests from 
pharmaceutical corporations but their actions align with the commerce logic interest in 
expanding access to prescription drugs. PAOs position as advocates for improving health 
care provide the organizations with moral legitimacy that allows them to engage directly 
with policy makers on legislation related to pharmaceutical regulation. Nevertheless, 
many of these organizations also have direct financial ties with the pharmaceutical 
industry creating potential conflicts of interest that could negate an organization’s moral 
legitimacy if these relationships were made public. The exact extent of industry ties is 
complicated by the information asymmetry mentioned earlier but researchers have 
estimated between 30 and 70 percent of all PAOs receive varying levels of financial 
support from the industry (Rose 2013). The acceptance of financial support does not 
automatically mean a PAO advocates for industry interest but the examples above 
indicate the potential for conflicts of interest and co-optations exist in these relationships.  
 Despite the potential risk of appearing to mislead the public, pharmaceutical 
corporations have an interest in continuing to support PAOs because these organizations 
also facilitate the marketing and branding of disease conditions (Moynihan and Cassels 
2005). A good example of brand management utilizing PAOs is the expansion of 
attention-deficit/ hyperactive disorder from being a childhood problem to a condition also 
afflicting adults. Moynihan and Cassels (2005: 61-81) discussed in detail how events 
hosted by the Children and Adults with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 
(CHADD) were sponsored by pharmaceutical corporations with the intent of spreading 




significance of these industry tactics for Moynihan and Cassels (2005) was how they 
were hidden from public view. Company logos and product names appeared at the events 
but the events themselves were publicized as CHADD events even though a 
pharmaceutical corporation was covering all the expenses. 
 The research of Shelia Rothman and her colleagues (2011) provides detailed 
information about one company’s relationships to PAOs. Rothman et al. (2011) analyzed 
the grant activity of Eli Lilly, one of the first U. S. pharmaceutical corporations to make 
its charitable donations available to the public. The most significant finding from their 
study is how the company acted strategically by donating to PAOs that aligned with the 
therapeutic areas of the company’s bestselling products: neuroscience, endocrinology, 
and oncology. Because the company listed all the PAOs receiving donations, the 
researchers were able crosscheck the information by looking at the websites and tax 
filings for the 188 PAOs meeting the study criteria. Of these 188 PAOs, the researchers 
found complete data on 161 (85.6%) organizations. Of these 161 organizations, only 40 
(25%) publically acknowledged receiving financial support from Eli Lilly. Not listing a 
corporate sponsor does not mean an organization is co-opted, but researchers argue that 
this lack of transparency is the main problem in accurately understanding the dynamics of 
the relationship between pharmaceutical companies and patient advocacy organizations 
(Angell 2005, Jones 2008, Moynihan and Cassels 2005, Rose 2008, Rothman et al. 
2011). 
 This lack of transparency is not limited to the United States. Kathryn Jones’ 
(2008) research addressed the issue of industry influence in patient advocacy groups in 




information on corporate donations with publically available PAO disclosure 
information. Her data also indicated companies made donations strategically by selecting 
organizations advocating for causes represented by the therapeutic classes of their 
products. Her general conclusion was that while the industry is not bankrolling or setting 
the agenda for advocacy groups, the lack of transparency in reporting financial 
connections constrains the identification of possible conflicts of interest. 
 In conclusion, pharmaceutical corporations structure their interactions with 
patients as actions of public awareness on the management of pathological conditions by 
framing patients as active health care consumers. Direct to customer advertisements rely 
on disease narratives to engender the salience of a disease state to potential customers and 
frame pharmaceutical products as a legitimate, if not the optimal, treatment option. 
Pharmaceutical corporations support patient advocacy organizations because they can 
generate public awareness on diseases and provide an additional legitimate platform for 
product advertisement. Moreover, when pharmaceutical corporations donate to advocacy 
groups, they tend to select charities advocating for diseases represented within their 
product range, demonstrating this is a strategic activity aligned with the logic order of the 
market as opposed to the logic order of care. 
 Within the pharmaceutical field, patients appear to be the stakeholders with the 
least amount of power to influence field dynamics and shape interactions. I do not 
propose that patients are passive actors, Patient Advocacy Organizations are initiated and 
lead by patients, but the relationship between pharmaceutical corporations and patient is 
dominated by the corporate agenda. Social media has provided some increased power to 




pharmaceutical corporations may frame drug advertisements within narratives of care, the 
likelihood patients as a stakeholder group could directly influence dominant 
organizational strategy seems remote. 
3.4 Pharmaceutical Corporations and Physicians 
 Physicians function as gatekeepers in the organizational field but their ability to 
perform this function has changed over time due to the actions of pharmaceutical 
corporations. During the 1980s, the structure of the relationship between pharmaceutical 
corporations and physicians shifted away from being a partnership in health care 
treatment towards a market based dynamic of unequal power where physicians are 
consumers of pharmaceutical products (Angell 2005, Applbaum 2009, Goldacre 2012, 
Jaakkola and Renko 2007, Jain 2007, Landa and Elliot 2013, Spurling 2010). Elina 
Jaakkola and Mijia Renko’s (2007) study represents the structure of this new market 
dynamic as they frame physicians as “surrogate adopters” who evaluate new drugs using 
a different set of criteria than the end-user (patient). “As physicians evaluate the 
product’s acceptability from their patients’ viewpoint as well as their own, marketers of 
new products should communicate the key benefits of an innovation for both parties” 
(Jaakkola and Renko 2007: 342). Pharmaceutical companies are advised to understand 
the context in which physicians make decisions shapes physician perceptions about a 
product so the presentation of information to physicians should be treated as a marketing 
campaign to increase new product adoption (Cook 2006, Sismondo 2009). Applbaum 
(2009) succinctly summarized the new dynamic between pharmaceutical companies and 
physicians by stating, “The strategic goal becomes how to convert them from potential 




3.4.1 Key Opinion Leaders, Ghostwriters, and Clinical Data 
 One of the main strategies pharmaceutical corporations employ to align physician 
interest with their own is the utilization of key opinion leaders (KOL). Pharmaceutical 
companies realized in the early 20th century that physicians were more responsive to 
product claims when they occurred through a direct physician-to-physician interaction 
(Fox 1961, Landa and Elliot 2013, Sismondo 2013). Pharmaceutical corporations now 
utilize KOLs for authorship on journal articles and as speakers at conferences and 
symposiums. The role of KOLs within the field is so important to the successful 
management of pharmaceutical products that a separate industry of companies has 
emerged focusing on locating, recruiting, and managing KOLs (Landa and Elliot 2013, 
Sismondo 2009, 2013).  
 The strategic goal for pharmaceutical companies in employing KOLs is to 
increase the adoption rate of products (Matheson 2008, Sismondo 2009). This is achieved 
through the careful selection of KOLs on the criteria of professional reputation and 
professional embeddedness. Another important selection criterion for KOLs is that their 
research should align with the product, meaning KOLs are generally already working and 
established in the therapeutic area of a pharmaceutical company’s product portfolio.  
 Nevertheless, key opinion leaders are not industry shills but are reflexive actors 
within the field (Fox 1961, Goldacre 2012, Matheson 2008). KOLs are medical 
professionals aware of their ethical obligations towards patients and publically resent 
implications that they would advocate for inferior, or harmful, products because of their 
industry relationships. As Sergio Sismondo (2009: 640) found in his research: “Dr. A, for 




for. I think they’re terrific. So, I am not putting my parents on it because I am speaking 
for the company — it’s the best drug.’” This statement indicates that while KOLs 
advocate on behalf of pharmaceutical corporations for specific products, they publically 
maintain a primary alignment with the logic order of care. 
 Becoming a KOL provides both professional and financial opportunities for a 
physician. KOLs can receive compensation for travel expenses to conferences and 
honorariums for giving conference talks. They can also receive honorariums for giving 
talks to local physicians groups. However, the financial benefits scholars are most critical 
towards are the available research grants from the companies of the products they 
advocate. Critics argue the real dynamics of the KOL relationships are not neutral but 
structured to align the larger presentation of medical knowledge to physicians with the 
interest of the pharmaceutical industry (Goldacre 2012, Matheson 2008, Sismondo 2009). 
 Pharmaceutical companies also strategically control the knowledge available on 
their products and seek to influence physicians by hiring ghostwriters on journal articles. 
Ghostwriting is the practice whereby a pharmaceutical company, or a company hired by a 
pharmaceutical company, writes an article on the results of a clinical trial and then 
solicits a physician to sign on as the primary author. The ability of the physician to make 
changes to the article varies, as well as, the access the physician is given to review the 
data. This practice is one of the most contested strategies within the pharmaceutical field 
because in addition to being seen by many as a subversive form of marketing (Goldacre 
2012, Matheson 2008, Sismondo 2009, Spielmans and Parry 2010), it also raises 
questions on the scientific legitimacy of professional medicine. The extent of 




(2005), a former editor in chief at the New England Journal of Medicine, stated 
ghostwriting articles for professional journals has become increasingly commonplace.   
 Ghostwriting occurs because it meets the interests of both individual physicians 
and pharmaceutical corporations. The practice assists physicians in developing their 
professional reputations by increasing their publication count. Physicians, especially 
those with academic careers, are evaluated on their impact within the discipline and 
publication counts are a prime measure of this (Sismondo 2009). Ghostwriting benefits 
companies through practices that generate the highest impact and product exposure: 
strategically targeting KOLs for authorship and submitting to the most prestigious 
journals. Both of these tactics can improve the cultural capital of a product, regardless of 
its scientific merit, by engendering the perception in other physicians that the drug 
provides a greater advancement in treatment because a leading professional in a 
prestigious journal endorsed it (Applbaum 2009, Sah and Fugh-Berman 2013). 
Cognitively, this strategy is a way to get around the problem of a reflexive gatekeeper 
because delivering a questionable message through a trusted source discourages the 
receiver from questioning the validity of the message. 
 The medical profession has been reluctant to address the issue of ghostwriting. 
Many physicians do not think it is a problem because the ghostwriter is able to review 
and revise the work before the final submission (Goldacre 2012, Sismondo 2009). 
Journals also benefit from ghostwriting because the requests for reprints of individual 
articles by pharmaceutical companies, drug representatives use reprints of articles as 
handouts during office visits, brings in a significant amount of revenue (Spielmans and 




legitimacy of scientific authority within professional medicine because the extent and 
impact of the practice is currently unmeasurable. 
 Related to the practice of ghostwriting, the ownership of clinical research data by 
pharmaceutical corporations also threatens the scientific legitimacy of professional 
medicine. Ben Goldacre (2012) and others (Abraham 1996, Angel 2005, Moynihan and 
Cassels 2005, Spielmans and Parry 2010) argue one of the biggest problems in the 
pharmaceutical field is the misleading use of evidence in professional journal articles. 
The corporate ownership of data is viewed as problematic because scientific legitimacy 
claims rest on the idea of objective analysis but when data are treated as proprietary 
products, their validity cannot be assessed. 
 Brown (2013) argued that the incentive to manipulate results is tied to the 
financial logic of the industry and made possible because the system of scientific review 
at journals relies on routinized practices, like test for statistical significance, which can be 
gamed, instead of engaging in difficult scientific judgement calls. Based on his extensive 
fieldwork within the industry on publication management, Sismondo (2009) argued the 
people and companies producing ghostwritten work understand the importance of 
scientific standards and the quality of the articles produced is not inferior to non-industry 
funded work. However, ghostwriting is a top-down managed process where the 
companies providing the service are financially dependent on pharmaceutical 
corporations. This interorganizational structure means that despite the importance of 
maintaining scientific standards, publication management companies know their value in 
the pharmaceutical field is determined primarily by producing material that successfully 




ghostwriting indicate the concern of pharmaceutical corporations over scientific validity 
may only be significant within physician interactions and is not likely to represent the 
dominant organizational strategy within the field. 
3.4.2 Advertising to Physicians 
 Pharmaceutical corporations also engage in direct marketing to physicians 
through advertisements in medical journals. Pharmaceutical companies argue that these 
advertisements serve educational purposes and research has revealed physicians do use 
advertisements in this way (Othman et al. 2009). This is a lucrative marketing strategy for 
corporations with research indicating returns of $2.43 for each dollar spent during the 
first four years of a products lifecycle and upwards of $4 after that (Othman et al. 2009). 
The systematic review of studies on journal advertisements by Noordin Othman and 
colleagues (2009) found that most advertisements used low quality references and studies 
examining advertisements for misleading claims consistently find them. While 
researchers point out these are problems with allowing direct to physician advertisements, 
journals have been reluctant to address the issue because many rely on the revenue 
advertising brings in (Goldacre 2012). Furthermore, the journals typically have internal 
standards and review policies that they argue are sufficient to identify fraudulent claims 
(Othman et al. 2009). 
 One of the most well researched areas in the relationship between pharmaceutical 
corporations and physicians is the practice of using drug representatives to market 
products through direct interactions with physicians. Research consistently indicates that 
a cognitive dissonance occurs in the practice whereby physicians do not think accepting 




habits but they think it does influence their peers (Chimonas 2007, Goldacre 2012, Sah 
and Fugh-Berman 2013). However, the evidence is clear that physician’s prescribing 
habits are influenced by gift practices and that companies, with their sophisticated 
marketing analysis teams, are aware of this or else they would not be spending money on 
the practice (Chimonas 2007, Goldacre 2012, Sah and Fugh-Berman 2013). 
 Research on the interactions between physicians and drug industry representatives 
indicate that these are complex social situations. Physicians view interactions with drug 
representatives reflexively and claim that they critically evaluate the material presented 
rather than accept the message at face value (Chimonas 2007, Goldacre 2012, Jain 2007). 
Physicians perceive the interactions as educational and informative, but at the same time 
are aware drug reps are sales personnel trained to present information biased towards 
their products. Yet the awareness of receiving a biased message does not prevent bias 
from occurring since researchers consistently show that physician prescription rates 
increase for specific medications and company products after a drug representative visit 
(Goldacre 2012, Sah and Fugh-Berman 2013). Susan Chimonas (2007) and her 
colleagues applied cognitive dissonance to explain how physicians negotiated this 
contradiction and argued that creating voluntary guidelines to regulate these interactions 
would not change physician behavior but the practice would have to completely stop in 
order to address the issue. 
 The final way pharmaceutical companies manage the information physicians 
receive is through continuing medical education. Continuing medical education 
requirements in the United States have been in place since the 1970s and mean that 




their medical license. The Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education 
(ACCME), formalized by the AMA in 1981, regulates and certifies continuing medical 
education programs but a range of other organizations actually develop and run the 
programs. Some of these organizations are almost completely supported by money from 
pharmaceutical corporations while others, such as the Veterans Administration, are less 
connected to industry (Brody 2009). The ACCME has strict guidelines on the content of 
continuing education programs but industry members sit on the boards developing these 
guidelines, which raises conflict of interest concerns. Pharmaceutical corporations also 
hire KOLs as presenters and provide them with scripts and slideshows, insuring the 
message physicians receive by maintaining control over program content (Brody 2009, 
Sismondo 2013). 
 In conclusion, pharmaceutical corporations structure their interactions with 
physicians in the field through practices designed to manage the availability and content 
on knowledge about pharmaceutical products. The strategies used range from the subtle 
control of information through key opinion leaders and ghostwriting to overt 
advertisements for products in medical journals and designing continuing education 
curriculum. I contend it is not that physicians do not adhere to the logic of care in the 
interactions with pharmaceutical corporations; rather pharmaceutical corporations have 
become more skillful in negotiating these interactions around their commercial interest. I 
think Sergio Sismondo best captured the institutionalized structure behind these field 
dynamics when he stated:     
Pharmaceutical companies not only shape taken-for-granted medical 




presence and roles: most physicians see the companies as playing legitimate 
roles when the companies promote products in clinics, when they create and 
distribute medical research, and when they fund and provide continuing 
medical education. (Sismondo 2013: 640) 
3.5 Pharmaceutical Corporations and the Retail Pharmaceutical Supply Chain 
 Unlike in other commercial industries, pharmaceutical corporations cannot sell 
their products directly to the consumer. Instead, products move through a series of 
intermediary organizations until reaching the patient. Further complicating the supply 
process is the fact that most consumers do not pay the complete cost of a prescription 
drug at the time of purchase. Payments move through a different series of intermediary 
organizations before reaching pharmaceutical corporations. This market structure is best 
understood as a subfield within the larger pharmaceutical field. Pharmaceutical 
corporations hold the dominant position in terms of drug pricing but the fragmented 
market created by different intermediary paths for supply and payment have allowed 
other stakeholders to gain a significant amount of negotiating power against the interests 
of pharmaceutical corporations. 
3.5.1 Prescription Drug Pricing 
 Few people in the United States currently pay for prescription drugs out-of-pocket 
but this was not always the case. In 1970, 82.4% of retail expenditures on prescription 
drugs were paid for out-of-pocket but by 2013, this figure had been reduced to 16.9% and 
health insurance was covering 82.1% of expenditures (Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services 2015). Unlike other consumer goods, there is no single price for a 




pricing, known as a Ramsey pricing scheme (Frank 2001, Lybecker 2006, Vogel 2007). 
Patients’ who use cash to purchase prescription drugs pay the highest price while 
individuals with drug benefits pay less, both in direct out-of-pocket cost and in the 
amount their insurer reimburses the retailer. 
 The common criticism of drug prices in the United States follows narratives of 
corporations engaged in profiteering and cost shifting (Spitz and Wickham 2012). The 
methods pharmaceutical corporations use to determine drug prices are proprietary 
knowledge but firms publicly state that price determinations reflect the need to remain 
profitable and continue engaging in research and development (Freeman 2006). The 
recent decision by Turing Pharmaceuticals to raise the price of Daraprim from $13.50 to 
$750 a pill is unique only because of the sustained attention it has received which is most 
likely due to the CEO’s brash manner and the presidential election cycle rather than the 
actual price hike (Ramsey 2015).  
 Most other industrialized nations employ a national level system of price control 
on prescription drugs, but in the United States, there is no regulation on drug pricing and 
private corporations act as intermediaries altering the price between pharmaceutical 
corporations and the consumer. Scholars argue that this structure of pharmaceutical 
coverage creates price differentials because prices are determined through negotiations 
between profit-maximizing firms and price-sensitive buyers (Frank 2001). Framing prices 
as a process of structural factors counters the ideological argument that pharmaceutical 
corporations are engaging in excessive rent seeking, or gouging the customer, by 
charging high prices. Four types of organizations occupy the role of negotiators in the 




organizations (HMOs), pharmacy benefits managers (PBMs), wholesale distributors, and 
retail pharmacies.  
 
Figure 3.1 Stakeholder Connections in the United States Retail Pharmacy Supply Chain 
3.5.2 Structure of the Pharmaceutical Supply Chain 
 Since the 1980s, HMOs, PBMs, wholesalers, and retail pharmacies have held 
different levels of influence within the pharmaceutical supply chain, but organizations of 
all four types continue to operate as negotiators within the pharmaceutical field. One of 
the key strategies employed by HMOs and PBMs is the use of formularies to restrict 
consumer drug choice and thereby lower the organizational cost of drug coverage. A drug 
formulary is a list of drugs for routine use that have been approved for some level of cost 




guideline’s incentive structure: open, preferred, or closed (Simonet 2007). Drug choice is 
unrestricted in open plans, meaning that any drug that a physician prescribes for the 
patient are covered. In preferred plans, some unlisted drugs are covered only if the patient 
receives prior authorization. Finally, in closed plans, unlisted drugs are not covered in 
any form, meaning that the patient has to pay the total cost out-of-pocket. 
 Cost-effective analysis is the basis of drug evaluations for formulary inclusion. To 
avoid conflicts of interests independent pharmacy and therapeutics committees oversee 
the drug selection process using information from a variety of sources that range from 
anecdotal physician evidence to clinical trial data from pharmaceutical manufactures 
(Neumann 2004). Large market PBMs are able to receive clinical data from 
pharmaceutical corporations that is not publically available because the companies want 
their products listed in the formulary. This practice demonstrates the strength of 
formularies as interorganizational negotiation tools.  
 Critics of the process argue the focus of pharmacy and therapeutics committees is 
on reducing pharmacy budgets rather than patient health. Furthermore, formularies are 
proprietary products and even though efforts to standardize them using evidence-based 
medicine have been made, the decision-making is still black-boxed to a certain extent, 
suggesting that some differentiation between formulary listings are the result of personal 
preferences rather than objective medical evidence (Neumann 2004). These facts indicate 
the interests of pharmacy and therapeutics committees likely align with the logic order of 
commerce.  
  Health Maintenance Organizations were the earliest large organizations that acted 




and his colleagues (1991) pointed out the early efforts of HMOs were designed to reduce 
the cost of pharmaceuticals by discouraging high price drug usage rather than actively 
negotiating lower prices with pharmaceutical corporations. Weiner el al. (1991) stated 
this strategy was adopted primary because prescription drugs accounted for only a small 
part of health care spending for insurers prior to the 1990s, making interorganizational 
negotiation a financially ineffective method to reduce overall health care cost. Rather 
than controlling patients, HMOs sought to control physicians and pharmacists by using 
formularies and imposing mandatory generic substitution rules. While these practices did 
lower the cost of drug usage on individual prescriptions, Weiner el al. (1991) found that 
having drug coverage through an HMO actually increased overall drug usage in patients 
and negated the overall cost reductions for the organization. This outcome is not 
unexpected and is referred to as the moral hazard of health care coverage (Arrow 1963, 
Hoffman 2006). By the end of the 1980s, HMOs and other traditional fee-for-service 
health insurers were increasingly turning to pharmacy benefits managers as a more 
efficient strategy for managing customer drug benefits and reducing drug cost.  
 Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) are third party organizations that negotiate 
rebates and discounts between pharmaceutical manufactures on behalf of their clients: 
HMOs, traditional health insurers, retail pharmacies, the Federal Government, hospitals, 
and other organizations that provide prescription drug access (Simonet 2007, Sroka et al. 
2000). Drug formularies are the primary strategy that PBMs employ as leverage to 
negotiate with pharmaceutical manufactures. Since not all drugs are included in a 
formulary, formularies act to either provide access to or exclude specific pharmaceutical 




corporations want their products to be included in formularies and are willing to negotiate 
rebates directly with PBMs based on the size of the potential market. 
 In addition to managing drug billing for their clients, PBMs also collect data on 
patient pharmaceutical usage and physician prescription records. The collection of patient 
data is valuable for managing individual health by spotting potential drug interactions or 
duplications. Physician prescribing data is useful for payers to assess the success of their 
control mechanisms. The PBM industry is highly concentrated with a few corporations 
controlling large market segments and occupying dominant positions (Simonet 2007). 
The structure of the industry, as well as the value of the data collected by PBMs, led three 
of the largest pharmaceutical corporations to acquire PBMs during the 1990s as a strategy 
of vertical integration; however, almost all of these acquisitions ended as costly failures 
(Simonet 2007). 
 Daniel Simonet (2007) argued while the pharmaceutical corporations that 
acquired PBMs during the 1990s publically presented the actions as intended to improve 
patient quality and safety, the reality was these corporations pursued the acquisitions as a 
strategy to obtain market control. “PBM ownership was a mean to obtain information on 
patients and prescribers, to increase control on drug prescription, to secure an access to 
markets and build entry barriers” (Simonet 2007: 19). The three major pharmaceutical 
corporations that acquired PBMs were Merck, SmithKline Beecham, and Eli Lilly; each 
firm acquired a large PBM with coverage ranging from 14 million patients to 56 million 
patients and at costs between $2.3 billion and $6.6 billion. The pharmaceutical 
corporations argued post-acquisition that these PBMs would operate autonomously from 




formulary changes after the acquisition that benefited the parent firm at the expense of 
other pharmaceutical corporations (Simonet 2007).  
 This strategy of vertical integration, however, resulted in long-term failures in all 
cases because of countervailing actions taken by other stakeholders in the pharmaceutical 
field and unexpected internal complications from the mergers. The first external pressure 
came from government regulators. The Federal Trade Commission intervened in the 
Merck-Medco and Eli Lilly-PCS acquisitions to limit the ability of the parent company to 
alter the PBMs formulary independently. The FTC did not place limits on the SmithKline 
Beecham-Diversified agreement. Physicians also expressed hostility to these acquisitions 
for several reasons: formulary usage denies individual practitioner experience, drug 
pricing is not transparent which complicates formulary compliance, and the asymmetry 
between PBMs and practitioners creates a situation where if practitioners ignore the 
financial arrangements created by the PBM and parent company physicians would no 
longer be the best patient advocates (Simonet 2007). In addition to these external factors, 
PBMs proved difficult to integrate within the structure of the parent company because of 
the firewalls required by the FTC.  
 Financially, these acquisitions did not produce the expected market gains, and by 
2003, all three pharmaceutical companies had spun-off or sold the PBMs they acquired 
(Simonet 2007). While the vertical integration of PBMs did not work for pharmaceutical 
corporations, since Merck’s sale of Medco several major retail pharmacy chains have 
pursued the strategy (Simonet 2007). The most notable examples are the 2007 acquisition 
of Caremark by CVS, the second largest PBM at the time, and the recent announcement 




 Retail pharmacies are another key stakeholder in the pharmaceutical supply chain 
because they are the delivery point to the consumer. In 2014, standalone chain and 
independent pharmacies accounted for 55.5% of the total number of prescriptions filled 
in the U.S. (Drug Channels Institute 2015). Pharmacy outlets in mass merchant or 
supermarkets accounted for another 23.4% of prescriptions filled. Retail pharmacies 
occupy an intersecting position in the supply chain because they negotiate financial 
arrangements with PBMs and insurers for the right to be providers to their clients and 
they negotiate supply orders with wholesalers and pharmaceutical manufactures.  
 The cost of a drug at a retail pharmacy is a component of two factors. First, the 
size of the pharmacy, chain or independent, determines its bargaining power with PBMs 
and insurers (Brooks et al. 2008). Because PBMs gain negotiation power through the 
coverage size of their market, chain pharmacies get better deals than local or independent 
operators. The second factor is the customer type. There are three main categories of 
retail customers: government beneficiaries, private third party covered beneficiaries, and 
cash-paying patients (Brooks et al. 2008). The price a customer pays is based on the 
negotiation between the pharmacy and the PBM with cash customers paying the most; 
therefore, the same drug has different prices within the same pharmacy. The profitability 
of a pharmacy is determined by its ability to negotiate a low payment rate with the PBMs 
and high rebate rates with wholesalers and manufacturers. Brooks et al. (2008) stated that 
approximately 70% of pharmacy stock comes from wholesalers and the remaining 30% 
from manufactures. The fact the majority of retail drugs arrive at pharmacies through 
wholesale distributors is another element distorting the publically listed price for a drug 




3.5.3 The Federal Government as a Powerless Buyer 
 Fligstein and McAdam (2012) explicitly discussed the importance of considering 
the role of government within a strategic action field. Unlike other fields, the Federal 
government occupies two separate roles in the pharmaceutical field. The first role, 
discussed earlier in the chapter, is the regulatory role in determining what products are 
allowed on the market. The second role is as a purchaser of pharmaceutical products 
through different government sponsored health care programs and health care benefits 
provided to government employees. This makes the Federal government the largest single 
purchaser of prescription drugs in the Unites States, but when congress expanded 
Medicare coverage to include prescription drugs, the Federal government was explicitly 
denied the ability to negotiate prices directly with pharmaceutical corporations 
(Newhouse 2004). 
 This legislative restriction has resulted in the United States having higher average 
drug prices on almost all major brand name pharmaceuticals because drug manufactures 
use Medicare prices as the starting point for negotiations with purchasers. By prohibiting 
the largest purchaser to negotiate on prices, the Federal government is forced into the role 
of a price-taker when economic theory on market structure predicts the Federal 
government should be the price-maker (Vogel 2007). Many industry critics contend 
patients in the United States are in essence subsidizing drugs for the rest of the world 
(Goldacre  2012, Lexchin 2006). 
 Medicare Part D, the prescription drug component of Medicare currently enrolls 
72 percent of eligible Medicare beneficiaries (Hoadley et al. 2015). However, despite the 




offers beneficiaries options of plans sponsored by private companies. This further 
undercuts the ability of Medicare to receive favorable prices since program recipients are 
spread across multiple private markets instead of being consolidated into a single 
Medicare market. The other oddity of Medicare Part D is the much maligned “donut 
hole” (Newhouse 2004). The drug plans offered through Medicare Part D provide 
varying levels of coverage up to a certain limit; the average plan’s limit is $3,310 in 2016 
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2015). After the limit is reached, the enrollee is responsible 
for the majority of their drug cost until they reach a total of $4,850 (an out-of-pocket cost 
of $1,540), after which Medicare and the patients’ drug coverage provider again cover 
most of the patients’ drug cost.  
 In addition to Medicare Part D being a complicated system for patients to 
navigate, the program further reveals how pharmaceutical corporations occupy the 
dominant role in the field. In a 2006 letter to the New England Journal of Medicine, 
Congresswoman Louise Slaughter discussed the legislative processes that occurred 
during the final legislative period on Medicare Part D. According to Slaughter (2006), the 
final bill was altered 24 hours before the vote during closed door meetings between 
congressional leaders and industry representatives. Congresswoman Slaughter’s 
assessment makes it clear her colleagues made sure the pharmaceutical industry’s 
interests, in terms of drug pricing and preventing drug reimportation, were represented in 
the bill at the expense of providing patients access to cheaper drugs. 
 In conclusion, the pharmaceutical supply chain in the United States is a complex 
network of several different organizational players. Through various different 




pharmaceutical manufactures. Size is a key organizational feature that provides increased 
bargaining power because size corresponds to the potential market segment a 
pharmaceutical corporation can gain access too. Several large mergers and acquisitions 
occurring within the past two decades have also influenced the pharmaceutical supply 
chain by creating a more concentrated market. The three largest PBMs in 2003, 
controlling 52% of the market, are now two larger organizations with the acquisition of 
Caremark by CVS and the 2012 merger of Express Scripts and Medco Solutions.  
 The organizational strategies of the majority of stakeholders in the pharmaceutical 
supply chain appear to align with the logic of commerce. Suppliers in the field, 
pharmaceutical corporations, retail pharmacies, and wholesalers, act to keep prices high 
in order to maximize profits. Purchasers in the field, pharmacy benefit managers and 
health insurers, negotiate with supplies to reduce their cost but not necessarily the cost to 
patients. The end consumer, patients, are insulated from these negations, which results in 
most patients being unware of the total costs of prescription drugs. The fact complaints 
about high drug costs are made through public media indicates patients as stakeholders 
occupy a marginalized role in the pharmaceutical supply chain. That this marginalization 
of patients affects the organizational strategy of pharmaceutical corporations is indicated 
by the common practice of raising drug prices on acquired products. 
3.6 Conclusion 
 This analysis shows the multitude of stakeholders within the pharmaceutical field 
creates a dynamic system with pharmaceutical organizations at the center. The structure 
of the field is fragmented such that pharmaceutical corporations, while occupying the 




pharmaceutical corporations in general pursuing distinct strategy sets at each site of 
stakeholder interaction. As the previous literature indicates, these strategies are not 
isolated but align with the three logic orders of commerce, care, and science, which 
create differing expectations and power relations.  
 Pharmaceutical corporations interact with the Food and Drug Administration 
through the logic of science. While the FDA represents a potential countervailing actor 
within the field, legislative action has created a situation where the agency is financially 
dependent on pharmaceutical corporations, making anti-industry decisions uncommon. 
Furthermore, the regulation of pharmaceutical products is limited to safety and efficacy 
demonstrated through clinical data gathered primarily from randomized control trials, not 
comparative experiments, preventing the organization from developing best practice 
options for medical professionals. Finally, FDA is dependent on applicants to submit 
data, allowing corporations to manage the review process further by strategically 
selecting the information provided for evaluation. 
 Pharmaceutical corporations interact with patients through the logic of care in two 
capacities. Patients are primarily consumers, and in the United States, pharmaceutical 
corporations are able to market products directly to patients. This allows pharmaceutical 
companies to increase demand for a product directly through advertisements and 
indirectly by raising awareness on an issue as a potential health concern. The second 
component of interaction between pharmaceutical corporations and patients is mediated 
through partnerships with patient advocacy organizations that provide legitimacy for 




 Pharmaceutical corporations interact with physicians through the logic of care. 
This assertion may sound contradictory because the methods of communication between 
theses stakeholders groups are scientific, but the underlying message of the content is on 
improving patient outcomes. The point of medical journal articles from the 
pharmaceutical industry perspective is not to present data for physicians to independently 
evaluate but to use data to support the adoption of a specific treatment. The use of key 
opinion leaders highlights how the delivery of the message is dominant in the interaction 
over the actual scientific value of the results.  
 Finally, pharmaceutical corporations interact with payers and purchasers in the 
pharmaceutical supply chain through the logic of commerce. Pharmaceutical corporations 
dominate these interactions by serving as the price makers in the market. However, the 
complex and fragmented structure of the general U.S. health care system weakens this 
role because large purchaser organizations are able to capitalize on their position as 
gatekeepers to the market and negotiate favorable prices.  
 While the Food and Drug Administration and physicians both act in a regulatory 
capacity between pharmaceutical corporations and the end consumer, patients, their 
overall power in the field has diminished from previous periods. Conversely, patients 
gained power within the field in response to the larger shift in health care management 
towards the logic of commerce but are unable to leverage their stakeholder position to 
negotiate on drug prices. Understanding these current trends and why these stakeholders 
are important within the field requires additional historical context on the formation of 
the field. The next chapter is a historical analysis of the pharmaceutical field in the 





DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES PHARMACEUTICAL FIELD 
4.1 Introduction  
 The purpose of this chapter is to provide historical evidence on the development 
and changes in the United States pharmaceutical field that led to the current dynamics 
discussed in the previous chapter. Historical analysis provides the context institutional 
theorists argue is critical for understanding how organizational behavior is 
institutionalized; specifically historical analysis reveals how changes in stakeholder 
interests and power relationships within a strategic action field act as external effects on 
organizational strategy. Fligstein and McAdam (2012) argue that a historical analysis is a 
critical part of the process for studying strategic actions fields because it identifies 
collective actions, distributions of stakeholder power, and processes of settlement 
negotiation.  
 Power relations in the field, determined by which stakeholder constructs the 
“rules of the game” (North 1990), are revealed by analyzing how settlements are reached 
through negotiations during periods of contention. Changing power dynamics is one 
mechanism that incorporates new institutional frameworks into an established 
organizational field. For example, Scott et al. (2000) demonstrated how changing power 
relations in the national health care field resulted in the organizational strategy of Bay 
Area hospitals shifting to align with the institutional logic of the dominate stakeholder. 




States pharmaceutical field has led to the current field structure of pharmaceutical 
corporations as dominant stakeholders over Federal regulators, physicians, and patients 
and created a field of institutional pluralism between the logics of science, care, and 
commerce.  
 Historical analysis also highlights the value of organizational embeddedness 
advocated by institutional theorists. The strategic adjustments organizations make in 
reaction to environmental changes are more apparent through the history of an 
organizational field. Understanding institutional effects requires evaluating how 
organizations in the same industry respond to the same external mechanisms. 
Institutionalized responses are indicated by strategic patterns between organizations. In a 
field of institutional pluralism, historical patterns in organizational strategy should reveal 
if the dominant logic order within a field changes over time and the relative influence 
between logics.  
 Dominant logic orders are stronger indicators of legitimate strategy; therefore, 
overtime the majority of organizations are predicted to change strategies primarily when 
the dominant logic of the field shifts. Organizations are predicted to adopt alternative 
strategies for organizationally specific reasons. Additionally, organizational strategy can 
be dependent on the historical context of the organization. For example, Powell and 
Sandholtz (2012) showed the professional background of a biotech startup’s founder, 
academic, corporate, or financial industry, had a significant impact on the organizational 
strategy of the firm. As Chandler (1977) and Fligstein (1985) demonstrated, 
organizational strategy within an industry is susceptible to historical changes in 




historical analysis contributes to the project goals by charting the development and 
changes within the pharmaceutical field that allow contemporary organizations legitimate 
options in selecting organizational strategies. 
4.2 Emergence of the Organizational Field, Late 19th Century to 1910s 
 The use of herbs and compounds for medicinal purposes traces back to ancient 
times but the defined organizational field for the pharmaceutical industry in the United 
States developed around the turn of the 20th century. The pharmaceutical trade originated 
in the United States during the Colonial period primarily through importation businesses. 
After the Revolutionary War, the pharmaceutical trade shifted from an importation based 
industry into homegrown manufacturing. While some of these early manufacturers 
reached the level of national distribution, there was little collective action between 
companies. In was only after the Federal government began to propose industry wide 
regulations in the late-19th century that the collective action necessary for a strategic 
action field began to emerge. During this time, pharmaceutical organizations as a group 
acted mainly through reactionary positions to deal with the mobilization of external 
actors on their businesses. This lack of strategic action resulted in the medical profession 
and Federal government becoming the dominant stakeholders when the pharmaceutical 
field emerged at the beginning of the 20th century. 
4.2.1 The Colonial Period and 19th Century  
 Colonists purchased brand name drugs imported from European manufacturers, 
and aside from a few local entrepreneurs capitalizing on Native American “cures,” the 
production of  indigenous pharmaceuticals in the colonies was non-existent (Young 




would purchase or acquire the empty bottles of brand name European products and refill 
them with homemade mixtures. Colonial independence did not immediately change these 
practices, as industrious new American producers packaged their products in containers 
resembling the imported goods to capitalize on customer loyalty (Young 1961). The 
increasing consumption caused by an expanding middle class and loose, or non-existent, 
regulations lead to an explosion of novel drug products on the American market during 
the 19th century. 
 Drug manufacturing during the 19th century was not unified by the collective 
behavior that defines strategic action fields but instead was divided between medical 
practitioners who produced their own products or had pharmacists mix compounds by 
prescription, small manufactures who produced known compounds for pharmacies to 
distribute, and patent medicine companies which marketed and sold secret formula 
products directly to the public (Starr 1982). Patent medicine companies did not actually 
sell patented products as they are defined by current patent law, which requires patent 
seekers to submit the chemical details of a product to the government, but sold 
proprietary products, allowing them to keep the formulas secret. These companies varied 
in scale from small firms with local distribution operations to larger firms with regional 
and national distributions (Young 1961).  
 Patent medicine companies were direct competitors to physicians in the 19th 
century by not only manufacturing drugs for curative purposes, but also publishing 
guides to achieve good health and inviting people to write in to them for personal health 
advice. Patent medicine companies threatened the organization of professional medicine 




and companies were not required to demonstrate their efficacy or provide more than 
anecdotal evidence in support of their curative claims. Patient medicine companies 
employed strategies that framed their products as resulting from scientific discoveries 
when in fact they rarely conducted any scientific evaluations on the products. 
 Starr’s (1982: 128) example of William Radam’s Microbe Killer is an example of 
how patent medicine companies gained legitimacy for their products through association 
with the medical community’s science based professional project during the 19th century 
(Abbott 1988). Radam’s Microbe Killer was a homemade tonic consisting of water, red 
wine, hydrochloric and sulphuric acid. The product’s success is attributed not to its 
efficacy, but to William Radam’s skillful advertising by capitalizing on the discovery of 
microbes (Young 1961, Starr 1982). The American Medical Association adopted a 
classification system in the late-19th century to distinguish between drug products and 
assert jurisdictional control over pharmaceutical treatment. The classification system 
divided pharmaceuticals into two categories: “ethical” preparations with known 
compositions advertised directly to medical professionals and available to patients only 
by prescription and “patent medicines” with secret formulas marketed directly to the 
public and available without physician oversight (Starr 1982). This categorization was an 
attempt to prevent patent medicines from being viewed as legitimate medical treatments 
by the public.   
4.2.2 Patent Medicine Companies 
 Lydia Pinkham and her Vegetable Compound is a classic example of the products 
produced by the patent medicine industry and the organizational strategies pursued by 




schoolteacher who took an herbal formula that her husband had received through a debt 
settlement and, with a few alterations, began selling it as a cure-all tonic (Conrad and 
Leiter 2008). Originally, Pinkham made her nostrum in the basement of her home in 
Lynn, Massachusetts and sold it locally but she expanded her business through the 
strategic use of newspaper advertisements. First advertised in the Boston Herald in 1876, 
Lydia E. Pinkham’s Vegetable Compound, was touted as a treatment for “Female 
Weaknesses”, which included menstrual cramps, diseases of the kidneys, and other issues 
related to female anatomy (Conrad and Leiter 2008, Starr 1982).  
 Pinkham marketed her product directly to consumers and advertised her product 
not only as a cure for specific illnesses but also as a substitute for treatments offered by 
medical professionals. Starr (1982) recounts one instance of a woman who wrote 
Pinkham to inquire if Pinkham’s compound would cure her prolapsed uterus because she 
wanted to avoid the operation her physician said was necessary. Pinkham’s reply was, 
“By all means avoid instrumental treatment for your trouble. Use the Compound as you 
have been using it – faithfully and patiently – and it will eventually work a cure” (Starr 
1982: 128). This example illustrates the dominant organizational strategy of patent 
medicine companies at the time: marketing is what matters. James Young (1961) argued 
the patent medical industry was pivotal in creating modern mass advertising. One of the 
more extreme marketing tactics used by patent medical companies that led to public 
outcry and eventual regulations on advertising methods was painting cliff sides along 
railroad routes (Young 1961). With no formal or legal federal regulation of drug 
production, companies had considerable leeway to make health claims about their 




 Direct to consumer advertisements and the personal touch of advice letters proved 
successful for Pinkham’s company. In fact, the company continued to advise women to 
write Mrs. Pinkham for almost 20 years after her death. The success of Lydia E. 
Pinkham’s Vegetable Compound is attributed to the company’s marketing strategy rather 
than any curative properties of the tonic (Conrad and Leiter 2008). Starr (1982) argued it 
was reliance on direct marketing over substantive evidence, specifically the positioning 
of nostrums and tonics as alternatives to professional treatment, that lead to the eventual 
decline of the patent medicine companies in the early 20th century. Young’s (1961) 
detailed analysis of specific patent medicines supports this conclusion as well and 
illustrates how flamboyant owners made some of the biggest patent medicine fortunes 
through showmanship rather than clinical efficacy. 
4.2.3 External Pressure and Collective Action 
 Patent medicine companies established the Proprietary Medicine Manufactures 
and Dealers Association in 1881 as a lobbying organization to repeal the taxes on 
proprietary drugs enacted during the Civil War (Young 1961). The Proprietary Medicine 
Manufactures and Dealers Association actions focused on the business structure of the 
industry, advocating mainly for lower tax rates and the freedom to make health claims in 
marketing. Their competitors, physicians and other medical professionals, created 
professional associations that focused on developing a cohesive institutional logic of 
professionalism for their practices based on science. The result was the emergence of the 
organizational field of pharmaceutical development with only one stakeholder possessing 





 The American Medical Association initially rejected the use of patent drugs as 
valid treatment options by physicians on the grounds that medical knowledge and 
techniques should belong to the profession but the organization did not have enough 
political power to inforce this rule nor influence public policy regarding drugs until the 
beginning of the 20th century (Starr 1982). Starr (1982) argued three changes occurred 
between 1900 and 1910 that allowed professional medicine to gain dominance over the 
patent drug manufacturers: muckraking journalists and other progressives joining the 
cause against these products, a growing membership finally giving the AMA the 
necessary financial resources to launch successful lobbying and public awareness 
campaigns, and ethical drug makers beginning to recognize their dependence on 
physicians as gatekeepers.  
 Throughout the 19th century patent medicine makers were constantly subjected to 
negative publicity; however, with the large diversity of newspapers, the most successful 
manufactures were able to maintain their market share by purchasing favorable editorials 
from competing publishers or even disturbing their own publications (Young 1961). The 
ability of patent medicine manufactures to purchase or present favorable counter opinions 
started to change around the turn of the 20th century corresponding to rise of professional 
journalism. Muckraking journalists began to increasingly target patent medicine 
companies through exposés that revealed fraudulent products and practices. Starr (1982) 
detailed the work of Samuel Hopkins Adams at Collier’s Weekly noting how his series of 
articles targeted a wide range of companies and used tactics such as printing the 
headstones of individuals who died of diseases shortly after taking the supposed cures. 




pharmaceutical industry by furthering the jurisdictional claims of professional medicine 
as the only legitimate source for evaluating drugs in the minds of the public. “The 
message underlying the exposés was that commercial interests were dangerous to health 
and that physicians had to be trusted” (Starr 1982: 130). 
 Financially both the popular press and medical journals remained dependent on 
the patent medicine industry for the substantial amount of income brought in by their 
advertisements. This relationship was altered with the American Medical Association 
1906 publication New and Nonofficial Remedies (Conrad and Leiter 2008, Starr 1982). 
This publication was tied to the passage of the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act that created 
the Bureau of Chemistry to test products for adulteration and contamination following the 
widespread revelations of the practices in the food processing industry popularized in 
Upton Sinclair’s 1906 novel The Jungle. The AMA also established its own lab to test 
drugs and a Council on Pharmacy and Chemistry to set acceptable standards for the 
compounds listed as ethical drugs that physicians used to prescribe from (Starr 1982). It 
is interesting to note here that neither AMA nor federal approval guaranteed a drug was 
safe or effective but only meant “that the drug companies would be honest about the 
contents of their wares, would not knowingly make fraudulent claims about their 
efficacy, and would not bypass physicians’ authority” (Conrad and Leiter 2008: 828). 
 While not a formal legal agreement between physicians and drug companies, 
Conrad and Leiter (2008) use the term gentlemen’s agreement, these actions further 
structured the field because the AMA took an exclusionary stance. Drug manufacturers 
could submit to testing and be allowed to continue advertising directly to physicians in 




could continue advertising and selling directly to the public. In essence, the AMA 
established itself not only as a gatekeeper between drug companies and potential patients 
but also acted as an internal governance unit2 within the field by signaling the legitimacy 
of the approved drugs to physicians and patients. The AMA’s success in legitimizing its 
claims can be judged by the actions of newspapers which began cutting back on 
advertisements for patent drugs listed as fraudulent by the AMA despite the fact that this 
meant a reduction in revenue.  
 Patent medicines did not disappear from American life quickly. The initial federal 
regulatory laws of 1906 proved weak and allowed manufactures of over-the-counter 
drugs and other goods to continue asserting unfounded health claims about their products 
and positioning them as alternatives to expensive physician visits and treatments (Tomes 
2001, Young 1961). Moreover, as Nancy Tomes (2001) pointed out, the high cost of care 
during the “Golden Age” of medicine, between the 1920s and 1960s, resulted in many 
people being priced out of the brand name prescription drug market and continuing to 
rely on patent medicine products as a source of care. However, the strengthening of 
federal regulation around the middle of the 20th century combined with the scientific 
advancements made in pharmaceutical development successfully removed patent drugs 
from the organizational field of the pharmaceutical industry.      
 In summation, the organizational field of pharmaceuticals in the United States 
emerged at the beginning of the 20th century largely as the result of professional 
medicine’s attempt to gain social legitimacy by expanding its jurisdiction over all aspects 
                                                          
2 Fligstein and McAdam (2012) define internal governance units as organizations “charged with overseeing 
compliance with field rules, and in general, facilitating the overall smooth functioning and reproduction of 




of health care. The structure of the field at this time was one dominated by a single 
stakeholder, medical professionals. With the passage of the 1906 Pure Food and Drug 
Act, the Federal government also emerged as a stakeholder in the field. Ethical drug 
producers became dependent on medical professionals for access to the market because 
physicians, with the assistance of the American Medical Association and federal laws, 
had become the gatekeepers to patients.  
 Patent medicine companies were a diverse group of organizations with only a few 
tenuous connections between the largest and most profitable firms. Patent medicine 
companies pursued profit maximizing strategies; however, like other commercial 
organizations at the time, these strategies were highly variable due to the fragmented 
legal and market system of the country. Ethical drug manufactures of the time also lacked 
a structure for engaging in collective action, but these organizations did have more 
uniform organizational strategies that aligned with the goals and expectations established 
by the AMA. The structure of the field was shaped further during the early decades of the 
20th century by serval diverse mechanisms: the development of in-house research labs at 
pharmaceutical corporations, a rise in academic-corporate research connections, highly 
public drug disasters leading to calls for enhanced government regulation, changes in 
patent laws regarding research conducted using government grants, and scientific 
advancements in biochemistry and pharmacology.   
4.3 Laboratory Development and Industry-Academic Collaboration, 1920-1940 
 The primary dynamic altering the pharmaceutical field during the interwar period, 
1920-1940, was changes in organizational strategy as pharmaceutical companies in the 




research relationships with universities. Prior to World War I, most large pharmaceutical 
manufactures in the United States had no interest in developing new drugs and were 
concerned primarily with the profitable production of known chemical compounds 
discovered by European chemists (Swann 1990). This led to a negative relationship 
between industry and research universities highlighted by the American Society for 
Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics’ ban on membership for individuals 
employed by industry that lasted from the association’s founding in 1908 until 1941.  
One reason American firms had little interest beyond reproduction based manufacturing 
was that the German and British pharmaceutical industries dominated drug development 
and production, but when World War I cut off the supply of European medicines, 
American pharmaceutical corporations realized that increasing production capacity could 
be economically beneficial (MacGarvie and Furman 2005). The strengthened patent and 
intellectual property laws combined with the auctioning off of German intellectual 
property at the end of the First World War served as additional factors influencing the 
creation of in-house research laboratories within America pharmaceutical corporations.  
4.3.1 In-House Research Laboratories 
 Swann (1990: 79) wrote, “If American firms learned anything from their German 
counterparts after the war, they learned that to remain at the cutting edge of practical 
therapeutics research was essential.” Pharmaceutical companies after the war began 
strategically investing internally by building in-house laboratories and hiring trained 
scientific staff to conduct research on new products. By the early 1930s, the annual 
investment in research and development at the largest firms in the country was regularly 




proved challenging since many of the executives at large firms had business 
backgrounds, as opposed to scientific backgrounds, which meant that they understood 
little about the research process. To overcome this lack of knowledge, industry leaders 
adopted two strategies: recruiting heavy from the already developed research programs in 
the university system and developing collaborative research relationships with 
universities. 
 Jeffrey L. Furman and Megan MacGarvie’s (2005, 2008, and 2009) detailed 
analysis of industry-university relationships during this time revealed several key 
mechanism shaped the strategies of these collaborations. Furman and MacGarvie (2009) 
noted geographic proximity influenced these relationships through:  
“a pattern in which firms with limited (or no) R&D capabilities are 
generally constrained to work with local partners while firms with greater 
internal R&D capabilities seek primarily local partners for smaller-scale 
projects and projects for which general skills are appropriate and distant 
partners for larger-scale projects an extraordinary projects.” (p. 937) 
At the same time, the rise of in-house research labs also benefited local universities by 
providing jobs for graduates. This labor market connection between universities and 
industry served to strengthen the scientific legitimacy of industrial research and 
development as evidenced by membership movements within the American Society for 
Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics during the 1920s to end the ban on 
industry employees (Parascandola 1990).  
 The developing relationship between industry and academics was reciprocal. 




faculty fellowships, grants, and renting laboratory space (MacGarvie and Furman 2005). 
Not all corporate financial donations were unrestricted; companies acted strategically in 
some cases by dictating the research agenda to grant recipients as a method for 
supplementing or substituting for in-house research and by constructing grant agreements 
that established the company’s legal claim over discoveries (Swann 1990). Despite the 
fact such tactics reinforced the negative image of the industry researcher in academic 
circles, a sentiment famously portrayed in Sinclair Lewis’s 1925 novel Arrowsmith, 
universities welcomed the money to expand their research programs. In the other 
direction, hiring trained academics led to changes in organizational strategy within 
pharmaceutical companies as these new employees brought scientific ideology into 
commercial research and development. At some companies, former academics had 
considerable leeway in setting up the laboratory and determining the research agenda 
(MacGarvie and Furman 2005). 
4.3.2 Increasing Federal Regulation 
 A highly publicized incident of product adulteration marked the end of this 
period. The deaths of over 100 individuals by a contaminated patent medicine facilitated 
to the passage of the 1938 Food and Drug Administration Reform Act, which 
significantly restructured the field by strengthening the federal government’s role as a 
regulator. Sulfanilamide product use, established by the late 1930s for the treatment of 
common colds, pneumonia, and venereal diseases, was common throughout Europe and 
the United States. Dr. Massengill’s Elixir Sulfanilamide was a patent medicine produced 
in Bristol, Tennessee and distributed across the country, with higher usage among blacks 




Massengill Company was a patent medicine company, the Elixir Sulfanilamide was 
distributed to patients by prescription. 
 During the summer of 1937, the S.E. Massengill Company began producing and 
distributing a liquid form of Elixir Sulfanilamide that contained diethylene glycol, an 
anti-freeze component, to improve the taste. In the following months over 100 people 
died from using the product. The media coverage and public outcry that followed this 
incidence focused on how no product safety evaluation was required prior to sale so the 
only law the S.E. Massengill Company violated was fraudulently mislabeling the elixir as 
containing alcohol.  
 This incident illustrates the larger dynamics between stakeholders in the field at 
the time, because physicians made the first reports of illness and death directly to the 
AMA, not the FDA (Carpenter 2010), underscoring the dominant role of the AMA in 
drug regulation. The AMA immediately sent a request to the company for product 
samples and tested them at the AMA Chemical Laboratory, which concluded the 
diethylene glycol additive was the cause of the death. The FDA started its own 
investigation three days after the AMA received the first death notification, and the 
agency’s analysis of the elixir reached the same conclusion.    
 Coincidently, debate on a bill reforming the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act had 
begun in early 1937 but had failed to lead to any legislative changes. The coverage of the 
sulfanilamide incidence generated publicity that the FDA capitalized on to lobby for 
stronger provisions than those contained in the initial revision proposals. While Carpenter 
(2010) cautioned against assigning too much credit to this sulfanilamide incidence for 




the FDA’s power by giving the agency the authority to formally regulate drugs through 
pre-market review. Nonetheless, industry lobbying efforts were successful in limiting this 
provision to the evaluation of product safety only, leaving the evaluation of efficacy 
solely to the AMA (Carpenter 2010, Greene & Podolsky 2009). 
 In summation, during the interwar years the dominant strategy of American 
pharmaceutical companies shifted from manufacturing known chemical compounds to 
researching new products. This change was made possible in part because of the prior 
investments by universities in building research programs which provided the industry 
with access to the skilled scientist necessary to construct and run in-house research 
departments. This new strategy provided the possibility for logics of science to be 
incorporated within a pharmaceutical corporation. The differing capabilities of 
pharmaceutical companies to invest in scientific research also led to the emergence of a 
strategic division within the industry between research organizations and compound 
manufactures (Chandler 2005). The coexistence of different organizational strategies 
within the same organizational type is an indicator institutional pluralism within the field. 
  Despite the creation of the FDA in 1906 through the Pure Food and Drug Act, the 
organization lacked the authority to directly influence field development and occupied a 
mostly reactionary role during this period. The passage of the 1938 Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetics Act laid the foundation for the FDA to gain authority and direct influence in 
the field. The stakeholder interests of the FDA and professional medicine aligned during 
this period with both advocating for stronger scientific evaluations on pharmaceutical 
products against industry arguments based around the logic of commerce. Public concern 




organizational strategies based on the logic of care. The developing power of the FDA 
was an important mechanism that shaped the field during the next few decades, but 
significant scientific advancements also heavily influenced the next period of field 
restructuring.  
4.4 Scientific Advancement and the Rise of the FDA, 1945-1962 
 The field dynamics in the years following the Second World War were 
characterized by scientific advancements that led to an increase in novel drugs on the 
market, the increased adoption of market based competitive practices by pharmaceutical 
corporations, the FDA assuming the dominant stakeholder position as a regulator, and the 
declining influence of medical professionals. The adoption of penicillin use early in 
World War II demonstrated the commercial viability of antibiotics, and drug innovations 
in general, spurring extensive research into antibiotics during the war and resulting in 
multiple new antibiotic products coming on the market after the war. By 1949, antibiotics 
were the largest prescription sales category and accounted for 10.8% of new prescriptions 
sold that year (Lee 2003). The successes of antibiotics lead to an increased focus on drug 
innovation by pharmaceutical corporations, and by the 1950s research and development 
competition had produced such a large number of marketable new drugs it is now 
considered the heyday of drug discovery (Lee 2003).  
4.4.1 Organizational Changes in Pharmaceutical Corporations 
 The focus on research and development, however, was not spread evenly between 
organizations within the industry. Differences in research capabilities led to increased 
field heterogeneity as drug manufacturers segmented further between firms developing 




(Chandler 2005, Lee 2003, Mazzoleni 2013). Jeho Lee’s (2003) research identified 
several key factors that led to this market segmentation. During the interwar period, there 
was not much differentiation between innovator and imitator pharmaceutical firms other 
than firm size. Innovator firms would develop new products but the simplicity of the 
chemical molecules allowed imitator firms to develop similar compounds. World War II 
resulted in innovator firms making strategic decisions to commit more resources to 
research; specifically Lee (2003) showed that innovator firms hired more biologists and 
scientists to expand their in-house research departments while imitator firms maintained 
roughly the same percentage of research staff. 
 The development of multiple new drugs within the same therapeutic class led to 
more market based competition between firms because of the lack of clear differences in 
outcomes between treatments. The 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act increased 
restrictions on what drugs could be sold directly to the public and states began passing 
no-substitution3 laws for filling prescriptions in the 1950s, four states in 1953 and 44 by 
1959 (Mazzoleni 2013). As a result, physicians became more important to the industry in 
their role as gatekeepers to the customer. These factors led pharmaceutical companies to 
develop strategies for influencing physicians directly, and “Over the course of the 1950s, 
pharmaceutical companies developed sophisticated promotional structures for their 
products, linking advertising, salesmanship, and direct mail with public relations, journal 
publications, conference presence, and even the research process itself” (Greene & 
Podolsky 2009:338).  
                                                          
3 No-substitution, or anti-substitution, laws were an attempt by pharmaceutical corporations to protect the 
market of their brand name products by making it illegal for pharmacists to substitute a physician’s brand 
name prescription with a generic product. The laws were eventual repealed during the 1970s (see 




 Jeremey Greene and Scott Podolsky (2009) analyzed this changing dynamic 
between pharmaceutical companies and physicians in detail. One of the factors 
influencing the restructuring of the relationship was that the sheer volume of new drugs 
coming on the market made it impossible for the average practicing physician to keep up 
with the research. Aware of this fact, pharmaceutical companies began expanding their 
sales forces, known at time as detail men, who would go to physicians’ offices and 
“educate” them about new products. One example Greene and Podolsky (2009) cited to 
support this change in organizational strategy was Pfizer increasing its number of detail 
men from eight in 1950 to 2,000 by 1958.  
 The use of detail men (at this time they were all men) was a contested issue within 
professional medicine. One group of medical professionals argued that these men 
purposely misled physicians by presenting only the benefits of the products that they 
represented. Other medical professionals countered that it was the physician’s job to 
verify the information presented and since the FDA reviewed marketed drugs for safety 
there was minimal risk to patients in choosing one product over another. Sociological 
research at the time revealed that while most physicians were conscious of the sales 
dynamic behind their interactions with detail men, they primarily found them a valuable 
way for learning about new products (Fox 1961, Greene and Podolsky 2009). At the field 
level, pharmaceutical companies were using detail men to shift the role of physicians as 
stakeholders within the field from self-reliant gatekeepers to consumer gatekeepers.  
 Another factor contributing to the high output of pharmaceutical development was 
the increased financial support for academic research from federal grants. Funding for the 




million by 1950 and reached 400 million in 1960 (Mazzoleni 2011). This increased 
federal funding changed the field dynamics of the previous period where industry money 
dominated the sponsorship of academic research to one where industry money was 
eventually dwarfed by federal expenditures. This change threatened to disrupt the 
collaborative structure of the industry-academic relationship as academics were no longer 
dependent on industry money to fund their labs and the ownership of work resulting from 
public funding became contested (Berman 2008).  
4.4.2 The Rise of the FDA 
 Like the interwar period, this period in field restructuring also ended with a highly 
publicized drug accident followed by new federal legislation redefining the authority and 
responsibility of field stakeholders. Thalidomide, used as a sedative and anti-nausea 
medication and commonly given to pregnant women to treat morning sickness, was 
released in the European market starting in 1957 but was rejected for the U.S. market by 
the FDA. Millions of European women used the drug and by end of 1961, Thalidomide 
use had become linked to a dramatic increase in birth defects. While the drug was never 
available in the U.S., a front-page Washington Post article on July 15, 1962 by Morton 
Mintz brought the issue national attention and made Frances Kelsey, the FDA staff 
member who rejected the application, a household name. President Kennedy would 
eventually honor Ms. Kelsey for her role at the FDA in preventing thalidomide tragedies 
in the United States, crystallizing a new public image of the FDA as the guardian of 
public health (Carpenter 2010).  
 Prior to Mintz’s article there was very little press coverage on the Thalidomide 




was not the result of a concerned journalist’s investigation, it was a strategic ploy by 
Senator Estes Kefauver, whose antitrust subcommittee provided Mintz with the details 
and Kelsey’s name (Carpenter 2010). Senator Estes Kefauver had started a series of 
hearings on the practices of the pharmaceutical industry in 1959. Originally focused on 
the pricing of prescription drugs, which had skyrocketed in the increasingly competitive 
post-World War II market, the hearings became a platform for Senator Kefauver to argue 
that broader reforms of the industry were needed. Senator Kefauver’s purposed 
amendments would strengthen the FDA regulatory statues in the 1938 Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetics Act but industry opposition to Kefauver’s provisions on restricting patent 
protections and AMA opposition over allowing a government agency to determine 
efficacy had stalled legislation until the 1962 coverage on the thalidomide incident began 
(Carpenter 2010). Newspaper articles calling for drug reforms escalated after the FDA 
further revealed on July 28, 1962 that while thalidomide had never been commercially 
available in the U.S. it had been widely distributed to American patients on an 
experimental basis.  
 The strong public outcry that followed provided the advantage Senator Kefauver 
and the FDA needed to move a new reform bill through congress. President Kennedy 
signed the Drug Amendment of 1962, also called the Kefauver-Hatch Act, on October 10, 
1962. This marked a significant shift in the dynamics of the organizational field as the 
bill expanded the role of the FDA by granting it the authority to conduct pre-market test 
on drug efficacy in addition to safety. The burden of proof was placed on the drug 
application’s sponsor to provide the FDA with the data necessary for evaluation. The 




clinical trials. It is the Kefauver-Hatch Act that led to randomized control trials (RCT) 
becoming the gold standard for drug evaluation in the United States.  
 The Kefauver-Hatch Act had several key effects on the process of drug 
development in the Unites States. The most notable effect of the 1962 legislation was the 
increased burden of testing required by the FDA that further fragmented the field of drug 
companies between innovators and imitators. The increased cost in developing innovative 
drugs reduced the competitive prospects of small and medium sized firms to be 
innovators allowing large, integrated corporations to dominate the novel drug market 
(Mazzoleni 2011). At the same time, the increased regulatory process lengthened the time 
it took for a drug to enter the market, conversely reducing the patent protection period of 
new drugs and thereby their profitability.  
 In conclusion, the period between the Second World War and 1962 brought 
scientific advancements and increased regulatory measures to the pharmaceutical field. 
Scientific advancement created progress in the treatment of disease but also furthered the 
division of organizational strategy between research and development firms and basic 
manufactures. While this fragmentation between organizational strategies might be 
expected to decrease the authority of pharmaceutical corporations as stakeholders in the 
field, the large corporations that were created managed to gain more power within the 
field over the following decades. Industry opposition to the Kefauver-Hatch Act indicates 
that while logic of care had been incorporated into the field it was not the dominant 
strategy of pharmaceutical corporations. 
 The Kefauver-Hatch Act gave the FDA increased regulatory authority and 




as a gatekeeper to both physicians and patients. The public perception of the FDA’s role 
further supported the organizations increased authority and legitimatized Federal 
regulation under the logic of care, in addition to the existing logic of science. However, 
tensions between pharmaceutical corporations and FDA would result in the regulatory 
dominance of the field being short.  
4.5 The Biotechnology Revolution and Organizational Change, 1970s – 1990s 
 The biotechnology revolution during the 1970s had a major impact on 
pharmaceuticals not only through scientific advancements in disease treatment but also 
by reshaping the structure of the industry. Biotechnology resulted in the emergence of a 
distinct subfield of new organizations and organizational forms, as well as, new 
relationships between pharmaceutical corporations and financial firms (Cockburn 2004, 
Henderson et al. 1999, Powell and Owen-Smith 2012, Powell and Sandholtz 2012). The 
biotechnology revolution provides the strongest historical evidence that multiple 
organizational strategies are legitimate within the pharmaceutical field.  
 By the early 1990s, established pharmaceutical corporations also faced mounting 
drug development cost stemming from the increased regulatory requirements, increased 
financial burdens from following the general trend of American corporations to become 
multi-divisional conglomerates, and mounting revenue pressure from firms’ increasing 
reliance on blockbuster drugs to generate income (Aitken et al. 2009, Chandler 2005, 
Kaplan 2006, Scherer 2001, Vogel 2007). The combination of these endogenous and 
external factors changed the dynamics within the field, specifically resulting in changes 





4.5.1 Scientific Advancements and Biotechnology 
 Prior to the 1970s drug development followed a process called random screening 
where natural and chemical compounds were tested randomly in laboratories for their 
possible therapeutic qualities (Chandler 2005, Cockburn 2004, Henderson et al 1999). 
This process of research relied primarily on basic science and allowed pharmaceutical 
corporations to build cost efficient in-house laboratories capable of the large scale testing 
that was necessary to find a few successful candidates for development from thousands of 
possibilities.  
 Following World War II this process proved highly profitable for pharmaceutical 
corporations in the United States who were able to produce a steady output of new drugs 
and become major players in the global pharmaceutical market (Chandler 2005). Some 
scholars refer to this time as the golden age of the pharmaceutical industry because of the 
sheer number of new products that emerged. However, other researchers are careful to 
point out the expansion of productivity between 1950-1990 benefited from the exogenous 
structural effects of research opportunities combined with unmet consumer need, as much 
as, internal management strategy (Henderson et al. 1999). Random screening was 
profitable only as long as large pharmaceutical corporations benefited from scale and 
scope: scale benefits occurred from having the resources to test thousands of chemical 
compounds to find a handful of therapeutically viable ones and scope benefits occurred 
from conducting research in a field with many potential discoveries. Stated less 
technically, the golden age of pharmaceuticals was really a period when companies were 





 In the late 1960s, pharmaceutical corporations began to benefit from scientific 
advancements in microbiology and enzymology resulting from the increased public 
funding of university research following WWII (Chandler 2005, Henderson et al. 1999). 
This new biochemical knowledge allowed pharmaceutical researchers to shift from 
random screening towards guided discovery or discovery by design research processes. 
Under random screening process, researchers could not effectively hit therapeutic targets 
and regularly discovered treatments for diseases that they were not actively searching for. 
The discovery by design process allowed researchers to test molecular compounds for 
specific therapeutic effects within the laboratory. This knowledge affected the field by 
reducing the benefits of scale gained by large firms and increased the benefits of strategic 
management within research programs.  
 The development of discovery by design research technology opened up the 
possibility that small firms could develop a marketable new product by strategically 
investing their limited research resources. However, adoption of this process for drug 
development was not evenly distributed throughout the industry (Chandler 2005). 
Incumbent firms with profitable portfolios were able to incorporate discovery by design 
techniques sooner because of the increased cost requirements for updating facilities and 
hiring new scientific personnel.  
 By 1993, the American companies of Merck, Pfizer, Abbot Laboratories, Eli 
Lilly, and Bristol-Myers Squibb were global leaders in the pharmaceutical field through 
the adoption of research by design strategies and each brought in over five billion dollars 
a year in revenue (Chandler 2005). Large corporations like these are now collectively 




other field level effect from the adoption of discovery by design was a consolidation of 
large pharmaceutical companies producing new molecular entities (Munos 2010). 
However, the biotechnology revolution of the early 1970s also resulted in the emergence 
of many small firms and a new organizational form that had an even greater impact on 
the structure of the field and the established corporations. 
 The biotechnology revolution began with academic discoveries in molecular 
biology, specifically recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology, and created advancements in 
pharmaceutical research by allowing for mass production of large molecule proteins with 
known therapeutic qualities and by providing tools to increase development efficiency for 
small molecule chemical drugs (Henderson et al. 1999). Unlike the scientific advances in 
biochemistry, established pharmaceutical corporations did not readily adopt molecular 
biology research in part because the successful development of these new products 
required significant investments in both new knowledge and changes to the 
manufacturing process. Large firms were also hesitant early adopters because the 
surrounding scientific uncertainty over whether these molecules would be profitable to 
manufacture on a commercial scale and the public concern over the perception of 
biomolecular research as genetic engineering (Henderson et al. 1999, Whittaker and 
Bower 1994). What occurred in the pharmaceutical field during the late 1970s was a rare 
event in an established industry: the emergence of a new organizational form. 
 Walter Powell and Kurt Sandholtz’s (2012) work details the institutional forces 
leading to the emergence of what they refer to as the Dedicated Biotechnology Firm 
(DBF). One of the unique factors creating these firms was the tightness between 




were making the discoveries within the fields of microbiology founded many of the new 
DBFs. Genentech, the first DBF to go public, was founded in 1976 by venture capitalist 
Robert Sawson and Herbert Boyer, a faculty member at the University of California San 
Francisco and one of the discoverers of the rDNA replication technique. Other early firms 
with academic founders who maintained their university connections were Cetus 1971, 
Biogen 1978, Hybritech 1978, Centocor 1979, and Chiron 1981 (Powell and Sandholtz 
2012).  
 Powell and Sandholtz (2012) argued these early DBFs were divided into two 
models of operational strategy: those with scientific orientations and those with 
commerce orientations. DBFs with scientific orientations were distinct within the 
pharmaceutical field not only because of the ties that they maintained with academic 
research centers but also because they emphasized the publication of their findings in 
peer reviewed journals. Commerce oriented DBFs were defined by having serial 
entrepreneur founders and poaching senior executives from established health care or 
traditional pharmaceutical corporations in the early stages of their development. 
Dedicated biotechnology firms had a huge impact on the structure of the pharmaceutical 
field itself through the relationship structure of their tie formation with large established 
pharmaceutical corporations.  
 As stated earlier, large pharmaceutical corporations did not take initiative at the 
start of the biotechnology revolution to build their own molecular biology programs but 
neither did these firms ignore this scientific breakthrough. Large pharmaceutical 
companies played a pivotal role in the down-stream process of developing marketable 




As small firms, DBFs were able to secure the money needed for basic research through 
public funding and venture capital investments but these sources were not able or willing 
to provide the necessary capital to build the manufacturing capacity required for 
commercialization. This allowed established pharmaceutical firms to form collaborative 
alliances with DBFs that provided Big Pharma firms with exposure to the new research 
technologies and DBFs with a pathway to the market. Collaborative relationships 
between DBFs and Big Pharma ranged from joint venture research and development 
projects to in-licensing4 products depending on the needs of the organizations involved 
(Chandler 2005, Cockburn 2004, Galambos and Sturchio 1998, Henderson et al. 1999, 
Powell and Sandholtz 2012). 
 Powell and Jason Owen-Smith (2012) analyzed the effects of the network 
structure of DBFs and determined not only did the type of tie formation indicate three 
distinct periods of field development between 1988 and 2004, but that the overall 
network became increasingly consolidated around a few key DBFs with new tie 
formation peaking in 1997. This work corresponds to the findings from other researchers 
(Chandler 2005, Powell and Sandholtz 2012, Sowlay and Lloyd 2010) who noted many 
of the early DBFs failed or were acquired by their Big Pharma collaborators. Of the 11 
prominent early biotech firms identified by Powell and Sandholtz (2012) only one, 
Amgen currently the world’s largest independent biotechnology corporation, is still an 
independent company, the remaining 10 firms have all been acquired. Chandler’s (2005) 
list of top eight biotechnology corporations in 1994 has considerable overlap with Powell 
                                                          
4 In-licensing is when one company carries out the research and development but another company is 
responsible for the manufacturing and marketing of a product, or when a company acquires the intellectual 




and Sandholtz’s (2012) list but shows the same results. Of Chandler’s (2005) top eight 
biotechnology companies posting over $100 million in revenue in 1994, only Amgen is 
still an independent corporation.  
 Another important factor about the biotechnology revolution was its highly 
localized structure, not only globally but also nationally. Henderson et al. (1999) argued 
there were four key institutional factors that resulted in the U.S. emergence and 
domination in biotechnology: public support of health related research, strong intellectual 
property protection, regulatory procedure for product approval, and a lucrative system of 
health care reimbursement. The global effect of American domination in biotechnology is 
seen through the rate of alliances between American DBFs and foreign Big Pharma 
(Chandler 2005, Rasmussen 2002, Whittaker and Bowen 1994). The biotechnology 
revolution was also highly localized within the United States. Powell et al. (2012) and 
Cooke (2004) discussed how difference in local resources lead to the emergence of high-
tech clusters or bioscience mega centers in Boston, San Francisco, and San Diego while 
hindering their development in other areas. 
 The scientific advancements of the 1970s had profound effects on the dynamics 
between pharmaceutical organizations within the field. Large corporations successful in 
adopting the new processes of research and development for chemical compounds raised 
the barriers of entry for other manufactures seeking to develop innovative products. 
Rather than disrupting the field, the biotechnology revolution resulted in the emergence 
of a new sub-field of dedicated biotechnology firms. The high cost of mass production 
acted as a barrier to entry for these firms to challenge the incumbent pharmaceutical 




network between firms. The strategy of acquisition of DBFs pursued by Big Pharma 
presents a possible avenue for the change of dominant logics within an established 
corporation. Depending on company sizes and how many personnel are retained, merges 
can alter established organizational culture. This indicates pharmaceutical corporations 
that engage in more merger and acquisitions are at an increased risk of change in 
organizational strategy compared to companies that rarely, or never, engage in these 
practices. During the 1980s, several key legislative acts, like the Orphan Drug Act, 
further reshaped the field dynamics. 
4.5.2 Legislation Indicating Shifting Power in the Field 
 Fligstein and McAdam (2012) stated that “it is impossible to evaluate any form of 
strategic action field without considering the history of state intervention in that particular 
field” (174). As noted in the previous chapter, the state holds two stakeholder positions 
within the pharmaceutical field: one as a regulator through the FDA and the other as a 
consumer through government sponsored health care plans, but the questions arises does 
the state also hold a third stakeholder position through Congress. This is a complicated 
question to answer because as Fligstein and McAdam (2012) pointed out the state is a 
strategic action field of its own, meaning that legislation is the results of actions by 
stakeholders within the field of state with their own interest. Unlike the stakeholders 
discussed in Chapter 3, I argue that Congress is not a direct stakeholder within the 
pharmaceutical field. While Congress has taken action to shape the field, the legislation 
process is a mediated response between other stakeholders in the field. For example, the 
1906 Pure Food and Drug Act is representative of professional medicine’s interests over 




Senator Kefauver’s hearings, its passage was due more to legislators appealing to the 
public’s interest rather than drug safety. While Congress is not a stakeholder in the field, 
legislative acts are a good indication of the shifting power dynamics within the field 
(Fligstein and McAdam 2012). For this reason, I discuss three pieces of legislation from 
the 1980s that indicate how the interest of pharmaceutical research organizations and the 
logic of commerce became dominant within the field. 
 In the early 1980s, the Bayh-Dole Act, the Orphan Drug Act, and the Hatch-
Waxman Act changed the dynamics within the pharmaceutical field. These legislative 
acts were passed during the period of deregulation in the Regan administration. While 
these Acts did not directly undercut the authority of the FDA as the regulatory body 
within the field, the history of each act reveals that the logic order of commerce was 
gaining dominance over the logics of care and science. All three Acts were designed to 
change the research strategies of pharmaceutical corporations through external 
inducements. Each Act was designed to motivate pharmaceutical development in a 
direction beneficial to patients but proponents of the Acts contend the practices used to 
stimulate research indicate corporate interests were really the legislators’ primary 
concern. 
 The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 allowed nonprofit organizations to receive patents 
and property licenses on research conducted with federal funds. Prior to the Bayh-Dole 
Act, universities were patenting results from research funded through federal money; 
however, without a uniform process, universities, and other nonprofit organizations 
seeking patents, had to deal with a variety of agencies with different requirements and 




Act streamlined the process for patenting discoveries made with feral money and resulted 
in a dramatic increase of university patents. In the 12 years leading up to Bayh-Dole, 
1968-1980, university patents rose from 100 a year to about 350, but the number of 
universities patents per year was around 3300 14 years after Bayh-Dole (Berman 2008).  
 Elizabeth Berman (2008) applied institutional theory to study university patenting 
in the United Stated from World War II to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act and argued 
that the Bayh-Dole Act was not as much a turning point as other scholars contend but was 
the outcome of institutionalization started in the 1950s. The Bayh-Dole Act was brought 
about by skilled actors and a professional project, the development of university patent 
administrators, who argued government licensing of research conducted with federal 
money was necessary for innovation because if the government retained the title over 
scientific discoveries they would go unused (Berman 2008).  
 Support for the argument that government retained ownership would discourage 
innovation came from two independent studies published 1968 on the outcomes of 
chemical discoveries. These studies concluded, “because HEW [Health, Education, and 
Welfare Department] patent policy did not allow for exclusive licenses, however, no 
pharmaceutical companies were willing to participate in the screening of these 
compounds with an eye toward their eventual development.” (Berman 2008: 846). 
Creating organizational motivation to apply research was the framework proponents for 
Bayh-Dole adopted; university patenting would make findings available to private 
corporations who would use that research to develop profitable and innovative outcomes 




starting university patenting, it increased the trend by legitimating the practice through 
institutionalization.  
 The Orphan Drug Act, passed in 1983, was designed to create incentives for 
pharmaceutical companies to research new drugs for rare illnesses. This act was seen as 
necessary because the rising cost of drug development meant that companies were 
unlikely to invest in small product markets where they would be unable to recoup 
development cost. Orphan diseases are officially defined as a condition or illness with a 
patient prevalence rate of 200,000 or less within the United States (Grabowski 2005, 
Wellman-Labadie and Zhou 2010). The FDA designates orphan drug status and has 
approved over 400 drugs since 1983 compared to an approval rate of only 10 for similar 
drugs between 1973 and 1983 (Food and Drug Administration 2015). Grabowski (2005) 
stated that the success of the act was due to its combination of “push” and “pull” 
economic incentives: the push program components include tax incentives, research 
grants, and accelerated approval times; the pull program component is seven years of 
market exclusivity. The period of market exclusivity is seen as one of the strongest and 
desirable components of the law (Grabowski 2005, Wellman-Labadie, and Zhou 2010). 
 In general, the Orphan Drug Act is considered a successful piece of legislation. 
Grabowski (2005) compared the outcomes in orphan drug development between the U.S., 
Japan, and European Union, regions that all passed similar legislation, and found the 
pharmaceutical companies in United States had produced more orphan drugs. There is 
evidence that the Orphan Drug Act also effected organizational strategy more directly. 
Chandler (2005) attributed the success of the DBF Genzyme to its initial research 




primarily positive on drug research and development, recent work by Olivier Wellman-
Labadie and Youwen Zhou (2010) raised the question of whether the Act needs to be 
reformed.  
 Wellman-Labadie and Zhou (2010) noted that the paradox of the exclusivity 
clause, once an orphan drug is approved no other drug can be approved for that disease 
during the seven year period but orphan drug approval does not mean the same drug 
cannot be approved for other treatments during that time period, has resulted in multiple 
drugs gaining orphan approval despite the fact that the drugs total treatment population is 
over 200,000 U.S. patients. This raises the question of whether companies are 
undermining the intent of the Act by taking successful drugs and expanding their 
profitability using orphan drug approvals. Instead of developing a new drug, a company 
takes and existing drug and applies to Orphan status. This practice gives the company 
market exclusivity on the treatment of a condition without requiring much additional 
research and development cost and does not result in new drugs coming to the market.  
 Financial expectations also appear to be shaping orphan drug research strategy. 
Wellman-Labadie and Zhou’s (2010) findings show oncology was the top therapeutic 
category with 650 drugs receiving an Orphan designation between 1983 and 2009; the 
second highest therapeutic category was infections drugs with only 212 designations. 
Wellman-Labadie and Zhou (2010) argued that the focus on oncology drugs is because 
they are more profitable than other categories not because there are more orphan diseases 
in this therapeutic class. Given the funding and tax incentives of the Orphan Drug Act, 
the high prices for the oncology drugs that are developed suggest patients are paying 




 Despite these criticisms, the Orphan Drug Act does address one issue raised often 
by critics of the global pharmaceutical structure, the focus of pharmaceutical companies 
on developing drugs for industrial nations while ignoring problems common in the 
developing world. Because the official definition of an orphan condition only applies to 
its prevalence rate in the United States, pharmaceutical corporations can receive the 
financial benefits of the act by developing a drug for a condition with higher prevalence 
rates in other parts of the world. However, the low profitably of developing markets 
appears to be a greater deterrence than the incentives of the Orphan Drug Act can 
overcome (Civan and Maloney 2006). Similar to the Bayh-Dole Act and Orphan Drug 
Act, the Hatch-Waxman Act was also designed to encourage pharmaceutical 
development. 
 The Hatch-Waxman Act, passed by congress in 1984, was intended to speed the 
entry of generic drugs into the market, thereby lowing overall drug prices, and to 
strengthen the intellectual property rights of pharmaceutical corporations as an incentive 
for innovation (Grabowski and Kyle 2007, Young and Andrus 2004). The act established 
the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) process at the FDA that requires 
manufacturers of generic medications only need to demonstrate bioequivalence between a 
new product and an existing marketed drug. The ANDA process reduced the amount of 
time and money necessary to introduce a generic drug by eliminating the requirement of 
lengthy clinical trials to demonstrate safety and efficacy. The act also shortened the time 
between patent expiration and generic entry by allowing companies to begin product 
development prior to patent expiration, meaning companies could file ANDA claims 




 The Hatch-Waxman Act contained two market exclusivity provisions to gain 
industry support for the legislation. The first provision gives the expiring patent holder 45 
days to file an infringement suit against the ANDA filer. If this occurs, the FDA grants a 
one time 30-month extension to the original patent holder during the course of the 
litigation. The second provision was designed to encourage ADNA filers by granting the 
first filer a six-month period of market exclusivity from other generic competitors.  
A large portion of criticisms against the Hatch-Waxman Act has centered on the 
misapplication of these two provisions as barriers to entry. Researchers have argued that 
the automatic 30-month exclusivity period discourages ANDA filers (Young and Andrus 
2004). Since the six-month market exclusivity period is trigged only when litigation ends 
or the generic manufacturer begins marketing the product, there have been instances 
where a brand name manufacturer paid a generic manufacturer to not bring their product 
to market, effectively preventing any other generic manufacturer from entering the 
market (Young and Andrus 2004). 
 Despite these problems, the Hatch-Waxman Act has created more competition in 
the market. Henry Grabowski and Margaret Kyle’s (2007) analysis of generic entry 
between 1995 and 2005 indicated that the market exclusivity period for brand name drugs 
has steadily declined since the early 1980s due to the rise of generic drugs. Their research 
also revealed generic manufacturers strategically target the most profitable brand name 
drugs. Comparing generic entry one year after patent expiration of new molecular entities 
by market size, measured as revenue per year, they found drugs in the smallest market, 
less than $50 million, faced generic entry from only 1.7 products while drugs in the 




Grabowski and Kyle (2007) attributed part of this difference to the Hatch-Waxman Act 
allowing generic manufactures to engage in a ‘prospecting’ approach by challenging 
patented drugs early in their product life cycle. 
 The three legislative acts discussed above collectively encouraged pharmaceutical 
innovation by protecting the intellectual property rights of pharmaceutical corporations 
through various provisions. Proponents of the pharmaceutical industry argue patents are 
necessary for continued innovation because of high research and development cost. 
Critics argue the current patent laws allow pharmaceuticals to engage in profiteering that 
result in higher prices for consumers while creating barriers to entry for generic 
manufactures. Regardless of these arguments, the evidence is clear that the United States 
patent law has created dynamics within the pharmaceutical field leading to novel drug 
developments at higher rates than in countries with less secure intellectual property rights 
(Henderson et al. 1999, Grabowski and Kyle 2007, Mazzoleni 2011). At the same time, 
strong patent laws have also shaped the organizations in the field by leading to huge 
profits for a small group of products and the rise of Big Pharma. 
4.6 The Organizational Strategies of Big Pharma 
 By the late 1970s, the barriers to entry in the pharmaceutical field resulted in a 
division between firms developing prescription drugs and those focused on over-the-
counter products (Chandler 2005). Organizations developing prescription drugs could be 
further divided between firms researching novel products from generic manufacturers. 
Big Pharma, large, vertically integrated research corporations, dominated the 
pharmaceutical field (Chandler 2005, Cockburn 2004). These firms were multidivisional 




focused on the down-stream (consumer market) development of pharmaceutical products. 
At the same time Big Pharma companies were pursuing strategies of vertical integration, 
they were also becoming conglomerates through the acquisitions of a variety of non-
pharmaceutical entities.  
 By the 1980s, this corporate strategy had become increasingly cumbersome and 
many Big Pharma companies began to engage in strategic divestments to both increase 
the efficiency of their primary function as pharmaceutical firms and avoid the corporate 
raiders of Wall Street. Chandler’s (2005) history of the industry provides excellent details 
on the activities of some of the largest pharmaceutical companies during this time. For 
example the path of American Home Products, renamed Wyeth Corporation in 2002, at 
its conglomerate height sold products ranging from canned and packaged foods to 
furniture polish before undergoing massive divestitures to refocus on its pharmaceutical 
roots only to then be acquired by Pfizer in 2009. 
4.6.1 Strategic Alliances, Mergers, and Acquisitions 
 The organizational structure of Big Pharma firms partially explains the rise of the 
DBF as an innovative organizational form and the strategy of Big Pharma firms to 
develop collaborative alliances with DBFs. Up-stream research, which consists of basic 
scientific exploration and discovery, was mostly confined to academic centers and non-
profit organizations but integration and spillover into industry did occur indicating 
interorganizational ties created porous organizational boundaries within the field 
(Cockburn 2004, Powell and Owen-Smith 2012).  
 In order to remain innovative, Big Pharma needed to gain access to the scientific 




failure. Hess and Rothaermel (2011) discussed two strategies pharmaceutical 
corporations used to access up-stream knowledge: strategic alliances and star scientists. 
Their findings indicated that within the pharmaceutical industry these strategies are 
substitutive and subject to contingency effects. Specifically “any performance effects of 
star scientists on firm innovation are contingent upon the stars’ connections to other firm-
specific resources” (Hess and Rothaermel 2011: 906). Many Big Pharma corporations 
pursued alliances with DBFs as a method of accessing new knowledge (Chandler 2005, 
Powell and Owen-Smith 2012, Powell and Sandholtz 2012).  
 Nadine Roijakkers and John Hagedoorn (2007) stated there were two primary 
types of collaborations in the pharmaceutical field, joint ventures and contractual 
partnerships. Joint ventures raise interdependence between organizations whereas 
contractual partnerships are flexible. The majority of alliances between pharmaceutical 
corporations and biotechnology companies were contractual partnerships, indicating that 
one firm was performing a service for the other. However, the rise of joint ventures 
during the late 1980s indicated that rather than continuing to rely on biotechnology 
companies to conduct research, established pharmaceutical corporations were also 
developing internal biotechnology research and development capabilities (Roijakkers and 
Hagedoorn 2007). Through network analysis, Roijakkers and Hagedoorn (2007) 
concluded the new biotechnology firms acted as innovators within the field while 
established pharmaceutical corporations occupied the dominant position in traditional 





 Research by Erica Whittaker and Jane Bower (1994) and Bruce Rasmussen 
(2002) offers further explanations on why roles in pharmaceutical alliances varied by 
organizational type. The fact established pharmaceutical corporations were engaged in 
multiple biotechnology alliances while also building internal research programs suggests 
these companies saw two strategic benefits to alliances (Whittaker and Bower 1994). 
First, alliances provided access to young scientists attracted to working at new 
biotechnology companies for the science based organizational culture and financial 
opportunities provided through stock options. Second, alliances allowed established firms 
to externalize the risk of conducting research. Rasmussen’s (2002) data supports the 
strategy of risk shifting by noting that the dominant contractual form of alliances was 
between established pharmaceutical corporations in-licensing the products developed by 
biotechnology firms. Alliances are not the only organizational strategy pharmaceutical 
corporations employed to gain access to innovation technology or new products; mergers 
and acquisitions are also common practices in the field. 
 Mohan Sowlay and Scott Lloyd’s (2010) research indicated that mergers and 
acquisitions between biotechnology firms and Big Pharma firms can be the result of 
strategic planning on the part of either corporation involved rather than a desperate move 
by a failing firm. Biotechnology companies benefit in a merger or acquisition with a Big 
Pharma firm as a method of cashing out that avoids the expense and organizational 
requirements of an initial public offering. This is an attractive strategy particularly for 
small firms without the capital to bring a product to market (Sowlay and Lloyd 2010). 
Fabio Pammolli and Massimo Riccaboni (2004) further highlight how a merger can be a 




difficult for small, specialized research firms to take the knowledge gained in one 
therapeutic area and transfer it successfully into the development of another product.  
 Big Pharma firms also benefit in acquiring biotechnology firms to gain products. 
Because the Hatch-Waxman Act does not cover biological products and the difficulty in 
creating therapeutically equivalent biologics5, there is limited competition in this market 
segment making biotech acquisitions a strategic method that Big Pharma firms can use to 
expand their product portfolios (Sowlay and Lloyd 2010). Biologics are particular 
attractive acquisitions because of their higher reimbursement rates although recent work 
by Ernst Berndt (2015) and his colleagues suggests the average net lifetime returns on 
biologics peaked between 1995 and 1999. Firm acquisition is also a strategy large firms 
employ when faced with a declining product portfolio due to patent expirations (Danzon 
et al 2007). 
 Despite all of the mergers and acquisitions occurring within the industry, 
researchers have not found consistent outcomes from the practice. Matthew J. Higgins 
and Daniel Rodriguez (2006) found that firms with prior relationships to the firms they 
acquired experienced positive long term outcomes because they were better able to 
evaluate the fit of the target firms products within their portfolios. Using a larger sample 
not restricted by prior relationships, Patricia Danzon and her colleagues (2007) found no 
evidence mergers created positive long term outcomes; furthermore, their findings 
suggest that “mergers that are motivated to address R&D gaps through cost savings and 
economies of scale are unsuccessful in the long run” (325). Finally, John LaMattina 
(2011) argued that the amount of total merger activity within the industry is having a 
                                                          
5 Biologics include a variety of products, often developed from organic processes, and differ from chemical 




negative impact by reducing innovation. His argument is based on data from large 
mergers that resulted in the elimination of entire research sites and aggregate level data 
showing declining research and development spending among Big Pharma firms. 
LaMattina’s (2011) conclusions are supported by the work of Sarah Kruse and her 
colleagues (2014) who found pharmaceutical executives and other insiders anonymously 
indicated that the short term strategies of mergers and alliances aimed at increasing 
profitability were undermining long term research productivity. Research productivity, 
particularity the development of new drugs, is another important issue to address because 
as a high technology industry pharmaceutical firms are dependent on innovation for 
survival. 
4.6.2 Strategies of Innovation and Productivity 
 There has been considerable discussion about the state of pharmaceutical 
innovation and research for more than 40 years (Fisher et al. 2015, Grabowski et al. 
1978). Pharmaceutical innovation is typically measured as the number of New Molecular 
(sometimes Chemical) Entities (NME/ NCE) approved per year by the FDA (DiMasi et 
al. 2003, Munos 2010, Paul et al 2010). Total industry productivity is measured by either 
the number of products in the research pipeline (Fisher et al. 2015) or the number of New 
Drug Applications (NDA) approved per year by the FDA (Munos 2010).  
 Figure 4.1 shows the trends for NDA and NME approvals between 1944 and 2014 
(Total NDA data from 1953 is missing because human and animal approvals were 
counted together). NDA applications peaked during the 1950s and average 120 per year 




late 1940s and 1950s was the result of regulatory changes that encouraged companies to 
submit applications for drugs that had already been on the market combined with the  
 
Figure 4.1 Approved FDA Submissions by Application Type, 1944-2014 
increased organizational focus on developing new drugs. The trend for NME submissions 
has been more stable with an average of 22 per year and a standard deviation of eight. 
Interpreting the organizational strategy for NME submissions requires further discussion 
on the changes in research and development cost.  
 The cost of bringing a new drug from concept to market has risen exponentially 
over the past decades from $138 million (Hansen 1979) to $318 million (DiMasi et al. 
1991) to $802 million (DiMasi et al. 2003) and is now estimated at $1.8 billion (Paul et 
al. 2010). These estimates combine the out-of-pocket cost for bringing a drug to market 
with the capitalized cost, the expected return on investment required by investors with 
alternative investment opportunities (DiMasi et al. 2003, Paul et al. 2010, Vogel 2007). 








































































































































































development process; reported cost estimates are derived from the aggregate cost of 
research on all products and divided by the number of successful products. 
 Current calculations for the NME success rates range from 8% (Paul et al. 2010), 
11% (Kruse et al. 2014), 11.5% Munos 2010), to 13% (DiMasi et al. 2010). The fact that 
there is variation is not surprising because calculations are limited by available data on 
pharmaceutical pipelines with some scholars having access to propriety information 
while others rely on publically reported information. The FDA collects data and reports 
on compounds only if they begin phase I clinical testing but does release reports on pre-
clinical testing, leaving researchers working with public data no information on drugs 
that never reach human testing.  
 DiMasi et al.’s (2010) work on pharmaceutical research is particularly insightful 
because they calculated success rates for both NMEs and biologics tested in humans 
between 1993 and 2004 using proprietary information. Their data indicated NMEs had a 
success rate of 13% while biologics had a success rate of 32%. DiMasi et al. (2010) also 
analyzed success rates by company origin and therapeutic class for the total combined 
sample of NMEs and biologics. Stratifying the sample by self-originating and in-licensed 
compounds, they found drugs that were in-licensed had higher success rates than self-
originated compounds: 27% to 16%. Furthermore, the data showed many of the in-
licensed drugs were acquired after phase I or II testing, indicating pharmaceutical firms 
wait to form alliances after a product demonstrates potential. Finally, by comparing the 
drugs in eight therapeutic classes they found that systemic anti-infective agents, which 




 Researchers argue that the effect of high development cost on the industry is a 
reduction in innovation (DiMasi et al. 2003, Paul et al. 2010, Vogel 2007), and 
compounded by the reduction in research programs and facilities due to mergers and 
acquisitions, some researchers even worry the industry is at risk of dying (Berndt et al. 
2015). Pammolli and Riccaboni (2004) point out that the paradox within the industry is 
that increased research has not lead to an increased flow of new drugs, findings which 
Munos (2010) reiterates and adds too by stating the rate of new biologics fails to deliver 
on the promised innovations of the biotechnology revolution. The trend line for NME 
approvals in Figure 4.1 supports their findings. Both Munos (2010) and Paul et al. (2010) 
reported companies claim they need between 2-3 new drug approvals a year to remain 
profitable; a target that both researchers noted firms historically have never met.  
 The odds of a pharmaceutical company receiving a NME approval in any given 
year are small. The number of NME approvals per year follows a Poisson distribution 
with most pharmaceutical corporations not receiving a NME approval during any given 
year (Munos 2010). Figure 4.2 shows the number of NMEs approved per year plotted 
with the 95% confidence interval around the population mean. The data in Figure 4.2 
does not indicate a declining trend in innovation as measured by the number of NME 
approvals per year. In fact, the number of NME approvals in 2012, 2013, and 2014 were 
all above the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval. Scholars consider the largest 
outlier in the data, 1996, a historical artifact. The increase in both NDA and NME 
approvals in 1996 is argued to be the result of the FDA clearing out backlogged 
applications after the passage of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act in 1992 rather than a 




 In addition to declining innovation, industry researchers have also expressed 
concern about the impact of declining revenue. Pharmaceutical corporations in the United 
States have pursued a blockbuster profit model where a small handful of products 
account for the majority of a firm’s revenue stream (Aitken et al. 2009, Grabowski and 
Kyle 2007). According to Berndt et al.’s (2015) calculations, the industry faces hazardous
  
Figure 4.2 Number of NME Approvals per Year, 1944-2014 
declines tied to the reliance on blockbuster drugs for income. Vogel (2007) provided data 
that further underscored the precarious financial position of this profit model by citing 
research showing only 3 out of 10 NMEs generate enough income to cover their research 
and development cost. Finally, Aitken et al. (2009) pointed out the shift in prescription 
drug spending from brand name drugs to generics is making it harder for research-
oriented pharmaceutical firms to predict future income streams because the market for 
blockbuster products is shrinking. 
 In conclusion, the organizational strategies of Big Pharma firms have been 














































































































































































strongly influenced the field in the 1970s and 1980s leading to the emergence of new 
organizational forms with settlements between incumbents and challengers achieved 
through collaborative negations. Changes in politics created favorable conditions for a 
series of legislative acts that while designed to foster innovation, also strengthened the 
position of large corporations. Finally, rising concerns on cost and generic competition 
have encouraged mergers and acquisitions as strategies to retain market share but leave 
industry analysist wondering if there is a sustainable future. 
4.7 Conclusion 







































































 The historical analysis in this chapter indicates how different institutional logics 
were incorporated into the pharmaceutical field over time. Table 4.1 shows the broad 
changes in dominant logics and stakeholders. Dominant stakeholders are the stakeholders 
with the most power during a period and subsequently determine the dominant logic of 
the field. Active stakeholders hold enough power to influence the direction and structure 
of the field but do not define the field. I use the term reactive stakeholder, as opposed to 
passive stakeholder, for the final group because while these stakeholders still demonstrate 
agency, they do not engage in collective action to alter the field but act collectively only 
in response to the actions of the other stakeholders. 
 In general, the historical analysis demonstrates the importance of existing 
structures and external shocks in shaping an organizational field. Medical professionals 
who applied the logic of science by classifying drugs as either ethical preparations or 
patent medicine were able to dominate the early field. Highly publicized incidents of drug 
contamination in the early and mid-20th century allowed federal regulators at the Food 
and Drug Administration to gain dominance by using the logic of care as a strategy for 
arguing the necessity for increased regulation. Finally, the rising financial power of 
American corporations combined with an anti-government political movement facilitated 
pharmaceutical corporations’ ascension to the position of dominant stakeholder during 
the 1980s. In the next chapter, I analyze data gathered on pharmaceutical corporations 
and drug approvals between 1997 and 2014 to determine if the three logics within the 





A QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY  
5.1 Introduction 
 The historical analysis in the preceding chapter demonstrates that while 
pharmaceutical corporations display organizational similarities, it is a mistake to 
conclude that the field is composed of a homogenous organizational model. Existing 
research shows that the institutional constraints of regulation and pharmacology do not 
fully explain the different organizational forms observed in the historical analysis. For 
example, Arora et al. (2014) categorized pharmaceutical corporations by the structure of 
their research process as either centralized, hybrid, or decentralized firms and found that 
this organizational characteristic influenced innovation strategy. While all of the firms in 
their sample pursued a mix of innovation strategies, centralized firms relied more on 
internal research and decentralized firms more on acquiring external research. The fact 
that this structural characteristic resulted in similar commercial outcomes between 
research strategies indicates that while the research process connects to the organizational 
model it is not explainable by outcome-based efficiency, suggesting that a latent 
construct, such as logic orders, influences the original selection of organizational models 
and research strategies.  
 Innovation strategy is one possible measures of organizational behavior that can 




presented several others. Organizations can be divided between companies developing 
novel pharmaceutical products and those manufacturing generics. Alternatively, 
companies can be categorized by whether or not they are engaged in research and 
development on biologics. On the other hand, companies could be grouped by basic 
structural characteristics; for example, diverse Big Pharma compared to small research 
firms. While these organizational differences may be the result of institutional effects, 
using them as a priori categories for comparative analysis will not evaluate the casual 
proposition that institutions effect organizational strategy. Indeed, Arora et al. (2014) 
noted a limitation of their work was that it did not demonstrate causality between 
organizational strategy and structure; i.e. they could not answer the question of whether 
the centralized structure results in a strategy focused on internal research or if a strategy 
of internal research results in a centralized structure. To answer this question, general 
practices can be analyzed first for latent constructs and then the components from these 
constructs can be used as measures to determine organizational categories through a 
casual modeling technique. The organizational strategies can then be compared between 
the emergent groups against theoretically predicted logic orders to assess if the identified 
latent constructs are institutional effects. 
 Based on the historical analysis, the characteristics defining organizational 
differences in the field can be classified into two broad categories: organizational 
structure and research path components. Measures of organizational structure are 
variables such as firm size, centralization, and ownership. Measures of research paths are 
variables such as generic production, portfolio diversity, and biologic research. This 




data as sources of organizational structure and research paths measures to determine if 
latent constructs exists in the field and cause unobserved organizational categorization.  
 The study design treats field level effects as the independent variable and 
organizational outcomes as dependent variables, which aligns with the recent 
methodological argument made by Royston Greenwood and his colleagues (2014) on the 
current direction needed in institutional logics research. Figure 5.1 illustrates the general 
theoretical model for this analysis drawn from the discussion in Chapter 2 and the 
findings from Chapter 4. The source of the latent constructs within the organizational 
field is unspecified in the model because it is the focus of the qualitative analysis. The 
variables sets in the model are operationalized as the corporate and FDA data. 
 
Figure 5.1 Model of Theoretical Prediction for Latent Class Formation 
 The goal of this chapter is to determine if these organizational measures result in 
the emergence of classes within the sample by building a model reflecting the theoretical 




previous research has analyzed drug approval data collected from the FDA (for examples 
see Grabowski and Kyle 2007 and Kapczynski et al. 2012), to my knowledge no prior 
research has applied this data to analyze latent organizational strategies, making the use 
of this data as an operationalization of latent strategy a novel contribution of this project.  
 To accomplish the goals stated above, I used three techniques for latent variable 
analysis: exploratory factor analysis, structural equation modeling, and latent class 
analysis. These methods are a progression of increasingly sophisticated statistical 
techniques for identifying latent constructs within data. Each analysis follows a model 
fitting strategy whereby the measures that fail to be significant are excluded from the 
final model. Using this method allows me to build models that are more parsimonious by 
eliminating variables and constructs that fail to fit in the next level of analysis. At the 
same time, this multi-method approach also serves as a validity assessment because the 
failure to find latent constructs at lower level does not support moving on to the next 
analysis. 
5.2 Data 
 The purpose of this section is to detail the process used to construct the 
quantitative dataset and demonstrate that these data are valid operationalization of 
organizational structure and research paths. The dataset combines information from two 
secondary sources: (1) the Food and Drug Administration’s public database of drug 
approvals, and (2) Mergent Online database of corporate financial reports. Information 
was collected for the years between 1997 and 2014 because 1997 was the earliest date 
information was available in the Mergent database and 2014 was the most recently 




from third party sources, after the data was collected ad hoc sampling criteria were 
applied to generate a final sample with complete information. For examples of prior 
organizational research using similar ad hoc sampling procedures see Authors et al. 2008, 
Bidwell 2011, and Reyt and Wiesenfeld 2015. 
5.2.1 Food and Drug Administration Data 
 The FDA database is publically available on the FDA’s website: 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Reports.Re
portsMenu. The FDA database provides details on each new drug application and 
biologic license application approved in the United States in downloadable Excel files. 
Table 5.1 shows the list of variables gathered from the FDA database. Adhering to the 
strategy-as-practice literature (Vaara and Whittington 2012), each application is viewed 
as the outcome of an organizational decision that potentially represents a cohesive 
underlying organizational strategy. Specifically, the variables new drug application 
chemical type, biological licensing application, orphan drug, and review type contain 
information that indicate strategic decisions within the drug development process. This 
data, then can reveal if distinct organizational research paths exists because organizations 
have agency in application process (Babiarz and Pisano 2014). 
Table 5.1 Variables from the Food and Drug Administration Database of Approved 
Drug Applications, 1997-2014 
 
Variable Name Description Value Format 
New Drug 
Application Number 
Unique numerical code assigned to 
application by the Food and Drug 
Administration 
six digit numeric code 
Drug Name 
Brand name of submitted drug 
assigned by the application company 
string variable 
Active ingredients 







 Biological license applications (BLA) are for biological products isolated from 
natural sources, not chemically derived, and therefore are not classifiable by new drug 
application (NDA) chemical types. Review classification also only applies to NDAs and 
contains two categories: priority review or standard review. The FDA determines if an 




Numeric code assigned the by Food 
and Drug Administration to indicate 
the type of approval application is 
seeking 
1 = New molecular entity 
2 = New active ingredient  
3 = New dosage form 
4 = New combination 
5 = New formulation or new 
manufacturer 
6 = New indication 
7 = Drug already marketed 
without an approved New 
Drug Application 
8 = Over-the-counter switch 
10 = New indication submitted 




Dummy variable indicating if the 
application is for a biologic agent 
1 = Biological license 
application 
Orphan Drug 
Dummy variable indicating if the 
application is for an orphan drug 
1 = Orphan drug application 
Review Type 
Binary variable indicating the review 
status of the application 
0 = Standard review 
1 = Priority review  
Application 
Company 




Day of the month the application was 
approved 
two digit numeric code (01 - 
31) 
Application Month 
Month of the year the application was 
approved 
two digit numeric code (01 - 
12) 
Application Year Year application was approved 





request priority review. Priority review status indicates that the drug represents an 
advancement over the current available therapy; officially defined as: 
“evidence of increased effectiveness in treatment, prevention, or diagnosis 
of condition; elimination or substantial reduction of a treatment-limiting 
drug reaction; documented enhancement of patient compliance that is 
expected to lead to an improvement in serious outcomes; or evidence of 
safety and effectiveness in a new subpopulation.” (FDA 2014)  
 Priority review results in the FDA making an approval decision within 6 months 
compared to the 10 months granted for standard review. Standard review is the default 
status and indicates that the drug has similar therapeutic qualities to those currently on the 
market. Orphan drug status can apply to both NDAs and BLAs. The categories of priority 
review and standard review are mutually exclusive but orphan drugs can categorized by 
either review process.  
 There are 557 unique company names listed in the sample. Correcting for 
inconsistencies in the coding (for example listings for Aqua Pharms and Aqua Pharms 
LLC were recoded to Aqua Pharms) reduced the number of companies to 397 unique 
entries with a mean of 4.66 submissions per company. The data is right skewed with a 
median of two submissions and a range of 4 to 67 submissions in the upper quartile. To 
ensure enough data at the organizational level, a cutoff of five submissions was applied to 
generate a sample of 92 companies to collect financial data on. Using the number of 
submissions as a sampling criteria biases the sample towards large and older 
corporations. Previous researchers have explicitly used organizational size and age as 




however, number of submissions is more appropriate for this study because it maximizes 
the data on actions needed for analyzing strategy. 
5.2.2 Corporate Financial Data 
 Annual corporate financial information was retrieved from the Mergent Online 
database, an online database of financial information on publically traded corporations. 
Database access is available through the Thomas Cooper Library at the University of 
South Carolina for students, faculty, and staff. The information in this database covers the 
end of fiscal years 1997 to 2014. The Mergent database allows users to build reports on 
singular companies that are downloadable as Excel files. Table 5.2 shows the variables 
gathered from this database. Consistent with prior organizational research, expense 
variables are operationalized as information on strategic actions, income variables as the 
outcomes of strategic actions, and demographic variables as controls and descriptors. 
These are widely used measures in the research to operationalize organizational structure 
(for examples see Arora et al. 2014, Chandler 1977, and Funk 2014). 
Table 5.2 Variables from the Mergent Online Database of Annual Corporate Reports, 
1997-2014 
 
Variable Name Description Format 
Company Name of publically traded corporation string variable 
Total Revenue 






Reported annual, marketing, selling, and 






Reported annual research and development 
expenses in millions of US dollars 
numeric value 
Operational Costs 
Reported annual operational expenses in 
millions of US dollars 
numeric value 
Total Expenses 





Reported annual litigation expenses in 







Reported annual expenses on continued 
research and development projects acquired 





Reported annual revenue from joint venture 
projects in millions of US dollars 
numeric value 
Net Income 
Reported annual net income in millions of US 
dollars 
numeric value 
Net Income per 
Basic Stock Share 
Reported annual income per basic share of 
common stock in US dollars 
numeric value 
Total Number of 
Employees 
Reported number of employees employed 
during the fiscal year 
numeric value 
Return on Assets 
Reported return on assets of company, 
calculated by Mergent 
percentage 
Report Date Year of annual report 
four digit numeric code 






Dummy Variable to indicate if application 
company is an acquisition or merger with 
parent company 
1 = application company 
is an acquired 
component of parent 
company 
Subsidiary 
Dummy Variable to indicate if application 
company is a subsidiary of parent company 
1 = application company 






Four digit industry code 
2834 = pharmaceutical 
preparations 
corporations  




2841 = surgical and 
medical instruments 
corporation  
3851 = ophthalmic goods 
corporations 
2821 = plastics, 
materials, and resins 
corporation 




Dummy Variable to indicate if company is 
incorporated outside of the United States 
1 = company is 
incorporated outside 





 The Mergent database did not contain data on private companies, which required 
the exclusion of 13 organizations because they were private companies during at least a 
portion of the study period. Consistent with prior research (Funk 2014), subsidiaries were 
treated as components of the parent corporations instead of individual organizations and 
drug approvals from subsidiaries and acquired companies were recoded to the parent 
company. Through this process, the sample was refined to a final set of 59 organizations. 
Two demographic variables were added to the dataset: Standard Industrial Classification 
Code and Foreign. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code does not change for 
individual organizations but seven companies either changed their incorporation location 
or used foreign subsidiaries to submit some applications during the study period which 
results in the variable being a continuous variable ranging between 0 and 1 when the 
dataset is collapsed by company and year. 
5.2.3 Therapeutic Class 
 The last data added was a variable for therapeutic classification types. Two 
sources were used to determine the therapeutic classification of each drug: the 2014 
Prescription Medications – Drug Information file from the National Health and Nutrition 
Examination Survey (NHANES) and the World Health Organization’s Anatomical 
Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) database. The classification system in the NHANES file, 
Lexicon Plus, originated from the private data collection corporation Cerner Multum. The 
WHO (ATC) system was developed through international collaboration and the detailed 
history is available on the WHO website (http://www.whocc.no/atc_ddd_methodology 




proprietary differences that result in more therapeutic categories. Table 5.3 lists the 
therapeutic categories of the variable. 




Antiparasitic Agent  
Blood and Blood Forming Organs Agent  
Cardiovascular System Agent 










Respiratory System Agent 
 
5.2.4 Complete Dataset 
 The final dataset contains 1,202 drug approvals matched with financial data from 
59 companies. Two-tailed t-test were used to compare the means of the approved FDA 
chemical types between the sample and excluded cases. Table 5.4 shows the means and 
test statistics for this comparison. To asses if the companies with more than five 
submissions that were excluded from final sample due to extraneous criteria drove these 
results, the t-test were rerun with these companies dropped. Using the reduced data, NME 
was no longer significant but OTC switches, already marketed and new formulation 










Sample Test Statistic 
NDA Chemical Type     
   New molecular entity 0.214 0.265 -2.44 * 
   New active ingredient  0.020 0.020 0.01 
   New dosage form 0.404 0.398 0.25 
   New combination 0.088 0.113 -1.70 
   New formulation or new manufacturer 0.154 0.078 5.12 *** 
   New indication 0.032 0.042 -1.46 
   Drug already marketed without an approved NDA 0.028 0.012 2.54 * 
   Over-the-counter switch 0.003 0.013 -2.14 * 
Biological License Application (BLA) 0.049 0.051 -.014 
* = p<0.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001 
 
 Time was an important factor to consider in this analysis. The first problem of 
time that needed to be address was that research and development expenses in a given 
year do not typically reflect the pharmaceutical output of that year; pharmaceutical 
development is a complicated multiyear process (Angell 2004, Applbaum 2009, Azoulay 
et al. 2010, Vogel 2007). Some scholars argue that research and development cost should 
be lagged to reflect the delayed outcome of the expense (Cullman and Zloczysti 2014). 
Using a lagged variable has a data cost by creating missing cases for the earliest years of 
each corporation but was applied here to address the issues raised in previous research. 
Two lagged variables for research and development costs: a 2-year lag and a 3-year lag, 
were created and tested through Poisson regressions (Appendix A and B) using new 
molecular entity and biological license applications as dependent variables. These 
analyses indicated that the 2-year lagged variable is the best fit. 
 Drug approvals are rare events, which results in sparseness in the dataset. To 
address this issue, the data was collapsed by company and year prior to analysis. The 




variables were broken into dummy variables to collapse as counts. To avoid skewing the 
analysis because of size differences in both number of submissions and revenue, all of the 
non-demographic variables were converted into rates. The financial expense variables 
were converted rates using total expense as the denominator. Rates for mergers and 
acquisitions, and subsidiary submissions were calculated using the total number of drug 
(NDA combined with BLA) approvals as the denominator. Rates for chemical type and 
therapeutic class were calculated using the total number of drug approvals as the 
denominator. I also converted firm size using the natural log because the variable had a 
non-parametric distribution. Table 5.5 shows the descriptive statistics for the final 
sample. 
Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics by Company, N = 59 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Marketing and Administrative Expenses Rate 0.38 0.12 0.07 0.64 
Operational Costs Rate 0.35 0.16 0.04 0.74 
2 Year lagged Research and Development 
Expenses Rate 
0.17 0.08 0.05 0.39 
Acquired in Process R&D Rate 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.07 
Litigation Expenses Rate 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.19 
Merger and Acquisition Submission Rate 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.32 
Subsidiary Approval Rate 0.13 0.24 0.00 0.97 
Joint Venture Income Rate -0.01 0.07 -0.44 0.17 
Return on Assets 5.05 11.41 -41.36 20.03 
Net Income per Basic Stock Share -9.78 95.25 -725.48 73.41 
Total Revenue 11,384.98 13,696.34 56.95 52,823.94 
Net Income 1,755.38 2,485.49 -52.17 9,866.69 
Total Approvals 16.93 16.35 2.00 70.00 
Total Number of Employees 29,384.99 33,796.06 112.50 
114,512.5
0 
Firm Size (log of Employees) 9.09 1.95 4.43 11.65 
Anti-infective Agent Rate 2.12 3.28 0 13 
Antineoplastic Agent Rate 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.60 
Antiparasitic Agent Rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Blood and blood forming organs Agent Rate 0.05 0.12 0.00 0.76 




Nervous System Agent Rate 0.15 0.22 0.00 0.80 
Dermatological Agent Rate 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.57 
Gastrointestinal Agent Rate 0.10 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Genitourinary Agent Rate 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.19 
Hormones and Hormone Modifiers Rate 0.09 0.15 0.00 0.67 
Immunological Agent Rate 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.71 
Metabolic Agent Rate 0.07 0.14 0.00 0.76 
Miscellaneous Agent Rate 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.50 
Ophthalmic Agent Rate 0.05 0.15 0.00 0.71 
Psychiatric Agent Rate 0.05 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Respiratory System Agent Rate 0.08 0.16 0.00 0.75 
New Molecular Entity Rate 0.26 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Biological License Application Rate 0.07 0.16 0.00 0.88 
New Active Ingredient Rate 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.67 
New Dosage Rate 0.40 0.21 0.00 0.90 
New Combination Rate 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.40 
New Formula Rate 0.10 0.13 0.00 0.57 
New Indication Rate 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.33 
Already Marketed without New Drug Application 
Approval 
0.02 0.05 0.00 0.29 
Other-the-Counter Switch Rate 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.14 
 
5.3 Methodology 
 The methodological approach follows the process of structuration6 applied by 
Weber et al (2013) and developed from Weick’s (1995) work on sense-making within 
organizations. The structuration process states institutionalization occurs over time as 
distinct practices become interconnected through repetition and form coherent 
institutional frameworks. Applied to Figure 5.1, the theory predicts combinations of 
specific actions form organizational strategies in an established field subject to 
institutional pressure. As an established field, the theoretical assumption for the 
                                                          
6 Structuration comes from the work of Anthony Giddens (1984) and is a recursive conceptualization of 
social structure whereby the actor’s perception and abilities are determined by the social structure that the 




pharmaceutical industry is that institutionalization has already occurred and, therefore, 
outcomes from general practices can identify the latent connections between actions.  
 The dataset contains a large number of items and it is unlikely that all of them 
operationalize a latent institutional framework; both the practice-as-strategy and 
structuration argument hold that not every practice is a component of an institutional 
framework. Applying a multi-step analysis is a method to achieve parsimony in the 
model and determine what measures contribute to the formation of organizational 
subgroups in the pharmaceutical industry. Exploratory factor analysis is the first step to 
identify existing connections between organizational actions. An exploratory factor 
analysis will address the basic question of whether latent constructs exist within the data 
as well as the specific measurement items that are connected. Structural equation 
modeling is the second step to assess if the identified factors interconnect through a larger 
relational structure. The structural equation model will determine if the measures form a 
coherent framework and if there are causal relationships between the latent constructs.  
 A logical method for evaluating organizational strategy is to study the decision-
making processes behind an organization’s central objective, the process known as 
strategy-as-practice (Schraven et al 2015, Vaara and Whittington 2012). For 
pharmaceutical companies practice is developing and selling pharmaceutical products. 
The application of drug approval data a measure of organizational strategy is a novel 
contribution of this project but supported by prior research showing that these decisions 
are strategic actions. The advent of discovery by design research processes and studies on 
the pharmaceutical pipeline (Fisher et al. 2015, Sowlay and Lloyd 2010) indicate that 




organization. While using only approval data leaves out research projects that never reach 
the clinical testing phase or are abandoned prior to approval, this constraint presents an 
accurate measure of the outcomes that become subject to negotiation between 
stakeholders within the field.  
 The first purpose of the exploratory factor analysis is to examine the dataset to 
determine if there are latent constructs to warrant further analysis. This is a conceptual 
quantitative first step in structuration (Weber 2013) because it identifies connections 
between different actions. The variables in the dataset represent different organizational 
decisions; therefore, that factors identified in the model should provide relational 
information on general organizational strategies in the field. Following a model fitting 
strategy, as opposed to model testing, allows some measure to not load on any factors 
without contradicting the overall theoretical expectation that latent constructs exist. 
 Based on the existing research, several predications can be made about possible 
latent constructs. Corporate financial information can reveal the organizational structure 
of a pharmaceutical firm and, therefore, can illustrate the focus of organizational strategy 
(Chandler 2005, Davis et al 2004, Roy 1997, Richard et al. 2009, Powell and Sandholtz 
2012). The financial information, including the structural components of subsidiary, 
merger, and acquisition, form the basis of attention for the organization. A factor loading 
return on assets (ROA), net earnings per basic share, and marketing and administrative 
expenses would indicate strategies of profitability. If research and development, acquired 





 The chemical type and therapeutic class variables illustrate organizational 
research strategy because each submission is a specific organizational action. The drug 
information is more challenging for predicting possible factor outcomes, but drawing on 
Fisher et al.’s (2015) work on the drug pipeline, new molecular entity application is 
expected to load with antineoplastic agents (cancer drugs) because cancer dominates the 
majority of the drugs under development. Antivirals (anti-infectives) and painkillers 
(central nervous system agents) are the other top drug classes in development expected to 
load with new molecular entity application, along with priority review and orphan drug 
status. New combination, new indication, and new formulation are predicted to load 
together since they are aspects of drug expansion and possible indications for an 
organizational strategy of medicalization. 
 In summation, the factor analysis will reveal latent constructs at the field level. 
These constructs are not all expected to contribute to organizational differences. It is 
likely some of the constructs will be the result of structural constraints placed on the 
organizations within the field. The contribution of the factor analysis in this research is to 
determine if latent constructs not readily explainable by external constraints exist. These 
factors are the most likely to provide the measures for the components that comprise an 
institutional framework.  
 Structural equation modeling allows for the determination of a causal relationship 
between the factors derived from the factor analysis (Acock 2013, Bollen 2011). This is 
an important next step because the central argument, field level constructs effect 
organizational strategy, is unsupported by factor analysis alone since the direction of 




second-generation statistical technique, structural equation modeling provides a method 
for distinguishing latent constructs that are causal indicators of organizational strategy.  
 Furthermore, since it is theoretically possible not all of the identified factors from 
the factor analysis will connect in a single coherent framework, applying a model fitting 
strategy allows for the elimination of unrelated factors. The contribution of the structural 
equation model to this research is that it will identify the presence of an interconnecting 
framework of pharmaceutical practices. Drawing from the strategy-as-practice research, 
the structural equation model will indicate distinct organizational level strategies within 
the field. 
 To determine if the measure of the identified strategies create organizational 
subgroups, the indicators from the best fit structural equation model will be used to 
conduct a latent class analysis. Mo Wang and Paul Hanges (2011) proposed latent class 
modeling as a more robust analysis technique for identifying organizational heterogeneity 
compared to current methodologies relying on categorization through qualitative 
techniques or stratification by demographic characteristics. Clustering analyses based on 
categorical variables is common practice but this method is problematic for evaluating 
causal claims because while differences may emerge between the groups, the researcher 
is unable to evaluate if the differences are a result of the characteristic used to define the 
groups (Wang and Hanges 2011). Latent class models can support causal claims because 
the techniques statistically derive the groups from a range of indicators; therefore, the 
researcher is able to determine which indictors are important for class separation by 




results of the analysis and it is inappropriate to decide a priori how many classes are in 
the data or how to categorize those classes (Collins and Lanza 2010, Masyn 2013).  
 Latent class analysis uses categorical variables, which require the transformation 
of the chemical type and therapeutic class variables from counts into ordinal categories. 
With a sample size of only 59 cases, a simple dichotomous transformation (1 = received 
an approval, 0 = did not receive an approval) is appropriate given the prevalence of no 
approvals in all categories. Using dummy variables does prevent the measurement of 
potential differences due to variations in approval rates, but given the small sample size, 
it is unlikely much variation would have be picked up in a more detailed categorical 
transformation. 
5.4 Exploratory Factor Analysis  
 Since the dataset contains a large number of variables and there is no theoretical 
expectation on which items best measure latent constructs in organizational strategy, the 
purpose of the factor analysis is to determine first if latent constructs exist and then to 
eliminate the items that fail to load on any factors. The factor analysis also provides the 
opportunity to assess the identified latent constructs against the findings of previous 
research to interpret potential underlying strategies in the field.  
 Prior to analysis, the dataset was split between the financial variables and the drug 
information variables because running all of the variables in a single factor analysis 
produced a Heywood7 case. When the factor model for the drug information variables is 
unrestricted it still converges as a Heywood case solution, but I think in this instance, the 
                                                          
7 Heywood cases are “conceptually implausible or impossible estimates in which a communality is 
estimated to be 1 or greater than 1” (Fabriger and Wegener 2012: 32). It is important to pay attention of 





solution is due to the small sample size and not a specification error. When the number of 
factors in the model is constrained, the solution ceases to converge as a Heywood case. 
 Table 5.6 shows the oblique rotation loadings for the common factor model of the 
financial indicators and Table 5.7 shows the factor output for the chemical type and 
therapeutic class indicators. Fit was determined by evaluating the eigenvalue and scree 
plot output. Since this was an exploratory factor analysis, a liberal approach was used to 
retaining factors by also assessing the cumulative variance provided by the factors with 
75% as the desired the cutoff point. 











Marketing & Administrative 
Costs 
-0.21 0.27 0.74 0.32 
Operational Costs 0.21 -0.78 -0.42 0.08 
Cost of 2 Year Lagged R&D 0.19 0.87 -0.04 0.34 
Cost of Acquired R&D -0.24 0.20 -0.48 0.61 
Cost of Joint R&D 0.13 -0.28 0.14 0.85 
Cost of Litigation -0.08 0.00 0.04 0.99 
Merger & Acquisitions 0.16 -0.11 0.14 0.92 
Subsidiary 0.31 -0.24 0.06 0.78 
Firm Size 0.84 0.01 0.03 0.31 
Non SIC  0.14 0.07 -0.41 0.81 
Foreign 0.46 0.03 0.45 0.61 
Net Earnings per Basic Share 0.21 -0.08 -0.09 0.93 
Return on Assets 0.80 0.05 -0.02 0.40 
Note: Factor loadings above 0.5 are in bold to aid interpretation. 
 
 The financial indicators suggest that organizational focus differs by the allocation 
of resources. Within the sample as a whole, the allocation of the three main expense 
categories: marketing and administrative, operational, and research and development, is 




The standard deviation of these variables in the sample is greater than the standard 
deviation for most individual companies, suggesting that allocation patterns become 
established within an organization. This stability of allocation patterns is expected given 
the findings from dominant logic research that shows logics create inertia at the 
organizational level (Bettis and Parhalad 1995). What is interesting about the model in 
Table 5.6, however, is that it indicates inertia also occurring at the field level. Operational 
cost loads negatively on both the research focus and administrative focus factors 
suggesting that reductions in this category may be a common industry practice for 
improving the bottom line. 
 The model in Table 5.6 shows a tradeoff in expense allocations between a strategy 
focused on research costs and one focused on administrative costs that suggest decisions 
about these practices may result from different perspectives. The factor model also 
suggests a connection between firm size and profitability. Given the industry history, this 
factor could indicate either a strategy of scale where larger companies are better able to 
target multiple profitable markets or a strategy of consolidation tied to organizational 
longevity. In summary, the factor model for the financial variables clearly shows the 
existence of distinct underlying concepts related to organizational structure can be drawn 
from the financial measures. 
 The therapeutic class and chemical type factor model in Table 5.7 indicates 
eleven distinct strategies. There appears to be two predominant underlying constructs 
driving the model based on the item with the highest loading on each of the factors; 
factors defined by the therapeutic target and factors defined by FDA application type. 




research, important research, endocrine research, and aging research. Factors indicating 
strategies driven by the FDA application type are innovative research, research altering 
current treatments, and diverse and genetic research.  



































































































































































































Therapeutic Categories         
Anti-Infective -0.17 -0.05 0.02 0.93 -0.08 -0.07 -0.03 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.11 
Antineoplastic 0.34 0.35 -0.12 0.01 0.65 0.06 0.03 0.21 -0.02 0.02 -0.20 0.17 
Blood Agents -0.07 0.19 0.36 -0.24 -0.24 -0.16 -0.08 0.33 -0.23 -0.31 0.00 0.37 
Cardiovascular 
Agents 
0.11 -0.18 0.10 0.02 0.01 -0.23 0.04 0.29 -0.08 -0.24 0.64 0.29 
Nervous 
System 
0.07 -0.21 -0.86 -0.21 0.02 -0.17 -0.14 0.05 -0.06 -0.08 -0.10 0.16 
Dermatological 0.03 -0.22 0.36 0.09 -0.13 -0.25 0.02 0.32 0.04 0.07 -0.48 0.34 
Gastrointestina
l Agents 
-0.10 0.02 0.16 -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 -0.01 -0.90 -0.12 0.03 -0.13 0.17 
Genito-urinary 
Agents 
0.02 -0.04 0.13 0.09 0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.38 0.68 0.35 
Hormones -0.03 -0.02 0.16 -0.09 0.01 0.02 -0.13 -0.04 -0.16 0.86 0.10 0.18 
Immunological 0.66 0.08 0.03 -0.04 -0.12 0.11 -0.05 0.12 -0.01 0.09 0.19 0.46 
Metabolic 
Agents 
0.00 0.06 0.01 -0.26 -0.13 0.05 0.83 -0.02 -0.02 -0.13 0.08 0.21 
Miscellaneous 
Agents 
-0.03 0.76 0.00 0.01 0.19 -0.13 -0.04 0.10 -0.06 0.09 -0.06 0.35 
Ophthalmic 
Agents 
-0.14 -0.23 0.37 -0.01 0.09 0.03 -0.28 0.01 -0.13 -0.41 0.08 0.47 
Psychiatric 
Agents 
-0.21 -0.09 -0.03 -0.13 -0.03 0.82 -0.10 0.02 -0.13 -0.09 -0.08 0.24 
Respiratory 
Agents 
-0.13 -0.12 -0.05 -0.23 -0.07 -0.18 0.01 0.03 0.82 -0.04 -0.09 0.20 
Chemical Types         
NME 0.77 -0.15 -0.11 0.10 -0.05 -0.17 0.00 -0.32 0.00 -0.24 0.13 0.14 
BLA -0.05 0.88 0.16 -0.02 -0.16 -0.05 -0.05 -0.12 0.04 -0.08 0.00 0.18 
New Active 
Ingredient 
-0.28 0.01 -0.60 0.28 -0.11 0.12 -0.08 0.23 -0.14 -0.13 -0.03 0.36 
New Dosage 
Form 
-0.51 -0.24 -0.10 -0.12 -0.39 -0.02 -0.14 0.18 -0.07 0.26 -0.03 0.26 
New 
Combination 
-0.19 -0.23 0.20 0.17 0.17 -0.08 0.80 0.06 -0.08 0.04 -0.12 0.18 
New Formula -0.11 -0.21 0.30 -0.30 0.54 -0.09 -0.30 0.15 0.03 0.12 -0.13 0.22 






-0.26 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.82 -0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.08 -0.02 0.19 0.23 




0.35 0.05 0.11 0.62 0.05 -0.13 -0.12 -0.20 -0.13 -0.18 -0.08 0.26 
Orphan Drug 
Status 
0.67 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.12 0.19 -0.14 0.09 -0.19 0.44 
Note: Factor loadings above 0.5 are in bold to aid interpretation. 
 
 The factors associated with the therapeutic targets represent a range of therapeutic 
classes but they can be connected through general trends in public health. The factors of 
diabetes combination research, endocrine research, and aging research represent 
therapeutic classes that contain diseases or conditions that are primary health concerns in 
the industrial world. Diabetes has been documented as an emerging health issues for 
many devolved nations; while ageing is a negative social status. The item inti-infective 
agents loads on the factor important research and represents general anti-viral and anti-
biotic drugs in addition to HIV medications. Taken together, these four factors suggest a 
larger underlying construct representing a therapeutic targeted research strategy. 
 The factors associated with the FDA application types appear to represent 
strategies focused on developing drugs representing advancements in treatment or 
targeting high status groups. Factors of innovative research and diverse and genetic 
research contain the items new molecular entity and biologic license application 
approvals, both items that are used in prior research to measure innovation. The items 
loading on the factor research altering current treatments represent alterations to existing 
treatments but the loading of antineoplastic agents suggest that this factor may connect to 
the other two because it represents research on the high status therapeutic category of 




research strategy on scientific advancement. However, not all of the factors fit into these 
two descriptive categories of therapeutic targeting or scientific advance. 
 The factors of expansionary research and de-professionalization research are the 
factors that most closely align with the thesis of medicalization. The loadings of the items 
for both therapeutic class and application type are close in strength, but each factor only 
has two items loading, making the interpretation of medicalization a weak argument. 
Historical events during the study period also raise doubts as to whether both of these 
factors are accurate measures of medicalization. The factor of de-professionalization 
research is mostly likely a historical artifact representing Merck, Johnson & Johnson, and 
Sanofi-Aventis switching the successful allergy medications Claritin, Zyrtec, and Allegra 
to over-the-counter medications following their patent expirations. The items loading on 
the factor of expansionary research, psychiatric agents and new indication, make sense 
historically and support the medicalization thesis; however, this factor does not contradict 
the counterargument that expansionary research could be driven by scientific 
advancements. The remaining two factors, non-neurological and not gastrointestinal, lack 
a clear interpretation of potential underlying constructs.  
 In summary, the factor analysis models suggest coherent organizational strategies 
exist within the field. The financial model indicates that three latent constructs are 
present, but the low number of items loading on each factor means caution needs to be 
taken in the interpretation of these findings. While the chemical type and therapeutic 
class model suggests some factors may connect through larger underlying constructs 
related to either a research strategy focused on therapeutic targets or one focused 




strategies are driven by technical aspects in pharmacologic research or the structure of the 
approval process. The factor outputs from both models show latent factors exist in the 
dataset, which supports the second step of the analysis, building a structural equation 
model; however, only the factor analysis of the financial variables justifies the 
elimination of potential measures.  
5.5 Structural Equation Model  
 The purpose of the structural equation model is to assess the latent constructs 
from the factor analysis models for causal connections and determine if the factors 
interconnect though a larger framework. Give the results of the factor analysis models, 
the measures of organizational structure from the financial variables are more likely 
covariates to drug development strategies than casual indicators. The failure of the model 
testing the financial variables to converge supports this interpretation; therefore, these 
measures were excluded from further model building.  
 I began the structural equation modeling process for the drug variables by running 
individual models for each of the 11 factors in Table 5.6. To ensure that there were 
enough indicators for each construct to reach a solution, all of the variables in a factor 
with a loading of 0.30 or greater were included in the models. Models that converged 
were retained and all retained models were added in a stepwise process starting from the 
innovation research factor, the factor that explained the highest proportion of variance. 
Figure 5.2 shows the final best fit model. 
 The goodness of fit statistics for the model in Figure 5.4 are satisfactory: χ2(40) = 
44.84, p=0.276, RMSEA = 0.045, CFI = 0.95, TLF = 0.93, and SRMR = 0.10. Analysis 




antineoplastic ratio would improve model fit. This relationship makes conceptual sense 
because a potential strategy for altering a drug’s market segment is through expanding 
the patient base by utilizing orphan drug requests.   
 
Figure 5.2 Best Fit Structural Equation Model 
 The model indicates a path dependency in the drug development strategy of 
pharmaceutical companies. The inverse relationship between the items loading on the 
factors of innovative research and alternating current treatments shows approvals for 
alterations to cancer drugs reduces the number of new molecular entity approvals a 
company receives. This finding is interesting in comparison to previous research on path 
dependencies in the pharmaceutical industry.  
 Cook et al. (2011) used economic modeling to argue that the path from treatment 




treatment B that was an alteration of treatment A. While my finding does not contradict 
this argument, it does question the spillover effect Cook et al. (2011) assumed would 
occur internally from the development of treatment B. The model in Figure 5.2 instead 
shows that developing alternations to existing drugs, either through new dosage or new 
formulation approvals, cost a company through a reduction of innovative approvals. This 
finding suggest then that a competitor firm rather than the originator firm as proposed by 
Cook et al. (2011) may realize the spillover effect from an intermediate treatment. 
 Further analysis of the data supports the presence of a bifurcated research path 
dependency within the field. Creating variables for innovative research and altering 
current treatments revealed that corporations with higher rates of innovate research had 
lower rates of altering current treatment approvals. The mean rate of alteration approvals 
by corporations above the median for innovative approvals was 0.40, and the mean rate 
of alteration approvals by corporations below the median for innovative approvals was 
0.62. The same trend occurs comparing the rate for innovative approvals of corporations 
above and below the median for alteration approvals, 0.36 to 0.90. 
 Another interesting finding from the model is the significant correlation between 
antineoplastic and orphan drug approvals. While the ratio of orphan drug approvals loads 
on the innovative research factor along with the ratios for new molecular entities and 
priority review approvals, as covered in Chapter 4, orphan drug approvals can be granted 
for existing treatments. Considering that cancer drugs represent the largest therapeutic 
category of drugs in the development pipeline and that new treatments are among the 
most expensive drugs on the market, this correlation could indicate a distinct strategy of 




treatment options are more effective for the target population than existing options, then 
this would still represent innovative research, but it also supports criticism of the Orphan 
Drug Act as being utilized by companies primarily for financial gain rather than 
stimulating novel research for underserved patient groups. 
 In summary, the model in Figure 5.2 shows that the connections between 
organizational research practices are not clearly explainable by the technical or scientific 
aspects of pharmacology. The trade-off that appears between developing innovative 
products and alterations to existing products is likely the result of organizational culture 
emphasizing one research path over the other. A more detailed explanation on this causal 
relationship requires additional organizational level data on the internal research practices 
at these companies and would be a good direction for future research.  
 In relation to the process of field structuration, the structural equation model 
significantly reduces the number of indicators contributing to measurable latent 
constructs in the data. This reduction is beneficial because it allows for a more 
parsimonious latent class analysis, as opposed to one including all of the variables, which 
increases the likelihood of finding meaningful class divisions (Collins and Lanza 2010). 
Additionally, the structural equation model indicates that the financial variables are more 
appropriately treated as covariates to the research strategies rather than as measures of 
latent constructs. 
5.6 Latent Class Analysis  
 The purpose of the latent class analysis is to determine if the identified latent 
constructs of research strategy leads to distinct organizational types within the field. This 




on pharmaceutical research and development than those based on historical 
characteristics. I used the variables from the best fit structural equation model, figure 5.4, 
to conduct a latent class analysis in Stata with the LCA Stata plugin developed by Lanza 
and her colleagues (2015). Table 5.8 and Figure 5.3 show the results of this analysis. 






Fit Statistics  Class Proportions 









1 11 278.85 2036 300.85 323.7 -365.61      
2 22 197.15 2024 243.15 290.93 -324.76  77% 23%   
3 33 176.01 2012 246.01 318.72 -314.19  52% 26% 22%  
4 44 161.16 2000 255.16 352.8 -306.77  26% 28% 22% 24% 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Fit Statistic Comparison between Class Solutions 
 
The data in Figure 5.3 and Table 5.8 indicate that the two class solution is the best fit 
model. Figure 5.4 shows the prevalence rates for the 11 variables in the model (0 = no 























Figure 5.4 Class Prevalence Rates 
 Figure 5.6 shows that the model does not have great class separation. The largest 
differences occur in priority review, NME, and orphan status approvals, all with above 60 
percent difference in prevalence rates between classes. The least amount of separation 
occurs with dermatological agents, new dosage, and already marketed submissions. The 
data in Figure 5.6 indicates a possible interpretation of the classes but is not very clear. 
To assists with interpreting the classes, I looked at the descriptive data for the variables 
excluded from the latent class model.  
 Comparing the data in Table 5.9 with the data in Figure 5.6 suggest that the 
organizational subgroups in the latent class model are separated into innovative 
corporations (class 1) and modification corporations (class 2). The innovative 
corporations receive more new molecular entities, orphan drugs, and priority review 
approvals. They were also more likely to develop antineoplastic, anti-infective, and 


























Table 5.9 Means by Latent Class for Financial, Chemical Type, and 
Therapeutic Variables not Included in Latent Class Model 
 
Financial Variables Class 1 Class 2 Test statistic 
Marketing & Administrative Cost 37% 38% -0.23 
Operational Costs 34% 36% -0.39 
2-Year Lagged R&D Cost 17% 15% 0.97 
Merger & Acquisition Approvals 3% 0% 1.44 
Subsidiary Approvals 16% 5% 1.45 
Number of Employees 33,874 13,500 1.97 
Percent not in Pharmaceuticals 43% 0% 1.38 
Percent Foreign Submission 44% 52% -0.52 
Return on Assets (ROA) in $s 6.96 -1.72 2.54* 
Net Income per Basic Share in $s 3.13 -55.46 2.01* 
Chemical & Therapeutic Variables    
Anti-infective Agents 13% 8% 0.81 
Cardiologic Agents 5% 4% 0.41 
Nervous System Agents 14% 19% -0.77 
Genitourinary Agents 2% 0% 1.36 
Hormones 9% 6% 0.58 
Metabolic Agents 6% 13% -1.62 
Miscellaneous Agents 4% 1% 0.99 
Ophthalmic Agents 6% 1% 1.04 
Psychiatric Agents 2% 15% -2.87** 
Respiratory Agents 5% 18% -2.63* 
BLA Submissions 9% 0% 1.70 
New Active Ingredient Submissions 1% 8% -2.29* 
New Combination Submissions 7% 9% -0.62 
New Indication Submissions 5% 5% -0.35 
OTC Switches 1% 0% 1.30 
Sample Size 46 13  
* = p<0.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001 
 
psychiatric, and respiratory agents. Based on the factor analysis in Table 5.7, these 
therapeutic classes are connected to the chemical type submissions of new active 
ingredient, new combination, and OTC switch, which are all applications defined as 
modifying existing drugs. Using the variables for innovative research and altering current 




innovative corporations have a lower rate of approvals for alterations to current research 
than modification corporations, 0.47 to 0.66 (p < 0.020 in a two-tailed t-test). Conversely, 
modification corporations have a lower rate of innovative approvals than innovative 
corporations, 0.18 to 0.78 (p < 0.000 in a two-tailed t-test). 
 In relation to the financial information, there does not a appear to be a difference 
in how expenses are allocated between the classes; as percentages of total expenses, 
marketing and administrative cost, operational cost, and the 2-year lagged R&D cost are 
similar between classes. In terms of organizational structure, innovators are larger, more 
likely to make use of subsidiaries, engage in mergers and acquisitions, and be outside the 
SIC industry category of pharmaceutical manufacturing and development. The innovator 
strategy appears to be more beneficial for organizations because they were more likely to 
have higher returns on assets and positive valuation on net income per basic share, both 
outcomes that make organizational survival more likely. 
 In conclusion, the latent class analysis indicates that there are two organizational 
groups in the sample demarcated by organizational strategy. These subgroups pursue 
distinct organizational strategies focused on either innovation or modification. The 
evidence of path dependency suggests that the latent constructs driving categorization are 
the result of organizational culture and not the result of technical or regulatory pressures. 
Furthermore, the fact that multiple organizations fall into each category means that the 
aspects of organizational cultural influencing the class separation are collective, and 
therefore not likely to be the result of unique internal organizational identity. Whether or 
not the source of these latent constructs is attributable to logics orders is not assessable 





 The analyses in this chapter revealed several important findings. The factor 
analysis showed that underlying latent constructs effecting organizational strategy can be 
identified from measures of general organizational practices. This finding is not restricted 
to the pharmaceutical industry and can applied by strategy-as-practice researchers in 
other fields. Of interest to researchers in the pharmaceutical industry, the factor analysis 
indicates that measures of organizational structure drawn from financial variables are 
most likely covariates to research strategies rather than determinants. This finding makes 
sense given the long-term research horizons and uncertainty in pharmaceutical 
development. 
 The structural equation model revealed several key latent constructs that 
interconnect in a coherent research framework. The most important finding from the 
structural equation model is the existence of a path dependency creating a trade-off 
between innovative research and alterations to current treatments. While the model does 
not assess the scientific contributions alterations to current treatments may have on 
shortening the development period for innovative treatments, the findings indicate that a 
spillover effect is not likely to be realized internally because of the inverse relationship 
between the rates of innovative approvals to alteration approvals.  
 The latent class analysis showed that distinct organizational categories exists 
within the field as a result of the latent constructs within organizational research 
strategies. The separation of categories aligns with the path dependency revealed by the 
structural equation model, and based on the financial measures, lead to different 




success than modifiers. This raises the question that if all of the organizations in the field 
are operating within a capitalist market system, why would some corporations persist in 
focusing on developing products that are alterations to current treatments? The latent 
class analysis cannot address this question but an institutional theory based prediction is 
that organizational culture has institutionalized the practices of innovation or 
modifications making it unlikely organizational members are aware of the connection 
between action and outcome. An analysis at the organizational level is necessary to 
determine if institutional factors do in fact contribute to the observed latent classes. The 
next chapter presents four case studies, two from each class, to elucidate if the latent class 







FOUR CASE STUDIES ON DRUG DEVELOPMENT 
6.1 Introduction 
 Applying the strategic action framework to analyze the incorporation of a new 
product within the pharmaceutical regime frames institutionalization as a causal process; 
therefore, evaluating how organizations negotiate the release of a new product provides a 
set of actions that can potentially reveal the dominant institutional logic of a company. 
This chapter is a set of four case studies on the market release of new molecular entities 
to elucidate if the latent classes identified in the previous chapter are organizational 
categorizes defined by distinct institutional orders. Figure 6.1 is the theoretical model 
illustrating the conceptual framework for this analytical step. 
 
 





 The data for the case studies came from two sources, academic medical journals 
and annual corporate reports. These sources directly address the dynamics between 
pharmaceutical corporations and two stakeholder groups: medical professionals and 
financial investors. The original goal of conducting a comprehensive analysis on all the 
major relationships between pharmaceutical corporations and the other stakeholders in 
the field ended up being beyond the scope of this project but the case studies conducted 
here show expanding the analysis to other stakeholders is a fruitful direction for future 
research. The case studies in this chapter show latent class analysis can identify 
organizational subgroups connected by organizational strategies; however, the data 
suggest that the differences between the innovator and modifier classes is the result of 
more than just the alignment of organizational strategy to institutional logics.   
6.2 Case Study Data and Methodology  
 Organizational scholars have a long history utilizing case study research and such 
work has led to many groundbreaking insights (Gibbert and Ruigrok 2010). Case studies 
provide an in depth analysis of organizational practices that is difficult to achieve in large 
sample studies and is an appropriate technique for directly comparing organizational 
strategies between groups. The main criticisms of case study research focus on the issue 
of the validity. There are two methods researchers have followed to assess the validity of 
case study data: triangulation through multiple data sources or using multiple coders to 
generate interrater reliability coefficients. This study uses triangulation by drawing data 
from two different sources: academic journals and annual corporate reports.  
 The relationship between case studies and theory can be either inductive or 




2005), used case studies inductively to develop broad theoretical explanations on 
organizational structure and change. Scott and his associates (2000) applied case studies 
deductively to elucidate the propositions derived from their quantitative analyses. This 
study follows the lead of Scott et al. (2000) and uses case studies to elucidate if the 
innovator and modifier classes identified in the previous chapter are the result of different 
logic orders on organizational strategy.  
6.2.1 Case Study Selection 
 Rather than directly selecting organizations from each latent class, two drugs from 
each class were selected as case study subjects. This allows the analysis to focus on 
strategies of drug development by analyzing the actions taken during the release of a 
specific product. Considering the propriety nature of pharmaceutical development and 
corporate practices in a competitive market system, the case histories are not exhaustive; 
however, previous research has shown the data does exist to evaluate the organizational 
strategy of pharmaceutical corporations during the drug development process (Abraham 
1995, Applbaum 2009, Matheson 2008).  
 A strategic selection method criterion (Small 2009) was employed by drawing the 
sample from the pool of new molecular entity approvals within each class. New 
molecular entity is an appropriate criterion because it requires interorganizational 
negotiations and therefore increases the availability of data: journal articles that inform 
physicians about a new treatment option are more prevalent during the early stages of a 
prescription drugs life cycle, and new products are more likely to be featured in annual 
corporate reports. In addition to providing potential cases in both classes, this criterion 




acts as a control for historical events within the field. The drugs selected for case study 
analysis are Novartis’s Tasigna, Johnson & Johnson’s Invega, Sepracor’s Lunesta, and 
Novo Nordisk’s Levemir. 
6.2.2 Data & Methods 
 Data were gathered from two sources: academic medical journals and annual 
corporate reports. One medical journal article for each drug was found on PubMed by 
searching the chemical name of each drug within three years of the FDA approval date. 
In order for an article to be selected for analysis, one or more authors had to be clearly 
identified as affiliated with the application company. Seven years of annual corporate 
reports on each corporation were collected from the Mergent online database. A period of 
seven years of reports was chosen for saturation; for example, Fiol (1989 and 1990) only 
analyzed three years of reports. The drug approval year was the midpoint with the three 
years of reports preceding and following the approval year completing each sample.  
 The data were analyzed using basic content analysis procedures (Weber 1990). 
While there is academic criticism on using content analysis for analyzing latent 
constructs, the methodology has become an accepted process for evaluating a wide range 
of organizational issues (Duriau et al 2007). In relation to this project, content analysis 
has been used for over thirty years to evaluate organizational strategy (see Bettman and 
Weitz 1984, Bowman 1984, Ditlevesen 2012, and Stanton and Stanton 2002). 
 The institutional logics perspective informed the construction of the codebook for 
the evaluation of the case study data. The rhetorical analysis of organizational material 
has been used successfully in prior research to evaluate the effects of institutional 




2005). Discourse related to organizational strategy within the academic journals and 
annual corporate reports was coded through an iterative coding process. Table 6.1 shows 
the final codebook. The entirety of the academic journals were read and coded; however, 
only the letter to shareholders and sections discussing the case study drug were coded in 
the annual corporate reports. 
 Since the purpose of this analysis was to elucidate the latent classes found in the 
quantitative analysis, the content coded in each source was statements about 
organizational strategy. Rather than counts of words or phrases, cohesive statements 
(sentences and paragraphs) were coded as single units of discussions on organizational 
strategy. The example of strategies discussing the need for care in Table 6.1 is two 
sentences from the 2005 Novo Nordisk letter to shareholders. The goal of this coded 
methodology was to ensure the identification of each strategy was correct by including 
the context of each statement.  
Table 6.1 Codebook for Case Study Analysis  
 
Research articles Example 
author(s) Turkoz et al 
author affiliations 
all are Ortho-McNeil Janssen Scientific Affairs (J&J 
subsidiary) 
funding sources Ortho-McNeil Janssen Scientific Affairs, LLC 
journal  Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 
reporting method of treatment 
effects 
"22% reduction from baseline" - relative effect 
treatment groups 
pooled analysis of 3 prior studies: five groups on various 
strengths against one placebo group 
alternative treatments 
no alternative medication tested but listed studies of other 
drugs that have found similar results 
framing of need 
"the damaging effect that negative symptoms have on the 
ability of patients with schizophrenia to participate fully in 
society."  




iatrogenic effects ADRs 10% or greater are listed 
trail duration three 6-week studies 
sample size 937 treatment & 337 placebo 
study limitations 
goodness of fit statistics for path analysis were below 
acceptable range 
drug genesis not discussed 
other 
results consistent with hypothesis that indirect symptoms are 
improved by the drug, but the data is not significant 
   
Annual Corporate Reports Example Logic Order 
Research & Development   
research pipeline 
"For several years Novartis has received more 
approvals for new medicines than competitors." 
(Novartis 2010:9) 
commerce 
publications and conferences 
"We expect to provide data on arfomoterol Phase 
III studies at appropriate medical meetings as we 








"Our two separate, six-month, placebo-controlled 
studies of the product have provided extensive data 
supporting the drug's suitability for nightly 
administration over long periods of time without the 
complications of significant next-day effects, 
tolerance and rebound, which are observed with 




“LUNESTA represents a new approach to the 
treatment of insomnia, and has the potential to bring 
these patients real relief.” (Sepracor 2004:2) 
care 
Patient Health    
need for care 
"We have a responsibility as part of our vision to 
try to influence the negative trends of this global 
health issue and avoid unnecessary human suffering 
and a staggering cost to society. That is why we 
wish to be a catalyst for changing diabetes." (Novo 
Nordisk 2005:4) 
care 
awareness of need 
"As part of our marketing strategy for 2007, we 
have begun the rollout of a new physician education 
campaign containing some of these data, which we 
believe will further distinguish LUNESTA as a 
unique treatment available for the millions of 






access to care 
"But thanks to our strong financial results in 2004, 
we were able to expand our "access to medicines" 
programs for uninsured and indigent patients 
suffering from leprosy, malaria, tuberculosis, 
chronic myeloid, leukemia and other diseases, all 
part of our important worldwide corporate 
citizenship program." (Novartis 2004: 8) 
care 
Health Care Industry   
perception of industry 
structure 
“Our perspectives on health policy are 
straightforward: We are champions of a health care 
system that provides incentives for innovation, that 
permits public and private health care systems to 
co-exist, that is characterized by strong and well-
respected regulatory authorities, that is centered 
around the best interests of patients and consumers, 
that provides for physician and patient choice, and 
that allows these choices to be made on the basis of 
broadly available, well-founded, clinical and 
economic evidence.” (Johnson & Johnson 2005:4) 
commerce 
intellectual property rights 
"The cost increases associated with the growing 
demand for healthcare services, diagnostics and 
medicines lead political activities aimed at reducing 
expenditures on medicines, via price reductions and 
generic substitution. Unfortunately, these efforts go 
even further and also encompass attempts to 
weaken patents and intellectual property rights." 
(Novartis 2008: 7) 
commerce 
interorganizational relations 
"We work actively to promote collaboration 
between all parties in the healthcare system to 
achieve common goals." (Novo Nordisk 2006:2) 
care 
public perceptions on 
industry 
"Clearly the global regulatory environment is 
growing tougher; pressure is being put on 
companies over the cost of health care, and private 
enterprise is under close public scrutiny." (Johnson 
& Johnson 2004:3) 
commerce 
Organizational Structure   
company principles 
"Thanks to the power of our operating model and 
the character of the people we attract, we have been 
able to deliver exceptionally consistent performance 
decade after decade." (Johnson & Johnson 2007:4) 
commerce 
mergers and acquisitions 
"Thanks to our strategy, in 2008, Novartis stayed on 
course and completed several targeted acquisitions 
and strategic investments that both strengthened the 







"During the first quarter of 2005, we signed a 
research and development agreement with San 
Diego-based ACADIA for development of new 
drug candidates targeted toward treatment of CNS 
disorders, primarily neuropsychiatric/neurologic 
conditions and neuropathic pain, as well as a 
possible 5-HT2A antagonist for use in a 
combination product with LUNESTA for sleep-
related indications." (Sepracor 2004:3) 
science 
organizational culture 
"Measurement of working climate indicates that 
this has been accomplished without affecting 
employee morale. In fact morale is at an all-time 
high!" (Novo Nordisk 2003:4) 
care 
business structure 
“Our decentralized management approach 
encourages our businesses to develop products and 
marketing strategies tuned to local cultures, 
enabling them to explore new product categories 




 While the case studies are focused on the development of specific drugs, most of 
the annual corporate reports in the sample contained little information on the drugs. This 
required expansion of the analysis to include the entire content of the letter to the 
shareholders. The content in the annual corporate reports was coded in a two-stage 
process similar to Powell and Sandholtz’s (2012) methods. The first pass coded the 
material into four main categories of organizational strategy: research and development, 
patient health, health care industry, and organizational structure. The second pass coded 
the material within each category into the logic order of science, care, or commerce.  
 The four main categories were identified as descriptive characteristics during the 
initial reading of a selection of annual reports. These categories are not interpretations of 
latent constructs, i.e. this is not grounded theory, rather the categories were employed to 
efficiently separate the data to evaluate the content based on the logic orders. This 
process allowed for coherent strategies related to the logic orders to emerge between 




alignment of each corporation’s organizational strategy. The dominant logic of the 
organization was determined as the logic order that contained the most statements of 
organizational strategies. 
 Annual corporate reports are an appropriate source for data to evaluate 
organizational logics because these publications have shifted from being primarily 
accounting reports to tools organizations use strategically to communicate organizational 
identity to outsiders (Duriau et al 2007). Researchers do not typically examine the entire 
report but focus their analysis on specific sections (Stanton and Stanton 2002). The letter 
to shareholders was selected here as the component to evaluate the general organizational 
strategy of each corporation because letters to shareholders have been utilized similarly in 
previous research to indicate causal relations between management ideology and 
organizational actions (Bettman and Weitz 1984, Duriau et al. 2007, Fiol 1989 and 1990).  
 Neither of these data sources is neutral in relation to institutional frameworks. The 
academic journal articles are components of science and the annual corporate reports are 
components of commerce. However, this does not mean the content only reflects these 
two logics. The factual content, clinical data and corporate performance metrics, is not 
the content analyzed. The analysis focuses on interpreting the discussions of strategy that 
resulted from the factual content. For example, in the academic articles treatment effects 
are coded as reported as either relative or absolute measures because Woloshin et al. 
(2008) stated that reporting treatment effects in relative terms was a strategic method 
employed to make treatment outcomes seem more impressive to physicians. This tactic 
then is aligned with the logic of commerce if the study authors are affiliated with the drug 




company as physicians would be more likely to the prescribe the drug. In a similar 
fashion, analyzing components within the letter to shareholders can also reveal 
organizational strategies aligned with logics other than the logic of commerce. 
6.3 Tasigna (nilotinib) and Novartis: Innovator Class 
 The FDA approved Tasigna (nilotinib) on October 29, 2007 as part of the 
chemotherapy treatment for leukemia. Deininger’s (2008) article is a review of two new 
second line treatment options available for chronic myeloid leukemia and is focused on 
the results of the clinical trials for Tasigna. The author, Michael W. Deininger, is 
affiliated with the Division of Hematology and Medical Oncology at the Oregon Health 
and Science University Cancer Institute. He is further identified as a consult for Novartis 
in the disclosure section. 
 This article is the only journal article in the sample that compared the effects of 
competing treatment options from different companies. What is interesting about this 
tactic is that the actual clinical studies were not comparative trials but Deininger (2008) 
attempted to distinguish the drugs from each other based on results from separate studies. 
He concluded that the results do not clearly indicate one products is superior, both appear 
to have benefits and drawbacks, but Tasigna appeared to have more potential for patients. 
The general tone of the article indicates an alignment with the logic of care. Deininger 
(2008) framed the competition between second line drugs as beneficial primarily for 
patients because it is “an important step on the path to individualized cancer therapy” 
(4030). Furthermore, whether or not Tasigna meets the potential predicted treatment 




These statements connect with the trends aligned with the logic of care in the annual 
corporate reports.  
 One of the organizational strategies that emerged from the Novartis letters to 
shareholders was the company’s efforts to provide medicines for patients that could not 
afford them. The 2004 letter to the shareholders discussed the company’s recently opened 
research center for tropical disease, which is managed as a not-for profit organization and 
targets the treatments of neglected diseases in developing countries. The center is part of 
the company’s broader goal of providing access to patients in need in line with the belief 
that the right to health is a basic human right. This concern for patients is repeated in all 
of the letters through statements mentioning the company’s multiple access-to-medicine 
programs. This aligns with the logic of care and can be viewed as a tactic to secure moral 
legitimacy for the company by appealing to general humanitarian concerns. 
 Additional examples of Novartis addressing broader health issues occur in later 
reports. The 2006 letter to shareholders explained that corporate citizenship was an 
important issue at Novartis and that was why the company engaged in multiple access-to-
medicine programs, connecting this topic between strategies of patient care and 
organizational structure. In the 2007 letter, the section covering the access-to-medicines 
programs was expanded to included a discussion on corporate citizenship and a new 
corporate commitment to environmental sustainability. The 2008 letter announced the 
launch of a vaccines institute in Italy that would focus on developing vaccines for 
patients in developing countries, and in the 2009 letter, Novartis is stated to have played a 
crucial part in the successful campaign against leprosy, the near eradication of which is 




continuing to provide medicine to those without access, Novartis was now taking a 
holistic approach to health care access by expanding its philanthropic programs to include 
management and technical training to assist countries in building health care 
infrastructures.  
 The organizational principle of providing access continues to be visible in the 
unusual diversification of the company by selling both prescription and generic drugs. 
The letters framed the generic segment of the company as providing access to medicine 
for patients in the industrial world who can afford to pay for medication, but not the high 
prices of brand name drugs. The generic drug business “provides affordable treatment 
options following the expiry of patents” (Novartis 2006:6).  In the 2008 letter this 
strategy is attributed to helping maintain the overall fiscal performance of the company in 
the deteriorating economic climate and it is indicated the strategy is becoming legitimized 
within the industry because it “now enjoys broad support and that a growing number of 
major pharmaceutical companies are also investing in generic pharmaceuticals” (Novartis 
2008:6). This strategy of product diversification is a good illustration of the overall 
organizational strategy of Novartis. The letters discussed how the generics business 
allowed the company to provide access to more people while at the same time touting the 
strategy as successful in contributing to growing profitability. Entry into the generic 
market as a strategy aligns with both the logics of care and commerce because Novartis 
stated it allowed the company to provide care to an underserved population but at the 
same time was profitable. Other components within the letters indicate that Novartis is 




 Examples of actions that align with the logic of commerce are seen in all of the 
reports. The 2004 letter stated the need for strong intellectual property rights and keeping 
the industry profitable was necessary to develop innovations for future generations. The 
letter also discussed the company’s acquisition strategy as designed to improve its 
generic portfolio. Tasigna was first mentioned in the 2006 letter, which stated its 
expected launch date and projected Tasigna to reach peak annual sales of 1 billion 
dollars. The fact that the earliest discussion of Tasigna is framed around projected 
profitability is an example pragmatic legitimacy as an explanation of drug development 
and aligns with the logic of commerce. The use of pragmatic legitimacy as an 
explanatory tactic for strategies reflecting the logic of commerce becomes clearer in the 
discussions on strategy related to the health care industry. 
 Over a page in the 2007 letter is devoted to an ideological discussion of anti-
market assaults on the pharmaceutical industry and why commercialization is the 
appropriate strategy for pharmaceutical development. The 2007 letter stated explicitly the 
three biggest challenges for Novartis were increased pressure on costs, erosion of patent 
rights, and growing public mistrust. Later in the letter, the CEO stated, “I personally feel 
the level of hostility toward innovation goes too far when industrialized countries take for 
granted that they have the healthiest population in the history of mankind but at the same 
time demand breakthrough medicines with no side effects and offered at minimal prices” 
(Novartis 2007:8). This letter more than the others reveals the company as conflicted 
between seeking to expand access to care while also existing as a profitable commercial 
corporation. The connection between innovation and commercialization is an example of 




innovation. The 2008 letter to shareholders continued to criticize the larger structural 
issues of the health care industry but the critique was toned down from the previous year. 
Finally, the CEO stated in the 2009 report “I would like to emphasize that our primary 
purpose as a pharmaceutical company is to discover and develop effective medicines and 
successfully bring them to market” (10), again reinforcing the connection between 
development and capitalism found in the logic of commerce as the dominant component 
of the organizational strategy. 
 In conclusion, it is clear Novartis is a company that cares. None of the other case 
studies discussed extensive programs providing access to medicine consistently nor did 
they mention founding multiple organizations dedicated to addressing a wide range of 
health issues targeted to low profit markets. Yet at the same time Novartis is still a 
commercial company stating in response to policies of price controls that people need to 
realize innovation has a price and that patients benefit from the financial success of 
industry. As a large corporation, the letters mentioned multiple products each year 
making it difficult to focus on the development of Tasigna, and Tasigna was only briefly 
discussed elsewhere in the annual reports. Based on the content in the letter to 
shareholders, my conclusion is the organizational strategy of Novartis is not dominated 
by on logic but equally aligned with the logics of care and commerce. 
6.4 Invega (paliperidone) and Johnson & Johnson: Innovator Class 
 Invega is a psychotherapeutic agent approved by the FDA on December 19, 2006 
for the treatment of schizophrenia. The article by Turkoz et al. (2008) is a pooled analysis 
of data from three prior studies to test for the indirect effects of Invega. The data 




placebo groups. All four study authors are employees of Ortho-McNeil Janssen Scientific 
Affairs, a wholly owned subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson.  
 The need for an analysis of indirect effects is framed around the complexity of 
schizophrenia, which causes both positive and negative symptoms in patients. The goal of 
this analysis was to separate the total effects between direct and indirect effects through 
path analysis to test the hypothesis that the drug has a direct effect on the negative 
symptoms of schizophrenia that contribute indirectly to patient outcomes. The authors’ 
conclude the findings support this hypothesis: “these data suggest that paliperidone ER 
improves the negative symptoms of schizophrenia through a direct effect as well as an 
indirect effect on positive and mood symptoms” (Turkoz et al 2008:957). However, the 
data only shows the direct effect is significant; neither of the mediated effects tested, 
indirect effects on positive and negative symptoms, were significant in the model. While 
the authors’ noted that these indirect effects were not significant in their discussion of the 
results, the fact that they concluded that the study supported the hypothesis of indirect 
effects indicates the intent of this article aligns with the logics of commerce because the 
measurable outcomes of the drug are overstated. The analysis of the data from the annual 
corporate reports supports further the interpretation that Johnson & Johnson pursues an 
organizational strategy aligned with the logic of commerce. 
 The annual corporate report sections on Invega give the impression Johnson & 
Johnson is primarily focused on scientific advancements and patient care. The 2007 
annual report is the only one that discussed Invega in detail. The section on Invega 
opened with a personal story of a patient struggling with schizophrenia and how 




then discussed the history of schizophrenia research at the company and the multiple 
breakthroughs made since 1953. The conclusion of the section stated Invega was one 
more product that will enable patients to return to fulfilling their dreams. This section on 
Invega contained no discussions that aligned with the logic of commerce, most of the 
discussion is focused on improving patient health and advances in treatment, but the 
content in the letters to shareholders indicates the strategic focus of the company was 
actually aligned with the logic of commerce. 
 The 2003 and 2004 letters appeared balanced between the three logics. The 2003 
letter contains statements of care: “Patients’ stories of the impact of this technology are 
inspiring, and remind us that our business – the business of health care – is a meaningful 
endeavor and an extraordinary responsibility”; statements of science: “While financial 
achievements are important in themselves, more significant are the health care advances 
they enable that are the foundation for our future”; and statements of commerce 
“Productivity initiatives such as Process Excellence help us exploit every opportunity to 
maximize the resources of this vast organization”. The 2004 letter contained similar 
statements but there was more discussion about the how the organizational structure meet 
targets related to science, care, and commerce. In addition, the 2004 letter is the first to 
mention regulatory pressures on the cost of care as a factor influencing organizational 
strategy.  
 It becomes clear in the 2005 letter that while Johnson & Johnson is making 
research advances and improving people’s lives, the dominant organizational strategy of 
the company aligns with the logic of commerce. The letter opens with a statement that 




improved treatments: “An improvement in mix toward higher margin products, 
productivity increases driven by cost containment efforts, and positive interest and other 
incomes all helped drive impressive earnings growth” (Johnson & Johnson 2005:1). The 
letter also discussed the general structure of health care systems in more detail and made 
clear the company position is health care systems should be based on market principles 
where products have both clinical and economic value. 
 The 2006 letter is the first letter in the sample to integrate performance metric 
graphs into the text. The bottom of the first page presents three bar charts showing net 
sales, diluted earnings per share, and dividends per share between 2002 and 2006. The 
incorporation of these graphs that were previously in a separate section of the report 
emphasized the focus of the strategic statements in the letter is commercial productivity. 
The 2006 letter also discussed in detail the four strategic principles of the company: (1) 
founded on the values embodied in the Credo, (2) broadly based in human health care, (3) 
a decentralized business operation, and (4) a long-term management strategy. Each of 
these principles is explained in relation to specific organizational strategies. The credo 
“challenges employees to put the needs and well-being of the people they serve first”; 
being broadly based offers “advantages that enable us to elevate our performance” 
(emphasis in the original); decentralization combines the best properties of small firms 
with the resources of a large corporation; and long term management is another “source 
of enduring financial strength” (Johnson & Johnson 2006). While these principles cover 
the range of all three logics, the letter connected these principles through a broader 




using pragmatic legitimacy to indicate that components of science and care are 
strategically adopted to meet the company’s commercial needs. 
 The 2007 letter was the first to discuss philanthropic sponsorships, but it is clear 
the strategy of sponsorship is part of the organization’s commercial strategy: “Our 
sponsorship of the 2008 Olympics in Beijing is boosting awareness of our companies and 
our brands throughout the Asia-Pacific region” (Johnson & Johnson 2007:6). The letter 
discussed the four key businesses principles again but they were modified from the 
principles listed in previous years to: (1) winning in health care, (2) capitalizing on 
convergence, (3) accelerating growth in emerging markets, and (4) developing leadership 
and talent. These new principles are more commercially focused and indicated the 
organizational strategy was increasingly focused on market based tactics. Winning in 
health care is a particularly interesting principle because the explanation focused on 
managerial changes to the organizational structure and indicated Johnson & Johnson 
considers the health care industry a competition between organizations rather than an 
institution for social improvement. The letter to shareholders in the 2008 and 2009 annual 
reports contained similar content to the years of 2006 and 2007 with one notable 
exception. The 2008 letter addressed the broader economic issues of the global recession 
and discussed how the company remained strong by highlighting the fact it was the third 
best performing stock in the Dow Industrial Average for the year.  
 In conclusion, the data indicates the dominant organizational strategy for Johnson 
& Johnson aligns with the logic of commerce. While the content of the material discussed 
scientific advances and concern for patient health, these topics were ultimately woven 




Components of science and care were presented predominantly as elements of cognitive 
legitimacy; the company engaged in scientific research and patient care because that is 
what pharmaceutical corporations do, not because these actions defined corporate goals. 
Components of science and care were also presented pragmatically to explain strategies 
designed to provide the company with a competitive edge. 
 Turkoz et al. (2008) stated there was a clear need to improve schizophrenia 
treatment and learn about how current treatments effect the entire range of negative 
symptoms. This position represents the logics of both care and science, but the authors 
conclusion, that Invega could treat indirect symptoms, is unsupported by the data 
indicating the primary interest of the author’s was market expansion. This article also 
represents the use of pragmatic legitimacy; the data did not support the hypothesis on 
Invega, but neither did it disprove the hypothesis, so practitioners are encouraged to 
adopt the treatment because it could improve their patients’ outcomes. The actions in this 
situation are legitimized through positions of self-interest. Johnson & Johnson gets 
increased sales and physicians can switch their patients to a medication that may or may 
not improve their condition but shows no indication it will worsen the symptoms. 
6.5 Lunesta/Estorra (eszopiclone) and Sepracor: Modifier Class 
 The FDA approved Lunesta (eszopiclone) on December 15, 2004 for the 
treatment of primary insomnia. Walsh (2007) and colleagues article presented the 
findings from a Phase IIIB/IV clinical trial Sepracor submitted to the FDA. Ten of the six 
authors’ work for Sepracor and the article stated the company provided the funding for 
the trial. The research design was a standard, double-blind randomized trial of the 




against the control group and as absolute measures calculated against the baseline of the 
treatment group.  
 The authors stated the clinical trial had several unique components compared to 
previous insomnia studies. First, the trial was long, lasting for over six months, and the 
researchers used a non-standard methodology for sleep studies by gathering data beyond 
sleep quality. Walsh et al. (2007) stated the most significant aspect of the trial was it “is 
the first to demonstrate that long-term treatment of primary insomnia with eszopiclone 
3mg, or any hypnotic, enhanced quality of life, reduced work limitations, and reduced 
global insomnia severity, in addition to improving quantitative, patient-reported sleep 
variables” (967). While the article focused on these improvements to patients, the overall 
tone of the article framed eszopiclone as a scientific breakthrough in sleep therapy and 
indicated a strategy aligned with the logic of science. The early years of the annual 
corporate reports also focused on the scientific discoveries and advances in patient 
treatments made by Sepracor. 
 The shareholder letters in 2001 and 2002 framed Sepracor as a company founded 
on innovative research. The letters also highlight the organizational structure by stating 
Sepracor is a unique, integrated small pharmaceutical organization that can take a product 
from development to commercialization. Even though the letters highlight the company’s 
scientific abilities, a significant portion of income was derived through royalties from 
out-licensed products, indicating that Sepracor’s early infrastructure was more supportive 
of research and development than commercialization. Both the 2001 and 2002 letters 
discussed in detail only one commercialized product that was developed in-house, 




name Estorra, as a promising product in the late-stage pipeline. Outside of the letter to 
shareholders, there were lengthy sections in the reports containing a discussion on the 
current clinical research results for Lunesta and an explanation of insomnia and its effect 
on people’s lives. These sections framed insomnia as an under-treated health need but 
indicated the organizational strategy for developing Lunesta focused on scientific 
discovery rather than capitalizing on an unmet market demand. 
 About a quarter of the 2003 letter to shareholders was devoted to Lunesta. The 
primary focus of this section was on the general scientific progress being made in treating 
sleep disorders and the specific research being conducted by Sepracor. “As the science 
surrounding GABA continues to evolve, we feel privileged to be at the forefront of 
research for the treatment of sleep disorders” (Sepracor 2003:2). The letter highlights that 
2,700 patients were enrolled in the phase III trials submitted to the FDA for approval and 
how the company was conducting an additional long-term follow-up study specifically 
because “the surprising absence of scientifically robust, long-term efficacy data” 
(Sepracor 2003:2). The content of the letter indicates Sepracor presents a public identity 
based on scientific accomplishment. This is a strategy of moral legitimacy because it is 
justifying the alignment of non-commercial strategies with the general social promise of 
scientific medicine. This tactics is seen explicitly in the claim that the need for insomnia 
treatments is that sleep is a fundamental component of good health. This strategy 
suggests Sepracor’s dominant organizational strategy aligns with the logic of science. 
 In the 2004 letter, Estorra has been rebranded as Lunesta and discussion on the 
drug again takes up about a quarter of the letter. The letter discussed the continued 




a better understanding on the relationship between insomnia and other commonly 
occurring conditions. Stating that Sepracor is interested in furthering scientific 
knowledge on insomnia by investigating comorbidity causality is another instance of a 
non-commercial organizational strategy justified through moral legitimacy. The content 
of the first four annual corporate reports indicated Sepracor is aligned predominantly with 
the logic of science; however, starting with the 2004 letter to shareholders, an increasing 
amount of the discussion on organizational strategy is devoted to market based tactics. 
For example, the 2004 letter discussed the need for expanding the Lunesta sales force to 
achieve product growth and highlighted how the company’s unique infrastructure makes 
it an ideal partner for a U.S. biotech corporation seeking to commercialize a new product.  
 In the 2005 letter, the Lunesta content is focused more on patient care and 
commercialization than scientific discovery. While future developments are still 
mentioned as important to the company’s long-term plans, the letter stated the expansion 
of the sales force had driven short-term growth rather than the introduction of a new 
product. The discussion of organizational strategies for market development as well as 
issues related to the health care industry is even more prevalent in the 2006 letter. 
However, the final section of the letter stated, “Increasingly, our focus will be on future 
opportunities in the form of candidates that we generate from our internal discovery 
capabilities” (Sepracor 2006:3), indicating Sepracor was still strongly tied to the logic of 
science. 
 The final Sepracor letter to shareholders analyzed was a notable departure from 
the previous six. The entire structure of the letter was different and focused almost 




a new CEO who initiated structural changes as part of an “objective to create a stronger 
and more productive commercial organization” (Sepracor 2007:3). While the letter still 
mentioned specific products, it no longer contained sections discussing the development 
of the products. What is particularly interesting about this letter is that while the content 
was predominantly market orientated, the opening section described Sepracor as a 
pioneering research company that was built on the scientific advancement of dividing 
chiral drugs into parts. This origin story is absent from all of the early letters and seems to 
be included here as a tactic of pragmatic legitimacy for altering the organizational 
strategy. 
 In conclusion, Lunesta was the most challenging case to analyze. The early 
Sepracor annual reports aligned with the logic of science but the tone and substance of 
the reports took a notable departure in 2005 towards the logic of commerce. What is 
interesting about this apparent shift in organizational strategy is that while there was a 
change in management as the founder and CEO retried in early 2007, Sepracor was 
subsequently acquired in 2009 by the Japanese firm Sumitomo Dainippon Pharma. This 
information suggests that the shift in tone aligning the company with the logic of 
commerce and presenting this change through tactics of pragmatic legitimacy could have 
been part of a broader organizational strategy to become an acquisition target. 
Furthermore, while the importance of scientific research was dominant in the majority of 
the letters, the organizational strategy of out-licensing also was mentioned frequently as a 
method of profitability, indicating the company was always pursuing a strategy of 




 Finally, toward the end of the annual reports in a legalese section on licensing 
agreements, is the information that the compound leading to Lunesta was in-licensed 
through a 1999 data package acquisition from Rhone-Poulenc Rorer SA. The exact intent 
of this acquisition is not stated but that Rhone-Poulenc Rorer SA received an out-license 
for a Sepracor developed product in return suggest the early company was focused more 
on research and development than commercialization, meaning they traded a developed 
compound for an undeveloped one with the intent of developing it in-house. In 
conclusion, Sepracor was originally a company aligned with the logic of science but 
between 2001 and 2007 its primary alignment shifted to the logic of commerce. The 
reason for this shift is unclear from the current data but the retirement of the founder 
indicates the change in organizational strategy could originate with the new management. 
6.6 Levemir (insulin detemir) and Novo Nordisk: Modifier Class 
 Levemir is a modern insulin for treating diabetes approved by the FDA on June 
16, 2005. The article by Hermansen and colleagues (2006) presented the data from a 26-
week clinical trial comparing Levemir to an existing insulin treatment also produced by 
Novo Nordisk. Two of the six authors of the study were Novo Nordisk employees. The 
treatment effects were reported as relative differences between the two products and the 
authors concluded the newer product, Levemir, offered a clinically important 
improvement over the existing the treatment option.  
 In addition to the scientific presentation of the data, the authors also discussed 
several aspects of patient care. Levemir patients in the trial experienced reduced 
hypoglycemic incidents and gained less weight; both of these outcomes were framed as 




trial protocols also made clear the authors’ concern for general patient safety and 
information on the individual investigators at the 58 research sites is provided in an 
online supplement, making this the most transparent journal article in the sample. 
Furthermore, seven patients who experienced adverse events during the trial, allergic 
reactions or injection site infections, were withdrawn from the study by the researchers. 
These actions indicate a strategy interested in demonstrating the moral legitimacy of the 
research by focusing on patient safety in addition to clinical efficacy and suggest Novo 
Nordisk’s organizational strategy aligns with the logic of care. A strategic focus on 
patient care is also evident within the annual corporate reports. 
 Strategic discussion in the earliest letter analyzed, 2002, focused primarily on the 
organizational structure of the company. The report framed the recent acquisition of a 
Brazilian company as being “able to make our product portfolio available to a greater part 
of the Brazilian diabetes community than in the past” (Novo Nordisk 2002:2). The term 
“diabetes community” rather than diabetes market and the statement on making the 
product portfolio available rather than expanding both indicate an organizational strategy 
aligned with the logic of care. An organizational focus on care is further supported by the 
discussion on care related strategies extending beyond the patient. The 2002 letter 
discussed a pilot study on corporate climate to evaluate company morale and the 2003 
letter reported the results of the first company wide survey showed overall high employee 
morale. While the other companies discussed employees, they focused on metrics such as 
leadership skill and industry accomplishments; the fact that the Novo Nordisk letters 
reported on corporate morale and took pride in the high results further indicates the 




 The corporate focus on care becomes stronger in the later annual reports. The 
2003 letter stated the executive management was requesting the board of directors alter 
the Articles of Association to “specify that the company, besides its financial purpose 
will strive to achieve its objectives in an environmentally and socially responsible way” 
(Novo Nordisk 2003:3). The inclusion of interest on the environment and social 
wellbeing beyond the commercial requirements of the company represents a tactic of 
moral legitimacy to support the broader organizational alignment with the logic of care 
that could be perceived as deviant by financial stakeholders. In 2004, defeating diabetes 
is stated as both the passion and business of the company while the leadership position of 
the company in the diabetes market is framed as being able to meet previously unmet 
medical needs. The organizational strategy to meet the demands of a competitive 
business environment is stated as a “long-term, holistic perspective” taking a “multi-
pronged approach to providing better access to health through capacity building, a 
preferential pricing policy for the poorest nations, and funding through the World 
Diabetes Foundation” (Novo Nordisk 2004:1). These tactics all reinforce an underlying 
strategy aligned with the logic of care. 
 The letter in 2005, the year Levemir was approved, demonstrated the strongest 
commitment yet to organizational strategies focused on patient care. The subtitle to the 
letter: “Poised for continued growth – but not at any cost” reinforced the company’s 
primary focus was on patient health and that strategies sacrificing patient health for 
commercial gain were not in the interest of the company. The title statement is explained 
as an ethical strategy for growth that includes corporate transparency and care for the 




stated that the increased profits from cost reduction measures were put back into research 
and development. The U.S. approval of Levemir is framed as good news for patients and 
physicians and only elsewhere in the annual report is it stated that the U.S. market is the 
world’s largest and most profitable market for diabetes treatments. 
 The 2006 letter restated some of the major strategies aligned with the logics of 
care: the goal of defeating diabetes, tackling environmental problems, and maintaining 
good employee morale. This letter departed from the earlier ones in how it highlighted 
the company’s philanthropy efforts. The 2006 letter opened with the story of a little girl 
diagnosed with diabetes and how her quest to raise awareness on the condition led to the 
initiation of the United Nations World Diabetes Day. The letter mentioned later that 
Novo Nordisk was a sponsor of the first World Diabetes Day. The 2006 letter also 
discussed the promotion of collaborative efforts to fight diabetes reiterating that the goal 
of defeating diabetes requires collaboration between health care stakeholders. The 
statement that collaboration is necessary is a distinctly different from an organizational 
strategy dominated by the logic of commerce that would view health care as a 
competition. 
 The 2007 letter again mentioned the company’s participation in World Diabetes 
Day and stated Novo Nordisk hosted the “first Global Changing Diabetes Leadership 
Forum in New York” (2007:3). The goal of defeating diabetes and the discussions on 
corporate philanthropy reveal Novo Nordisk primary interest was in improving the lives 
of patients. The final letter analyzed, 2008, continued to indicate the company’s 
alignment with the logic of care even though there was an increased focus on market 




to provide treatment to poor children, the 2008 letter also stated the need to make sure the 
global economic downturn does not impede access to care. 
 In conclusion, the data indicates the organizational strategy of Novo Nordisk 
aligns primarily with the logic of care. The company pursued organizational programs 
designed not only to address the medical needs of care for patients but also global 
environmental issues and internal employee morale. The introduction of Levemir 
highlighted the product as an improvement in patient health and discussed how the 
product was a step towards tailored care. The most important aspect of the logic of care 
revealed in the data is Novo Nordisk’s stated goal of defeating diabetes. Diabetes is a 
chronic condition with the potential for maximizing profits through a lifetime of 
treatment, but defeating diabetes would undermine the continued growth in profits for a 
company focused on diabetes treatments. The use of the term defeat orients the strategy 
around the treatment of disease rather than a market competition to expand product share. 
Further indicating Novo Nordisk dominant organizational strategy aligns with the logic 
of care is the recognition that defeating diabetes requires collaboration between health 
care stakeholders. 
6.7 Discussion: Evaluation of the Classes 
 The data show the pharmaceutical field of the United States is a field of 
institutional pluralism and that organizations within the field pursue organizational 
strategies aligned with different logic orders. The latent class analysis resulted in the 
emergence of two organizational subgroups within the sample, but the case studies reveal 
that while the organizations within these subgroups demonstrate alignments to different 




to the different logic orders. Conversely, within class similarities show that the 
quantitative assessments successfully identified latent constructs of organizational 
strategy that separate organizations within the field, which shows that the mixed-methods 
approach used in this project is a valuable addition to the research literature. 
 The theoretical propositions in Chapter 2 expected the different processes of 
institutional legitimacy to align with different logic orders but the data indicates that this 
is not the case. I observed tactics of cognitive legitimacy used most often to support 
strategies aligned with the dominant logic of the field, commerce. Theoretically, this 
makes sense because cognitive legitimacy comes from following expectations because 
deviation is unthinkable. Tactics of pragmatic legitimacy also aligned with the logic of 
commerce. While my original expectation that the alignment between pragmatic 
legitimacy and the logic of commerce was based on the logic of commerce defining self-
interested organizational strategies as appropriate, an alternate interpretation is that 
pursuing organizational practices aligned with the dominant logic of the field is a strategy 
of self-interest separate from the component of self-interest within the logic of 
commerce. Drawing from the general organizational theory literature, it is understood 
that organizations act in various ways to ensure survival; therefore, strategies aligned 
with the dominant logic of a field are a pragmatic method to meet this goal regardless of 
the dominant logic order within the field.  
 Drawing from the case study data, the clearest example of institutional effects on 
organizational strategy is seen by comparing Novo Nordisk to Johnson & Johnson. Both 
corporations used combative phrasing to describe the company’s central principles but 




health care” was directed at expanding the number of health care markets where the 
company occupied leadership positions. This strategy is a clear reflection of the logic of 
commerce because the competition is between Johnson & Johnson and other health care 
corporations for dominance within the market. Conversely, Novo Nordisk’s strategy of 
“beating diabetes” framed the competition as occurring between the corporation and the 
disease, reflecting the logic of care. Furthermore, while Novo Nordisk occupied a 
dominant position within the diabetes treatment market, the company explicitly noted that 
meeting the goal of defeating diabetes would require collaboration between stakeholders. 
Collaboration between stakeholders to reduce morbidity rates is an opposing strategy 
from that of the logic of commerce. 
 Another key example from these two case studies is the differences in 
organizational strategies on corporate philanthropy. While both organizations engaged in 
strategic philanthropy, Johnson & Johnson explicitly pursued philanthropic opportunities 
to commercialize and expand the company’s brand. For example, Johnson & Johnson 
legitimized sponsorship of the 2008 Beijing Olympics pragmatically as a way for the 
company to increase awareness in the Asia-Pacific region. On the other hand, Novo 
Nordisk legitimized sponsorship of the United Nations World Diabetes Day as spreading 
awareness about a specific health concern with brand awareness as a side note. The data 
on Johnson & Johnson and Novo Nordisk clearly show distinct dominant organizational 
strategies aligned with different logic orders. If these were the only case studies, then it 
would be appropriate to change the label of innovator class to commercial focused 
companies and modifier class to patient focused companies, but the other two case 




 Novartis and Sepracor were companies with conflicting internal alignments 
between logic orders. It is clear that Novartis is committed to maintaining health care 
within a commercial market system, aligning with the logic of commerce. Novartis’ 
organizational tactics of labeling criticism against the pharmaceutical industry as 
scapegoating and arguing against price controls by stating that innovation has a price are 
both strategies of cognitive legitimacy supporting the market model of health care. These 
statements also imply that Novartis is not acting primarily in a self-interested manner, for 
example engaging in price differentiation between markets is framed as following the 
rules of the game. This line of reasoning aligns with cognitive legitimacy, meaning that it 
is not just profits driving Novartis strategy but a cognitive constraint on seeing health 
care organizations as able to operate outside of a market system. On the other hand, 
Novartis also engaged in organizational practices for non-commercial reasons that align 
with the logic of care. 
 Novartis had extensive corporate philanthropy programs targeting underserved 
populations. While Johnson & Johnson’s strategy demonstrated corporate philanthropy 
within the pharmaceutical industry is just as susceptible to self-interested practices as in 
other industries (King 2006), it is clear that the Novartis programs were focused on 
providing access to medicine rather than expanding brand awareness. This is the root of 
the conflict in analyzing the Novartis data for institutional effects. On one hand, Novartis 
is upfront about pursuing strategies of profitability because this is the dominant 
expectation of the organizational field, but on the other hand, constantly highlighting 
non-profit charity work appears to be a tactic designed to counter industry critics by 




 Comparing Novartis with Novo Nordisk provides an alternative explanation for 
this conflicting interest. Both companies originate and are incorporated in Europe and 
both companies specifically discussed organizational strategies of corporate social 
responsibility and environmental sustainability, two topics that were absent in the 
Johnson & Johnson and Sepracor reports. What appears as tactics morally legitimizing 
practices related to the logic of care could actually be a reflection of different 
organizational expectations placed on European companies.  
 Cheah et al (2007) noted that within a sample of multinational corporations 
investor responses to corporate social responsibility varied because corporate social 
responsibility was normative in the United Kingdom but not in the United States. This 
research indicates that the data on corporate social responsibility and environmental 
sustainability practices for the two European companies in my sample may more 
accurately be a reflection of cognitive legitimacy based on the organizational 
expectations for European businesses. Reviewing the data again suggests that while 
Novartis is exceptional within the sample for its extensive access to medicine programs, 
some content classified as representative of the logic of care may more correctly align 
with the logic of commerce for European companies. Taking in to account all of the other 
examples of strategy aligned with the logic of commerce, it is correct to reinterpret 
commerce as Novartis’ dominant logic. Novo Nordisk, however, remains aligned with 
the logic of care due to the continued dominance of care related strategies after corporate 
social responsibility and environmental sustainability practices were recoded. 
 Sepracor was a complicated company to analyze for another reason. Sepracor 




Figure 6.2 shows the financial expense data for the four organizations in the sample. 
Sepracor is a clear outlier compared to the other three organizations. Research and 
development is the largest expense category during the first three years but then 
marketing and administrative expenses becomes the largest cost category. This change 
corresponds to the release of Lunesta, which the annual corporate reports note included a 
significant increase in sales personnel. In addition to the data in Figure 6.2, Sepracor was 
the only company that did not distribute dividends to shareholders. According to the 
annual corporate reports, the company policy was to reinvest income in the business and 
management did not anticipate ever paying dividends. This financial data reiterates that 
Sepracor originated as an organization aligned with the logic of science but this 
alignment shifted to the logic of commerce during the research period. 
 The data show Johnson & Johnson and Novartis both align with the logics of 
commerce, which the historical analysis in Chapter 4 shows is the current dominant logic 
of the organizational field. Rather than innovators, it seems more appropriate to relabel 
this organizational subgroup as the commercialization class. Novo Nordisk and Sepracor, 
however, are not aligned with the same institutional logic. There are two possible 
explanations for this. First, the small sample size could have prevented a three class 
solution in which Novo Nordisk and Sepracor would have been in different classes from 
being the best fit. A larger sample size may be able to detect differences within the 
modifier class that the current study was unable to identify. The second explanation is 
that the modifier organizations do actually have a homogenous organizational strategy in 
the sense that while these organizations do not share the same logic, they do align as 










Furthermore, Novo Nordisk and Sepracor both apply moral legitimacy tactics as support 
for their alternative organizational strategies. 
 Quirke’s (2013) research showed that rouge organizations can encompass 
multiple different organizational strategies deviating from the dominant logic of the field 
but all of the schools were oriented towards a common goal of educating students to meet 
the demands of living in an industrial economy. Specifically, Quirke noted all of schools 
pursued strategies that would lead to college. My data shows a similar effect since neither 
Sepracor nor Novo Nordisk deviated from the dominant field goal to develop commercial 
pharmaceutical products. Constructing alternate strategies that still meet the dominant 
expectations creates the possibility for internal conflict and results in a tenuous 
connection with the alternate logic as other stakeholders in the field evaluate the 
organization negatively for failing to meet the expectations of the dominant logic (Kraatz 
and Block 2008). However, the data indicates that both Sepracor and Novo Nordisk 
reduced the potential for conflict over alternative strategies by utilizing tactics of moral 
legitimacy to appeal to broader health related social concerns.  
 For example, in the Sepracor letters, statements about the company’s research 
strategy, especially on Lunesta, were legitimized as supporting the broad goal of 
increasing scientific knowledge. While research is expected to occur within a 
pharmaceutical company, the dominant expectation is that the company is down-stream 
working on commercializing the knowledge of scientific researchers rather than up-
stream generating knowledge (Cockburn 2004, Hess and Rothaermel 2011). Engaging in 
basic scientific research would be a deviation to other stakeholders because it is a 




moral legitimacy to support its research strategy by connecting the work to general social 
health through claims such as sleep being essential for good health and a productive 
society.  
 Novo Nordisk used statements of moral legitimacy to support organizational 
strategies that aligned with the logic of care also by appealing to broad social issues of 
health. The goal to defeat diabetes is legitimized explicitly through the size of the 
problem as affecting the functioning of society. In 2006, Novo Nordisk stated 10% of the 
world’s population had diabetes or the pre-stages of the disease, making it the largest 
health challenge of the century with the potential to increase public health spending and 
reduce productivity. This legitimizes the organizational strategy of defeating diabetes by 
appealing to the broad goal of maintaining a functioning society. 
 The modifier class then can be viewed as connected through the use of 
organizational strategies employing tactics of moral legitimacy to justify alternative 
organizational strategies and goals. This indicates that when organizations exist within a 
field of institutional pluralism, pursuing strategies that deviate from the dominant 
expectations require organizations to justify those practices through moral legitimacy by 
appealing to general social expectations outside of the field. Moralizers then is a more 
appropriate label than modifiers for this class of organizations. 
 Returning to the path dependency identified in the structural equation model, the 
case studies reveal a division within classes rather than between classes, Figure 6.3. 
Novartis and Novo Nordisk had more innovative approvals than alterations to current 
treatments while Johnson & Johnson and Sepracor had more alternation approvals than 




dependency observed in the Chapter 5, but the finding supports the re-labeling of the 
classes to commercialization and moralizers. At the same time, this data could be an 
artifact of the case study selection criteria that constrained the sample to organizations 
that received a new molecular entity approval. In summation, this data suggest that the 
path dependency is primarily an organizational level effect rather than a field level effect. 
 
Figure 6.3 Number of Approvals by Type During the Case Study Period 
 A question that emerged from the case studies is what affect does scope, in terms 
of diversity in an organization’s research portfolio, have on the class separation. The 
variable for firm size, number of employees, was not significantly different between the 
classes but the moralizer organizations in the case study are clearly smaller than the 
commercialization class. Furthermore, the letters to shareholders of the moralizers 
focused on few products while the commercialization class mentioned multiple products. 
Using a Herfindahl index8 to calculate the scope of organizational research in the total 
                                                          
8 The Herfindahl index ( 𝐻 =  ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1  ) is used to measure market concentration but Arora et al. (2009) 
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sample revealed that the mean portfolio of the commercialization class was more diverse 
than the moralizer class (0.38 to 0.63, p<0.000 in a two tailed t-test). 
 This finding adds another explanatory layer to the interpretation of the class 
separation, and suggests that successfully legitimizing an alternative organizational 
model may be dependent on the scope of the organizational portfolio. A focused portfolio 
may lend itself to tactics of moral legitimacy precisely because the few products can be 
clearly connected to an alternate external social values; Novo Nordisk presented diabetes 
as a global problem while Sepracor linked sleep deprivation to general well-being. Using 
moral legitimacy to support a diverse range of products requires a large organizational 
investment in identifying diverse social values because applying the same value to a 
range of products would increase the chance the alternate logic would be perceived as 
illegitimate. Conversely, alignment to a dominant logic within a field may lead an 
organization to expand its scope because the uncontested legitimacy may provide the 
necessary slack for experimentation in new product directions. 
 In summary, the case studies show qualitative differences in organizational 
structure and practices between the classes identified from the latent class analysis. The 
quantitative analyses suggested that the class separation was driven by a path dependency 
in the research process between pursuing innovative developments compared to seeking 
alterations to existing treatments, but the case studies show this differentiation is not an 
accurate interpretation. Rather than being the result of differences in research decisions, 
the case studies reveal that the differentiation of classes occurs between organizations 
that align with the dominant logic of the field and those that pursue alternative logics. Of 
                                                          





particular importance in the distinction between classes is the use of legitimacy tactics, 
whereby, organizations not aligned with the dominant logic seek to justify their deviation 
by aligning their strategies to a set of broader social values. 
6.8 Conclusion  
 While previous research has shown that institutional logics influence strategy 
within an organization (DiMaggio 1990, Powell and Sandholtz 2012), the results of this 
study indicate that this effect is attenuated at the field level. Specifically, when 
organizations in a field of institutional pluralism have a range of strategy options between 
different logic orders, the strongest effect is between strategies that align or deviate from 
the dominant logic of the field.  
 This study applied a finer grain definition of institutional logics in line with the 
previous work by Dunn and Jones (2010), Powell and Sandholtz (2012), and Scott et al. 
(2000) but the results suggest an alternative conceptualization of institutional logics in 
line with Thornton et al. (2012) as an alternative to assess institutional effects on 
organizations. Thornton et al.’s (2012) theory predicted a two class solution because the 
logics of science and health are not distinct logics but components within the logic of 
professions. My findings align with this broader conceptualization of institutional logics; 
however, I am hesitant to relabel the moralizers to professionals because the data shows a 
clear difference in organizational strategies between the two cases. Furthermore, the 
evidence also indicates science and care are distinct logics because they have both been 
identified as the dominant logic within in the pharmaceutical field and medicine in 





 The case studies add a richer understanding to the organizational dynamics within 
a field subject to institutional pluralism. These four case studies demonstrate that 
organizations are both aware of the dominant logic within the field and the other logics 
that shape the expectations of other stakeholders. Managerial attention is strategic in 
presenting the decisions and actions of corporations as institutionally legitimate. The 
findings show that institutional logics are not just internalized through organizational 
culture but form the frameworks corporations use for interorganizational actions. 
 In summation, the case studies demonstrated that managerial attention is 
structured by institutional logics. The dominant strategies of Sepracor and Novo Nordisk 
were not aligned with the dominant logic of the field, however, both corporations were 
aware that the logic of commerce structures the field and strategically supported actions 
aligned with alternative logics by appealing to other social goals rather than challenging 
the logic of commerce. At the same time, the data from Novartis and Johnson & Johnson 
shows these organization were aware that the logics of care and science are evaluation 
frameworks for other stakeholders in the field and utilized components of this logics to 
discuss certain strategies. In the end, while a corporation may have a dominant logic, 
organizational legitimacy under institutional pluralism requires that the company address 







7.1 Limitations and Future Directions 
 Data availability was the most significant limitation in this project. The variables 
in the dataset are operationalized as measures of organizational strategy but they do not 
represent the complete decision making process that occurs during drug development. 
This dataset also lacks information on drugs not approved or submitted to the FDA, so 
organizational strategies related to abandoning or discontinuing research are not 
analyzed. Finally, the data collected was aggregated at the organizational level that 
obscures internal dynamics of organizational practice. These limitations, however, are not 
unique to this project but a reality of conducting organizational research because detailed 
internal data is rarely publically available, especially the data needed to conduct an 
analysis at the field level.  
 Another limitation is the quality of the data sources themselves. In his recent 
work, Rob Kitchin (2014) discussed at length common problems for researchers using 
secondary datasets. Related specifically to this project, Kitchin (2014) noted using 
secondary data leaves the data management practices unknown to the researcher and 
means that the data collection process may not have focused on the information of 
interest. I found several errors in the FDA data that led me to suspect that while the 




inconsistent with this goal. The errors I found were incorrectly coded application 
companies. For example, the FDA listed Pfizer as the application company granted 
approval for Torisel on May 30, 2007 but the application for Torisel was actually 
submitted by Wyeth Pharmaceuticals. Pfizer acquired Wyeth Pharmaceuticals in 2009 at 
which point the sales and the intellectual property rights for Torisel transferred to Pfizer. 
This example suggests the FDA database is managed to identify the current manufacturer 
rather than the original manufacturer even though the description of the variable indicates 
otherwise. If this is the case, it would explain the declining rate of matching in the 
sample. However, while this a problem, it is not a problem unique to this study, and any 
research using the FDA database will be similarly biased. 
 The sampling criteria for constructing the quantitative dataset excluded 
companies that received less than five FDA approvals, which biases the data towards 
larger and established companies and creates the potential for selection bias. This is an 
important limitation to consider for interpreting the results because companies that 
challenge the dominant logic within an organizational field may have different outcomes 
than companies accepting the dominant logic but pursing strategies aligned with an 
alternate logic. Based on the data analyzed here, the pharmaceutical field in the United 
States is an organizational field where institutional pluralism exists and the dominant 
logic is unchallenged; both of the companies in the moralizer class demonstrated support 
for the pharmaceutical industry as a commercial industry.  
However, this could be a misinterpretation of institutional effects if the reason 
excluded companies failed to reach the minimum of five approvals was that they 




assess this possibility by shortening the period for collecting data to gather exhaustive 
data on all of the companies that received FDA approvals. This way companies that only 
received a few approvals would be included in the analysis and could be assed for 
organizational strategies that challenge the dominant logic of the field. If further research 
concludes that no challengers exist in the field, this would suggest a field of sustained 
institutional pluralism might only be possible when the organizational practice is 
institutionalized. Specifically, the pharmaceutical regime might allow organizations to 
pursue alternative strategies because the practice of pharmaceutical development is not 
contested whereas in organizational fields with contested practices, institutional pluralism 
might only exist during periods of field negotiation. 
The sparseness of the data limited the possibilities for the use of longitudinal 
analysis techniques. Longitudinal data allows for latent transition analysis and provides a 
richer interpretation of classes based on the prevalence of class switching (Collins and 
Lanza 2012). While there is no universally accepted sample size for a latent transition 
analysis, Collins and Lanza do not recommend researchers attempt the analysis with 
sample sizes smaller than 300. My sample size of 59 organizations is well below the 
recommended limit, making it methodologically questionable to conduct a latent 
transition analysis. 
My original intent for selecting the cases studies was to use the experience of a 
product-harm crisis as the selection criteria. A product-harm crisis9 creates a situation 
where stakeholder interaction related to diverging interests become more visible because 
                                                          
9 A product-harm crisis occurs following the revelation that a consumer good has a detrimental effect on 
consumers after its release on the general market. Product-harm crises are not isolated to the 




the situation is a direct challenge to product legitimacy and organizational reactions to 
this challenge should identify the dominant organizational strategy (Cheah et al. 2007). 
Based on previous research the expectations during a product-harm crisis are that 
pharmaceutical corporations act to counter the negative claims and perceptions of other 
stakeholders using a variety of organizational tactics to protect the established validity of 
a product in the face of contradictions from new data (Abraham 1995, Applbaum 2010). 
The most visible product-harm crises lead to the withdrawal of a drug from the market 
making it an ideal selection criterion because the entire product lifecycle would be 
observed. However, none of the drugs withdrawn from the market during the study 
period came from organizations in the modification class so new molecular entity 
approval was selected as the alternate criterion. 
A strength of this project is that the quantitative analyses provide a clear, 
empirical boundary for different organizational categories. The latent class analysis 
placed each organization in one, and only one, class. However, the quantitative methods 
are limited in capturing institutional logics by the data available and how organizational 
processes are reduced to measurable variables. A direction for future research to address 
this limitation is to increase the robustness of the dataset by including more information. 
Based on the literature review variables measuring in and out-licensing, research and 
financial alliances, percentage of income devoted to philanthropy, and occupational 
composition of employees would me valuable measure to include in the quantitative 
dataset. The case study analysis could also be expanded by including articles by 




analyzing organizational material directed at potential patients, such as advertisements 
and awareness campaigns.   
7.2 Conclusion 
The United States pharmaceutical industry is a dynamic organizational system 
populated by organizations pursuing different strategies to reach different goals. This 
project explored the broader organizational field of the pharmaceutical industry to 
determine if distinctive categories of pharmaceutical organizations existed by analyzing 
data for latent constructs identifying differences in organizational strategy. The data 
revealed two categories of organizations: commercialization firms and moralizers. The 
larger group, commercialization firms, contained organizations pursuing strategies 
aligned with the dominant logic of the field while moralizers were organizations pursing 
strategies aligned with different logic orders but connected through the use of moral 
legitimacy tactics to support deviant strategy. 
 This project contributes to the organizational studies literature through a novel 
approach to mixed-methods analysis for addressing the challenge institutional theorists’ 
face in measuring institutional effects. Rather than deriving institutional effects through 
qualitative techniques, this study applied latent class analysis to identity subgroups and 
then used content analysis to assess those subgroups for components of institutional 
orders. This project faced many of the challenges previous researchers have encountered 
when analyzing institutional effects but triangulation through quantitative and qualitative 
methods provided data that demonstrates institutional effects on organizational strategy. 
 While the generalizability of the findings is limited, this project shows sustained 




address differing stakeholder expectations complicate identifying an organizations 
dominant logic, but analyzing multiple sources revealed coherent organizational 
strategies aligned with defined institutional logic orders. The findings show that the effect 
of specific institutional logics is attenuated at the field level. Specifically, that direct field 
level institutional effects on organizational strategy occur as a pressure to align with the 
dominant logic of the field or to justify alternative strategies aligned with other logics 
through appeals to broader social concerns interconnected to the field. 
 However, the central conclusion of this project rest on the assumption that each 
organization has a dominant logic (Bettis and Prahalad 1995). This perspective is not the 
only argument on the outcome of institutional pluralism. The hybrid organization model 
offers an alternative explanation on how organizations handle competing logic orders 
(Battilana and Dorado 2010, Pache and Santos 2013). Hybrid organizations selectively 
couple with components from multiple logic orders that are present in the field but resist 
domination by a single logic. This process allows these organizations to address the 
contradictory demands of multiple stakeholders without decoupling practice from identity 
(Westphal and Zajac 2001) or compromising (Oliver 1991). 
 The case studies provide evidence supporting the existence of hybrid 
organizations within the pharmaceutical industry. While Johnson & Johnson and Novo 
Nordisk both portrayed organizations aligned clearly with a single logic order, Novartis 
and Sepracor presented organizational strategies entangled between logics. Following the 
propositions of this project, I empirically determined a dominant logic in both 
originations but I am not convinced that this model is the best explanation for these 




pluralism would have practices aligned with a single logic because sustained pluralism 
requires addressing competing legitimate alternative logics, but this does not mean that 
hybrid organizations could not coexists in a field where some organizations clearly align 
to a singular logic. However, the fact that Novartis and Sepracor belonged to different 
classes suggest that the effect of adopting a hybrid strategy has less impact than the 
division between the dominant field logic and alternatives. 
 This study provides several useful pieces of information for managers. First, the 
findings of the structural equation model challenge the existing advice on the value of 
developing alterations to current treatments. While the development of mediating drugs 
may shorten the timeframe for the development of innovative products, the path 
dependency found in the structural equation model indicates that managers need to be 
cautious in expecting that the spillover effect from mediating drugs will be realized 
internally. The findings from the case studies show that organizations can pursue 
strategies that deviate from the dominant logic within a field; however, managers need to 
legitimize this deviation by aligning with an alternative logic rather than challenge the 
dominant logic. 
 In summation, institutional logics affect organizational strategy by providing the 
templates for organizational practice and shaping the process of interorganizational 
negotiation. My findings show that pharmaceutical corporations in the United States 
adhere to two research path structures of defined as either innovation or alteration. At the 
same time, these corporations negotiate the competing demands of multiple stakeholders 
by either aligning with the dominant field logic or morally legitimizing their deviation 
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POISSON MODEL TEST OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT VARIABLES 
 New Molecular Entity Approvals 
Variable I II III 
Foreign 1.16  1.16  1.10  
Return on Assets 1.01  1.01  1.01  
Firm Size 0.96  0.96  0.99  
Non-Pharmaceutical SIC Code 1.10  1.09  1.01  
Number of Priority Review 
Approvals 
1.26 *** 1.26 *** 1.25 ** 
Number of Orphan Drug 
Approvals 
1.29 * 1.29 * 1.24  
Marketing and Administrative 
Expense Rate 
0.96  1.03  0.98  
Operational Costs Rate 0.38  0.48  0.34  
Merger and Acquisition Approval 
Rate 
0.79  0.83  0.53  
Subsidiary Approval Rate 0.92  0.93  0.84  
PDUFA Period (1997-2001 
comparison period) 
      
   2002-2006 0.93  0.92  1.01 * 
   2007-2011 1.01  0.99  1.11  
   2012-2014 1.45  1.40  1.63  
       
R&D Expenses Rate 1.31      
2 Year lagged R&D Expenses 
Rate 
  2.77    
3 Year lagged R&D Expenses 
Rate 
    1.38  
       
Log likelihood -389.11 *** -388.15 *** -345.85 ** 
Pseudo R2 0.0463  0.0486 0.0442 
Observations 437.00  437.00  398.00 
notes: incidence rate ratios reported, total number of submissions used as exposure factor, 







POISSON MODEL TEST OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT VARIABLES 
 Biologic License Application Approvals 
Variable I II III 
Foreign 1.01  0.97  0.95  
Return on Assets 0.98  0.99  0.99  
Firm Size 1.77 ** 1.65 ** 1.58 ** 
Non-Pharmaceutical SIC Code 2.88 * 2.66 * 2.66 * 
Number of Priority Review 
Approvals 
0.55 * 0.58 * 0.56 * 
Number of Orphan Drug 
Approvals 
1.16  1.06  1.10  
Marketing and Administrative 
Expense Rate 
0.39  0.07  0.08  
Operational Costs Rate 0.02 * 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 
Merger and Acquisition 
Approval Rate 
0.40  0.30  0.39  
Subsidiary Approval Rate 1.19  1.19  1.24  
PDUFA Period (1997-2001 
comparison period) 
      
   2002-2006 1.67  1.67  1.26  
   2007-2011 1.80  1.86  1.35  
   2012-2014 4.02 ** 3.97 ** 2.66  
       
R&D Expenses Rate 259.17 **     
2 Year lagged R&D Expenses 
Rate 
  42.48 **   
3 Year lagged R&D Expenses 
Rate 
    65.29 ** 
       
Log likelihood -144.88 *** -145.44 *** -142.98 *** 
Pseudo R2 0.1600  0.1568  0.1455  
Observations 437.00  437.00  398.00  
notes: incidence rate ratios reported, total number of submissions used as exposure factor, 
*=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001 
 
